David Frank Hamilton

The case concerned an appeal by plaintiff Laura Revolinsky challenging the district court’s denial of her attorneys’ request for additional fees from a $15 million class settlement in multidistrict litigation over the marketing and safety of Seresto flea and tick collars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Revolinsky’s separate post-settlement motion seeking compensation for pre-MDL work and untimely reported time and expenses. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion by enforcing its earlier Case Management Order No. 4, which required Class Counsel’s advance approval for compensable work, monthly time submissions, and generally limited recovery to post-leadership-appointment efforts unless Class Counsel exercised discretion to include earlier common-benefit time. Revolinsky’s attorneys had received notice of these rules, did not object to them or to the fee application that excluded the disputed time, and filed their motion well after the deadlines for objections to the fee award had passed. The court noted that any reallocation would necessarily reduce payments to other firms from the fixed fee pool, and it distinguished the unchallenged total fee award from the internal allocation dispute among plaintiffs’ counsel.

procedure

The case concerned an appeal by plaintiff Laura Revolinsky challenging the district court’s denial of her attorneys’ request for additional fees from a $15 million class settlement in multidistrict litigation over the marketing and safety of Seresto flea and tick collars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Revolinsky’s separate post-settlement motion seeking compensation for pre-MDL work and untimely reported time and expenses. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion by enforcing its earlier Case Management Order No. 4, which required Class Counsel’s advance approval for compensable work, monthly time submissions, and generally limited recovery to post-leadership-appointment efforts unless Class Counsel exercised discretion to include earlier common-benefit time. Revolinsky’s attorneys had received notice of these rules, did not object to them or to the fee application that excluded the disputed time, and filed their motion well after the deadlines for objections to the fee award had passed. The court noted that any reallocation would necessarily reduce payments to other firms from the fixed fee pool, and it distinguished the unchallenged total fee award from the internal allocation dispute among plaintiffs’ counsel.

procedure

The case concerned a dispute between employer Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States multiemployer pension plan over Penske’s withdrawal liability. Penske had aligned the expiration dates of multiple collective bargaining agreements to potentially reduce its liability by tens of millions of dollars; in response, the plan’s trustees voted to expel one bargaining unit (Local 745) unless Penske agreed to treat any 2022 withdrawal as occurring in 2021. Penske sued to block the expulsion, while the plan counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment on the withdrawal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings that the trustees had authority under the Trust Agreement to expel the unit, that their decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the counterclaim must first proceed to arbitration under 29 U.S.C. § 1401 before federal court review. The court applied deferential review to the trustees’ reasonable interpretation of the agreement and held that the statute requires arbitration of withdrawal liability disputes prior to judicial resolution.

labor & employmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between employer Penske Truck Leasing and the Central States multiemployer pension plan over withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act. Penske aligned the expiration dates of its collective bargaining agreements with multiple unions to trigger a single complete withdrawal (rather than partial withdrawals plus a complete one), potentially saving tens of millions of dollars; the plan responded by threatening to expel one bargaining unit (Local 745) unless Penske agreed to treat any 2022 withdrawal as occurring in 2021, prompting Penske to sue for an injunction and the plan to counterclaim for a declaratory judgment on the withdrawal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plan on Penske’s claims and its dismissal of the counterclaim. It held that the plan’s Trust Agreement granted trustees discretionary authority to interpret its terms and to expel a participating employer or group when their arrangements threatened economic harm or actuarial soundness, that the trustees’ decision to expel Local 745 was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious, and that the counterclaim concerning the precise withdrawal date must first proceed to arbitration under 29 U.S.C. § 1401 before federal court review.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In United States v. McKay, defendant Dennis McKay appealed one condition of his supervised release after pleading guilty to Hobbs Act robberies and a firearm offense. The condition (Special Condition 13) allowed a probation officer to require McKay to notify third parties if the officer determined he posed a "risk" to them, including details of his criminal history. The Seventh Circuit held that McKay had not waived the challenge, because his counsel's statement at sentencing—when the district court specifically asked about the condition—constituted a sufficient objection that preserved the issue, and Yee v. City of Escondido permits new legal arguments supporting a preserved claim on appeal. The court then vacated the condition and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that its undefined terms rendered it impermissibly vague under circuit precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

In Nikko D'Ambrosio v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the plaintiff sued Meta, a woman he briefly dated and her parents, and the operators of a large Facebook group for women discussing Chicago-area dates, alleging that posts sharing his photos along with comments about his clingy behavior and a vulgar text he sent after a breakup violated the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Doxing Act, and other state-law claims for defamation and privacy invasion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). It held that the posts did not use D'Ambrosio's likeness for a commercial purpose under the IRPA, that the allegations failed to meet the Doxing Act's requirements of intent or reckless disregard of likely severe harm such as stalking or bodily injury, and that the remaining claims were not plausibly pled. The court separately ordered D'Ambrosio and his counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for pursuing a frivolous appeal against the ex-girlfriend and her parents and for filing a brief containing fictitious quotations and citations.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

Tire Town Auto LLC, a towing company, sued Wood County, Wisconsin, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the county removed it from a rotating list of approved towing services following complaints about employee conduct and overcharging. The company alleged that the removal violated its Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Tire Town failed to plausibly allege a protected property interest in remaining on the list, as the county’s Minimum Standards policy expressly disclaimed any contractual obligation, imposed no statutory or regulatory entitlement, and allowed removal “at any time for any appropriate reason,” leaving the county with broad discretion. Without such an interest, no due process protections applied.

civil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

In this case, a former University of Southern Indiana student sued the school and officials under Title IX, alleging sex discrimination and due process violations after a campus hearing found him responsible for sexual assault and suspended him for three semesters. He appealed the district court's denial of his request to continue litigating under the pseudonym "John Doe," which had been used in the university proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order requiring him to use his real name, holding that federal courts apply a strong presumption in favor of public disclosure of adult parties' identities. The court reasoned that this presumption applies even in sensitive Title IX matters and rejected arguments that would tie the pseudonym decision to the underlying merits, such as alleged evidence issues or the hearing outcome, because such rulings must be made early and independently of case merits. The plaintiff was given the option to dismiss the appeals to avoid public disclosure of his name.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, a former University of Southern Indiana student sued the school and officials under Title IX, alleging sex discrimination and due process violations after a campus hearing found him responsible for sexual assault and suspended him for three semesters. He appealed the district court's denial of his request to continue litigating under the pseudonym "John Doe," which had been used in the university proceedings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order requiring him to use his real name, holding that federal courts apply a strong presumption in favor of public disclosure of adult parties' identities. The court reasoned that this presumption applies even in sensitive Title IX matters and rejected arguments that would tie the pseudonym decision to the underlying merits, such as alleged evidence issues or the hearing outcome, because such rulings must be made early and independently of case merits. The plaintiff was given the option to dismiss the appeals to avoid public disclosure of his name.

civil rightsprocedure

In Andrea Nielsen v. Todd Sexton and Margaret Burke, an inmate at an Illinois women’s prison sued a counselor who repeatedly sexually assaulted her, along with the prison’s investigator and warden, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her Eighth Amendment rights. After learning of the assaults from a credible report, the investigator and warden devised a plan to use Nielsen as unwitting “bait” rather than immediately protecting her; the plan failed, and the assaults continued. A jury found all three defendants liable and awarded Nielsen $19.3 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed liability and the denial of qualified immunity against the investigator and warden, holding that the evidence supported a finding of deliberate indifference after the report and that no reasonable official could have viewed their conduct as proper. The court reversed in part and ordered a new trial limited to compensatory and punitive damages, however, because the jury lacked evidence of liability for pre-report conduct, excluded evidence was not harmless as to damages, and the district court should have required a special interrogatory pinpointing when deliberate indifference began.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, inmate Andrea Nielsen sued prison counselor Richard MacLeod and officials Todd Sexton and Warden Margaret Burke under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights after MacLeod repeatedly sexually assaulted her and the officials, upon learning of the abuse via a credible report, responded by using Nielsen as unwitting “bait” in a failed sting operation rather than protecting her. A jury found all defendants liable and awarded Nielsen $19.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the liability findings against Sexton and Burke, as well as the denial of qualified immunity, because sufficient evidence showed their deliberate indifference after receiving the report and no reasonable official could have viewed their bait plan as proper. However, the court reversed in part and ordered a new trial limited to compensatory and punitive damages against Sexton and Burke, holding that the jury lacked evidence to impose liability for pre-report conduct, the exclusion of certain evidence was not harmless as to damages, and the district court erred by not requiring a special interrogatory on the precise timing of the officials’ deliberate indifference to distinguish between Nielsen’s two theories of damages. The court also vacated the attorney fee award for reconsideration after the new damages trial, while leaving the judgment against MacLeod (who defaulted and did not appeal) undisturbed.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In this case, inmate Andrea Nielsen sued prison counselor Richard MacLeod and officials Todd Sexton and Warden Margaret Burke under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights after MacLeod repeatedly sexually assaulted her and the officials, upon learning of the abuse via a credible report, responded by using Nielsen as unwitting “bait” in a failed sting operation rather than protecting her. A jury found all defendants liable and awarded Nielsen $19.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the liability findings against Sexton and Burke, as well as the denial of qualified immunity, because sufficient evidence showed their deliberate indifference after receiving the report and no reasonable official could have viewed their bait plan as proper. However, the court reversed in part and ordered a new trial limited to compensatory and punitive damages against Sexton and Burke, holding that the jury lacked evidence to impose liability for pre-report conduct, the exclusion of certain evidence was not harmless as to damages, and the district court erred by not requiring a special interrogatory on the precise timing of the officials’ deliberate indifference to distinguish between Nielsen’s two theories of damages. The court also vacated the attorney fee award for reconsideration after the new damages trial, while leaving the judgment against MacLeod (who defaulted and did not appeal) undisturbed.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Andrea Nielsen v. Todd Sexton and Margaret Burke, an inmate at an Illinois women’s prison sued a counselor who repeatedly sexually assaulted her, along with the prison’s investigator and warden, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her Eighth Amendment rights. After learning of the assaults from a credible report, the investigator and warden devised a plan to use Nielsen as unwitting “bait” rather than immediately protecting her; the plan failed, and the assaults continued. A jury found all three defendants liable and awarded Nielsen $19.3 million in damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed liability and the denial of qualified immunity against the investigator and warden, holding that the evidence supported a finding of deliberate indifference after the report and that no reasonable official could have viewed their conduct as proper. The court reversed in part and ordered a new trial limited to compensatory and punitive damages, however, because the jury lacked evidence of liability for pre-report conduct, excluded evidence was not harmless as to damages, and the district court should have required a special interrogatory pinpointing when deliberate indifference began.

civil rightsprocedure

This case arose from the broader Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, in which Carina Ventures LLC (as successor to plaintiff Sysco) sued Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation for alleged price-fixing; the specific dispute concerned whether the parties’ negotiations had produced a binding $50 million settlement releasing Carina’s claims in that case and two related antitrust matters. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment enforcing the settlement. The court held that the parties’ exchange ending with an email stating “We accept” did not create an enforceable contract because several terms the parties themselves treated as material—including conditions tied to a separate Judgment Sharing Agreement among defendants and the scope of releases—remained open and directly affected the settlement’s value. Under Seventh Circuit precedent, an agreement in principle for an executory contract like this one is not binding when material terms are left for future negotiation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Rebekah Hillman lost her left leg below the knee in a 2020 accident on a Toro Timecutter zero-radius-turn riding mower when the machine rolled uncontrollably down a slope after the bypass pins were left engaged, disabling the hydrostatic braking system. She and her family sued Toro in federal court, claiming the mower was defectively designed for lacking an independent mechanical brake, a rollover protection system, and an interlock to prevent starting with the bypass pins in. The district court excluded all of the plaintiffs’ expert evidence as unreliable or irrelevant and granted Toro summary judgment. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion of most expert testimony and the dismissal of the rollover and interlock claims, but reversed summary judgment on the strict liability and negligent design claims based on the missing independent brake. The court held that one expert’s unchallenged opinions on that feature were reliable and relevant, creating genuine factual disputes about defect, causation, and the feasibility of an alternative design that must be resolved at trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

Fayez Dahleh bought an existing flexible-premium universal life insurance policy on the life of Gilda Perlas, a person with whom he had no prior relationship, and kept the policy in force by making late payments during repeated 61-day grace periods triggered when the policy’s accumulation value fell short of monthly charges. In February 2022 he missed a payment before a grace period ended, and Minnesota Life canceled the policy. Dahleh sued, claiming the insurer was required to give statutory notice and a longer grace period under 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/234 before terminating coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to Minnesota Life, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the policy’s required monthly charges were payable at monthly intervals, placing it within the statutory exemption from those notice and grace-period rules, and that the insurer therefore validly terminated the policy for nonpayment.

business & regulatory

In Abre Jackson v. Marc Anastasio, an Illinois prisoner sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his placement in disciplinary segregation for three months following a physical altercation with guards and a prison hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, because he was not allowed to call witnesses or view video evidence. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from damages even if Jackson’s evidence of the solitary confinement conditions—combined with its three-month duration—could establish a protected liberty interest under Sandin v. Conner. The court reasoned that the law on when such placements trigger due process protections was not clearly established at the time of the 2020 hearing.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, Fidel Santos Mendoza, who entered the U.S. illegally around 2006, sought cancellation of removal under federal immigration law, claiming that deporting him would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his three U.S.-citizen children, for whom he was the primary breadwinner. An immigration judge found he met the other statutory requirements but denied relief on the hardship ground, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit held it had jurisdiction to review the claim but denied the petition, concluding that the immigration judge committed no legal error. The court reasoned that the financial difficulties and children's anxiety symptoms were typical in removal proceedings, supported by substantial evidence, and not substantially more severe than ordinary cases, as the children had no history of institutionalization, medication, or therapy, and some financial mitigation was possible.

immigration

Stella Paterakos, a white Assistant Community Living Specialist for the City of Chicago, sued the city and her supervisor Crystal Warren after receiving three suspensions for performance issues, including failing to place her phone in “not-ready” status, violating lunch and break policies, and allegedly misusing FMLA leave to make personal calls. She claimed the discipline was racially motivated under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, and that the third suspension also constituted FMLA interference or retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that no reasonable jury could find the suspensions were based on race, as Paterakos substantially admitted the underlying conduct and the record showed consistent application of performance standards. On the FMLA claims, the court concluded that the defendants’ honest belief—whether correct or mistaken—that Paterakos was abusing her leave defeated both interference and retaliation theories.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned two medically fragile children in Indiana with severe medical conditions requiring 24/7 care, whose mothers had long been paid through the state's Medicaid waiver program to provide attendant care services at home to avoid institutionalization. Indiana's Family and Social Services Administration adopted a July 2024 policy change that would have barred the mothers from serving as paid providers, prompting the Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission and the families to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act's integration mandate and the Medicaid Act, seeking to block the change and secure in-home nursing. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring continued payments to the mothers until nurses could be obtained, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that order while remanding for further proceedings on its scope. The court held that the plaintiffs showed a strong likelihood of success on their ADA claims, as the policy risked forcing institutional placement rather than allowing services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, and found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's balancing of equities and the public interest in enforcing federal anti-discrimination requirements and preserving access to medically necessary home care.

civil rightshealthcare