The case involved antitrust claims by merchants against American Express, challenging contractual arbitration clauses that included class-action waivers on the ground that the high costs of individual arbitration would prevent effective pursuit of federal statutory remedies. A Second Circuit panel held the waivers unenforceable, and an active judge requested rehearing en banc; after a poll, the court denied that request. Judge Pooler’s concurrence explained that the panel’s decision rested on the Supreme Court’s Mitsubishi and Green Tree line of cases requiring that arbitration agreements permit vindication of federal statutory rights—an issue distinct from the state-law preemption analysis in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. Dissenting opinions contended that the panel ruling conflicted with Concepcion, created a circuit split, and warranted further review.
The case involved multiple plaintiffs who purchased uncompleted condominium units from defendant developers and sought to revoke their contracts under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA) for lack of required property disclosures. The developers argued that the sales qualified for ILSA's 100-lot exemption, which they claimed should be assessed once 100 or more nonexempt lots in the subdivision had been sold or could not be sold. The Second Circuit held that eligibility for the 100-lot exemption is instead determined at the time each purchaser signs the contract, entitling buyers to know then whether a property report is required. The court vacated the district courts' judgments in favor of the defendants and remanded for further proceedings, relying on the statute's text and purpose of providing timely consumer protections in land sales.
This case involved antitrust claims by health plans, pharmacies, and other purchasers challenging a 1997 settlement between Bayer and Barr Laboratories in patent litigation over the drug Cipro. Under the agreement, Bayer paid Barr nearly $400 million to refrain from marketing a generic version until the patent expired. Following a panel decision that upheld the settlement under the precedent of In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, several plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing en banc. The Second Circuit denied the petition because an active judge poll failed to produce a majority in favor of rehearing. The core reasoning was that the existing circuit precedent permitted reverse-payment settlements unless the underlying patent suit was shown to be fraudulent or objectively baseless.
The case involved Warren Green, who was convicted of possessing a weapon and marijuana while in prison and received a sentence that included three years of supervised release. As a special condition, the district court barred him from associating with members of the Bloods or other criminal street gangs and from wearing their colors, insignia, or obtaining related tattoos. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the condition for plain error and held that the prohibition on wearing gang colors or insignia was unconstitutionally vague because it provided no specific guidance on prohibited items. The court therefore vacated that portion of the condition and remanded for further proceedings, while noting that Green had lacked notice of the full terms at his oral sentencing.
The case involved a plaintiff suing a town and its official under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds due to factual issues, and later issued a clarification order addressing unrelated Monell and damages questions. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal more than four months after the immunity ruling. The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) requires notices of appeal in civil cases to be filed within 30 days and that an order clarifying non-immunity issues does not restart the clock for an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal.
The case concerns Timothy Watson's application for conscientious objector status and discharge from the Army, which the Department of the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board (DACORB) denied without providing an adequate statement of reasons. A Second Circuit panel held that where the DACORB fails to adequately explain a denial, a district court must generally remand the matter to the Army for a proper statement unless remand would be utterly futile because no possible basis in fact supports the decision. The full court denied rehearing en banc, reasoning that the panel's narrow holding applies only to the infrequently invoked DACORB process, adheres to established administrative remand principles, and does not raise questions of exceptional importance or threaten uniformity of precedent.
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