The case involved Bruce Boys, who obtained a default judgment against his former attorney Morris Olmer for negligent representation and then sued Olmer’s insurer, Continental Casualty Company, to collect on that judgment under Connecticut’s direct-action statute while also alleging unfair insurance and trade practices. The policy at issue was a claims-made-and-reported professional liability policy effective from October 15, 2006, to October 15, 2007, with a 60-day automatic extended reporting period, requiring both that a claim be first made against the insured and that written notice be given to Continental during that window. Although Boys provided affidavits stating that Olmer had informed his agent of the potential claim in 2007, Continental submitted evidence that it had no record of receiving any such notice until the 2010 lawsuit against it. The court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the absence of timely written notice meant the claim was not covered and that Boys’s related statutory claims therefore failed as well.
In Aho v. Anthony, plaintiff Alan Aho, chairman of the Griswold Republican Town Committee, sued town officials Philip Anthony and Normand Sylvestre under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they deprived him of his rights to vote and due process by failing to prevent his ejection from a 2008 special town meeting on a controversial land acquisition proposal. A state trooper removed Aho after a political opponent spoke with the officer, without allowing Aho to explain or vote, and the town officials took no action to intervene or investigate. The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by Anthony or Sylvestre in any constitutional violation and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court applied the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard and Second Circuit precedents requiring intentional misconduct and personal participation for § 1983 liability in election-related due process claims.
Keith Johnson, an African-American truck driver for C. White & Son Inc., sued the company alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act and Title VII, along with a state-law defamation claim, based on alleged pay disparities, denial of bonuses and route requests, and his eventual termination after he complained about race discrimination and filed CHRO complaints. C. White moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion in full, holding that Johnson failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination because payroll records showed no consistent racial disparity in pay or treatment and because his repeated performance problems (including fuel spills, missed deliveries, and safety violations) supplied legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that he did not show were pretextual. The court likewise found insufficient evidence of retaliation, noting that the termination followed multiple documented incidents after a final warning and that Johnson had not produced evidence of a causal link to his protected activity. Johnson did not oppose summary judgment on the defamation claim.
The case involved defendant Larry Corbett, charged with kidnapping, murder, and related drug and firearms offenses, who moved to suppress oral and written statements made to police after his arrest on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. The court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Corbett had signed a notice of rights form, was questioned after being shown crime scene photos, invoked his right to counsel, but then reinitiated communication with Detective Brown by referencing their shared Masonic affiliation and speaking with his grandfather. The court concluded that Corbett's waivers were valid and his statements voluntary, as the detective's responses did not involve coercive promises or psychological pressure under Edwards v. Arizona and related precedents, and a friendly or sympathetic approach by police does not render a confession involuntary. The motion to suppress was therefore denied.
In Palmieri v. Kammerer, plaintiff Gloria Palmieri sued East Haven police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant, seizing her lawfully possessed handgun from the kitchen table, and later obtaining and executing a search warrant based on allegedly false statements. The officers had responded to a report from a utility worker who had seen the gun during a visit, and after Palmieri made statements about using the gun for protection, they seized the weapon, applied for a warrant, and returned to confiscate additional firearms and her permit. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, reasoning that qualified immunity and the existence of consent or exigent circumstances barred some claims while others, including aspects of the warrant application and seizure, presented triable issues under Fourth Amendment standards.
The case concerned Greystone's claims against Berean for breaches of confidentiality, contract, and fiduciary duties, along with related tort and statutory violations arising from the alleged misuse of Greystone's investment product idea. After Berean transferred substantially all its assets to Jackson Securities in a 2005 transaction, Greystone amended its complaint to assert successor liability against Jackson. Both parties moved for summary judgment on that issue, and Jackson alternatively sought to sever it for a separate trial. The court ruled that Illinois law applies based on the transaction agreement's choice-of-law clause and denied the summary judgment motions, finding genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the deal constituted a merger or de facto merger that would impose successor liability. The motion for severance was also denied.