The case involved Francoise Gomis's petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying her claim for protection from removal to Senegal based on her fear of female genital mutilation. The Fourth Circuit panel denied the petition, and a poll for en banc rehearing failed because a majority of active judges did not vote to rehear. The court reasoned that it must defer to the immigration judge's factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise, and here the judge had relied on State Department reports indicating the practice was declining and rare in Dakar, where Gomis had lived, rather than her contrary opinion. The court also distinguished its prior decision in Haoua v. Gonzales, which involved different facts from another country.
The case concerned Dwight Whorley’s convictions on multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1462 for sending and receiving textual emails that described sexual fantasies involving children and that a jury determined were obscene. The Fourth Circuit panel upheld the convictions, and after a poll of active judges the court denied both rehearing and rehearing en banc. The opinion supporting denial reasoned that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity in any form, including purely textual descriptions of imagined conduct, and that the convictions therefore stand under existing Supreme Court precedent such as Miller v. California. The dissenting opinion contended that the emails involved only private, non-commercial communications of personal fantasies between consenting adults with no real children or victims, and urged extension of Stanley v. Georgia protections to such electronic messages.
The case involved three female victims of sexual assaults who sued the mayors and city councils of Pocomoke City and Ocean City, Maryland, as well as the State’s Attorney for Worcester County, alleging that police failed to adequately investigate their cases and the prosecutor refused to pursue charges due to a discriminatory policy against women aimed at protecting Ocean City's reputation as a resort. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection violations, plus additional counts for discriminatory prosecution and false imprisonment. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because private citizens have no constitutional, statutory, or common-law right to compel government investigations or prosecutions, which are discretionary functions enforceable only through public means like elections. It also held that the State’s Attorney enjoyed absolute immunity for prosecutorial decisions, and it declined pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim.
The case concerns an ERISA lawsuit filed by NARDA, Inc. and two plan beneficiaries against multiple service providers to an employee benefit plan that provided medical, life, and related benefits to association members; the plan became insolvent by 1986 with over $2 million in unpaid claims, leading to termination in 1987, and the complaint alleged mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty. The district court ruled on various motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, denying dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granting summary judgment to the Rhode Island Bank on fiduciary claims while denying similar relief to other defendants, granting summary judgment dismissing the indemnification claim, and denying summary judgment on prohibited transaction claims due to disputed facts. The core reasoning addressed whether extending benefits to non-beneficiaries stripped the plan of ERISA status, the fiduciary status of the defendants based on their roles, whether ERISA permits contribution or indemnification among fiduciaries, and whether specific fee and advance transactions violated ERISA prohibitions.
In United States v. Peralta, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and using a handgun during a drug felony, each carrying mandatory minimum sentences. The government moved for a downward departure from the drug minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based on the defendant's substantial assistance, but the defendant also sought further departure due to extraordinary family circumstances and emotional state after his wife and two children were murdered while he was incarcerated. The court held that once the government moves for departure below a statutory minimum on substantial-assistance grounds, the court may consider only factors related to that assistance and may not examine unrelated grounds such as family hardship. The core reasoning was that the statute's limited exception for substantial assistance does not open the door to other Sentencing Guidelines factors, and the Commission lacks authority to expand that statutory limit.
In Eden v. Amoco Oil Co., Inc., a franchisee sued his former franchisor under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act after Amoco refused to renew the gasoline station agreement, leading to his termination; a jury awarded $104,000 in damages. The court addressed post-trial motions for exemplary damages and prejudgment interest. It denied exemplary damages, holding that the PMPA requires proof of willful disregard shown by consciousness of wrongdoing or reckless disregard of the statute's requirements, a standard not met here. It also denied prejudgment interest because that element of damages must be presented to and decided by the jury as factfinder, not added by the court after the verdict.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Affiliations
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit — appointed by George H.W. Bush
District Court, D. Maryland — appointed by Ronald Reagan