Paul Victor Niemeyer

The case involved Francoise Gomis's petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying her claim for protection from removal to Senegal based on her fear of female genital mutilation. The Fourth Circuit panel denied the petition, and a poll for en banc rehearing failed because a majority of active judges did not vote to rehear. The court reasoned that it must defer to the immigration judge's factual findings unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise, and here the judge had relied on State Department reports indicating the practice was declining and rare in Dakar, where Gomis had lived, rather than her contrary opinion. The court also distinguished its prior decision in Haoua v. Gonzales, which involved different facts from another country.

immigration

The case concerned Dwight Whorley’s convictions on multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1462 for sending and receiving textual emails that described sexual fantasies involving children and that a jury determined were obscene. The Fourth Circuit panel upheld the convictions, and after a poll of active judges the court denied both rehearing and rehearing en banc. The opinion supporting denial reasoned that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity in any form, including purely textual descriptions of imagined conduct, and that the convictions therefore stand under existing Supreme Court precedent such as Miller v. California. The dissenting opinion contended that the emails involved only private, non-commercial communications of personal fantasies between consenting adults with no real children or victims, and urged extension of Stanley v. Georgia protections to such electronic messages.

free speechcriminal law

The case involved three female victims of sexual assaults who sued the mayors and city councils of Pocomoke City and Ocean City, Maryland, as well as the State’s Attorney for Worcester County, alleging that police failed to adequately investigate their cases and the prosecutor refused to pursue charges due to a discriminatory policy against women aimed at protecting Ocean City's reputation as a resort. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection violations, plus additional counts for discriminatory prosecution and false imprisonment. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because private citizens have no constitutional, statutory, or common-law right to compel government investigations or prosecutions, which are discretionary functions enforceable only through public means like elections. It also held that the State’s Attorney enjoyed absolute immunity for prosecutorial decisions, and it declined pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerns an ERISA lawsuit filed by NARDA, Inc. and two plan beneficiaries against multiple service providers to an employee benefit plan that provided medical, life, and related benefits to association members; the plan became insolvent by 1986 with over $2 million in unpaid claims, leading to termination in 1987, and the complaint alleged mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty. The district court ruled on various motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, denying dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, granting summary judgment to the Rhode Island Bank on fiduciary claims while denying similar relief to other defendants, granting summary judgment dismissing the indemnification claim, and denying summary judgment on prohibited transaction claims due to disputed facts. The core reasoning addressed whether extending benefits to non-beneficiaries stripped the plan of ERISA status, the fiduciary status of the defendants based on their roles, whether ERISA permits contribution or indemnification among fiduciaries, and whether specific fee and advance transactions violated ERISA prohibitions.

labor & employmenthealthcarebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Peralta, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and using a handgun during a drug felony, each carrying mandatory minimum sentences. The government moved for a downward departure from the drug minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based on the defendant's substantial assistance, but the defendant also sought further departure due to extraordinary family circumstances and emotional state after his wife and two children were murdered while he was incarcerated. The court held that once the government moves for departure below a statutory minimum on substantial-assistance grounds, the court may consider only factors related to that assistance and may not examine unrelated grounds such as family hardship. The core reasoning was that the statute's limited exception for substantial assistance does not open the door to other Sentencing Guidelines factors, and the Commission lacks authority to expand that statutory limit.

criminal lawprocedure

In Eden v. Amoco Oil Co., Inc., a franchisee sued his former franchisor under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act after Amoco refused to renew the gasoline station agreement, leading to his termination; a jury awarded $104,000 in damages. The court addressed post-trial motions for exemplary damages and prejudgment interest. It denied exemplary damages, holding that the PMPA requires proof of willful disregard shown by consciousness of wrongdoing or reckless disregard of the statute's requirements, a standard not met here. It also denied prejudgment interest because that element of damages must be presented to and decided by the jury as factfinder, not added by the court after the verdict.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendants Neil Steinhorn and Eugene Petasky, who were charged with conspiring to transport stolen gold jewelry in interstate commerce as well as related money laundering violations. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the government's undercover sting operation lacked reasonable suspicion, was motivated by unrelated public corruption investigations, and amounted to outrageous conduct violating due process; Petasky also sought severance of his trial. The court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that due process imposes no reasonable-suspicion prerequisite on sting operations and that the government's actions did not rise to the level of outrageous conduct barred by Supreme Court precedent. The court likewise denied severance, finding no Bruton confrontation-clause violation or sufficient prejudice from joinder in a conspiracy case.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, Ronald Ford, an Amtrak police officer, sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained while pursuing a suspect in 1985. Amtrak moved in limine to exclude evidence of medical bills it had already paid through Group Policy GA-23000, arguing the payments were not from a collateral source and should not be recovered again. Ford opposed the motion, claiming the policy was a fringe benefit subject to the collateral source rule, which would allow the evidence. The court granted the motion and excluded the evidence, reasoning that the 1975 collective bargaining agreement between railroads and unions explicitly intended the policy payments to satisfy Amtrak's FELA obligations rather than serve as an additional benefit, and that admitting the amounts would risk jury confusion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment

In this case, three employees sued Champion Spark Plug Company under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging their terminations were based on age and seeking back pay, liquidated damages for willful violations, and equitable remedies including reinstatement or front pay. Following a jury trial that awarded back pay (including prejudgment interest) and found willfulness, the court conducted an equitable proceeding to address reinstatement and front pay. The court ordered reinstatement for one plaintiff with adjustments to salary and benefits, front pay for another, and money judgments for all three (including for the estate of the deceased plaintiff), while adjusting the awards to remove prejudgment interest and double the amounts for liquidated damages based on binding Fourth Circuit precedent. The core reasoning centered on separating legal issues for the jury from equitable remedies reserved for the court and applying statutory remedies under the ADEA while adhering to circuit law on interest and damages.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved railroad employees suing their union, the Transportation Communications International Union (TCU), over the use of dues for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining and the procedures for dues reductions under an agency shop arrangement authorized by the Railway Labor Act. Plaintiff Kathryn Kidwell, a union member, objected to her dues funding political or ideological activities, while non-member plaintiffs challenged the union's accounting and refund methods. The court ruled that the union must provide Kidwell and similar union members the same dues reductions as non-members for such expenditures, as required by the Railway Labor Act and First Amendment protections, but rejected the nonunion plaintiffs' challenges to the procedures, finding them adequate or moot. The decision was based on Supreme Court precedents interpreting union shop provisions and the duty of fair representation.

labor & employmentfree speech

This case involved plaintiffs who obtained a multimillion-dollar Florida state court judgment against Blue Cross for common-law claims arising from delayed payments under a health insurance policy, which Blue Cross then sought to enforce in Maryland state court. Blue Cross removed the enforcement action to federal court and moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that ERISA preempted the state claims and deprived the Florida court of authority to enter it. The Weiners moved to remand, contending that proceedings to enforce a judgment are not removable. The court denied both the motion to remand and the motion to vacate, holding that a collateral attack on the Florida judgment was improper because the ERISA preemption defense had been available during the original proceedings and on appeal, and principles of res judicata required giving effect to the state court judgment.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

The case involved 78 firefighter employees of Howard County, Maryland, who sued the county alleging that its method of averaging straight time and overtime wages in bi-weekly paychecks from 1986 to 1988 violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The firefighters argued that this averaging caused a temporary shortfall in overtime payments and loss of interest, even though totals matched over the 21-day work periods. Howard County defended its pay plan, which was based on collective bargaining and paid expected averages, sometimes resulting in overpayments. The court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding that the FLSA permits such averaging within the work period as long as full compensation is provided promptly after the period closes, with no violation occurring here.

labor & employment

This case concerned whether Maryland's slayer's rule barred a husband who killed his wife from receiving proceeds under her federal employee life insurance policy, where he had been designated as the primary beneficiary. The court granted summary judgment to the wife's mother, awarding her the full policy proceeds, after finding that the husband had feloniously and intentionally killed his wife based on his guilty plea, sentencing transcript, and admissions in the record. The reasoning relied on Maryland precedent such as Ford v. Ford and Chase v. Jenifer, which apply equitable principles preventing a killer from profiting from the victim's estate or life insurance, and confirmed that the rule extends to insurance policies as well as wills. The court rejected the husband's arguments that the killing was unintentional or that the rule did not apply to insurance proceeds.

criminal lawproperty

This case arose from 53 plaintiffs' purchase of leasehold interests in lithographic printing plates for stamps as a tax shelter investment, promoted through a complex scheme involving nonrecourse notes and inflated valuations; after the IRS denied the expected tax credits and deductions, plaintiffs sued 17 defendants for RICO violations and state-law claims including misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and malpractice. The court addressed numerous motions to dismiss on grounds including lack of personal jurisdiction, statutes of limitations, failure to state a claim, and improper service of process. It granted most motions and dismissed the RICO claim and many other counts against the majority of defendants, while denying dismissal of the malpractice claim against Friedman and Shaftan and the breach-of-contract claim against International Collectors Guild and Dell; the action against Philatelic was stayed due to bankruptcy. Core reasoning centered on plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead or establish necessary elements for the federal claims and certain state claims, combined with procedural deficiencies such as insufficient service.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this product liability case, Daniel Singleton sued crane manufacturer Manitowoc after losing four fingers when his hand was caught between a rotating crane superstructure and an external toolbox during operation at a construction site, claiming strict liability and negligence based on an alleged design defect creating a blind spot and failure to warn. The district court granted summary judgment to the manufacturer. The court reasoned that the crane, sold in 1966 without mirrors or warnings about external toolboxes (added later by others), was not defective or negligently designed under standards at the time, as no industry requirement or manufacturer practice existed for mirrors to eliminate such blind spots. The court further held that Singleton was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, having crossed into a taped-off danger zone around the operating crane despite his training, safety meetings, and admitted awareness of the risks.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Benard v. Hoff, the plaintiff alleged that after being hired to develop software for one-call utility notification systems and later discharged without receiving promised ownership in the company, the defendants fraudulently obtained and used his proprietary program, supporting claims under RICO sections 1962(a), (b), and (c) along with various state-law counts. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO counts. It held that the complaint adequately alleged the required relationship between defendants and an enterprise, either OCC alone or an association-in-fact including Hoff, OCC, and another individual. However, the alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud did not form a RICO pattern because they constituted a single scheme directed at one victim to acquire specific intellectual property, without facts showing a threat of ongoing or repeated conduct.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose when Baltimore Luggage sought a declaratory judgment that its new molded luggage line did not infringe Samsonite's trademarks and raised related antitrust and unfair competition claims, while Samsonite filed counterclaims and a parallel proceeding before the International Trade Commission alleging violations of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 based on the same trademark issues. The ITC determined that Samsonite lacked enforceable trademark rights because the design was functional, non-distinctive, and without secondary meaning, and it rejected Baltimore Luggage's antitrust and unclean hands defenses. The district court addressed whether those ITC rulings should be given preclusive effect under res judicata or collateral estoppel. The court granted Samsonite's motion for summary judgment on the antitrust and unfair competition counts of the complaint, concluding that the ITC determinations barred relitigation of those issues, but denied dismissal of the declaratory judgment count on trademarks. It also lifted a prior stay and scheduled further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Gussin v. Shockey, the plaintiffs entered an oral agency agreement with defendant Richard Shockey to manage the purchase, care, breeding, and sale of thoroughbred horses, under which Shockey was to receive five percent of net profits from sales. The Gussins later discovered that Shockey had negotiated secret kickbacks from sellers totaling $575,000 without disclosure, leading them to sue for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil RICO violations. The court granted partial summary judgment on liability and damages for the full amount of the kickbacks identified, dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for compensation, and dismissed remaining unproven claims. The decision rested on undisputed evidence that Shockey acted as the Gussins' agent and violated core duties of loyalty, disclosure, and avoidance of self-dealing or conflicts of interest under Maryland agency law, rendering him ineligible for any compensation.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Chace v. Champion Spark Plug Co., plaintiffs sued their former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) after being selected for termination during a workforce reduction, alleging age-based discrimination and seeking remedies including reinstatement, back pay, liquidated damages, and front pay for future lost earnings. Defendant Champion moved in limine to bar evidence of front pay at trial, arguing it was unavailable or speculative under the ADEA, and to exclude evidence of prejudgment interest when liquidated damages were also sought. The court denied the motion to exclude front pay evidence and ruled that it could be presented to the jury, reasoning that the ADEA permits flexible equitable remedies, including front pay when reinstatement is impracticable. On prejudgment interest, the court denied the motion to bar the evidence outright but required plaintiffs to prove it separately so the court could decide later whether it should be awarded alongside liquidated damages, consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent and recent Supreme Court guidance on the punitive nature of such damages.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved the widow and daughter of a federal employee who was exposed to anthrax bacteria at a government facility in 1955, leading to health problems and his death in 1985. They sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, barring FTCA claims even when intentional conduct is alleged. The court reasoned that the exclusivity provision of FECA applies to all liability, and the facts did not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityfederal power