Christopher Fitzgerald Droney

The case involved Bruce Boys, who obtained a default judgment against his former attorney Morris Olmer for negligent representation and then sued Olmer’s insurer, Continental Casualty Company, to collect on that judgment under Connecticut’s direct-action statute while also alleging unfair insurance and trade practices. The policy at issue was a claims-made-and-reported professional liability policy effective from October 15, 2006, to October 15, 2007, with a 60-day automatic extended reporting period, requiring both that a claim be first made against the insured and that written notice be given to Continental during that window. Although Boys provided affidavits stating that Olmer had informed his agent of the potential claim in 2007, Continental submitted evidence that it had no record of receiving any such notice until the 2010 lawsuit against it. The court granted Continental’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the absence of timely written notice meant the claim was not covered and that Boys’s related statutory claims therefore failed as well.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Aho v. Anthony, plaintiff Alan Aho, chairman of the Griswold Republican Town Committee, sued town officials Philip Anthony and Normand Sylvestre under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they deprived him of his rights to vote and due process by failing to prevent his ejection from a 2008 special town meeting on a controversial land acquisition proposal. A state trooper removed Aho after a political opponent spoke with the officer, without allowing Aho to explain or vote, and the town officials took no action to intervene or investigate. The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient personal involvement by Anthony or Sylvestre in any constitutional violation and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The court applied the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard and Second Circuit precedents requiring intentional misconduct and personal participation for § 1983 liability in election-related due process claims.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

Keith Johnson, an African-American truck driver for C. White & Son Inc., sued the company alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act and Title VII, along with a state-law defamation claim, based on alleged pay disparities, denial of bonuses and route requests, and his eventual termination after he complained about race discrimination and filed CHRO complaints. C. White moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion in full, holding that Johnson failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination because payroll records showed no consistent racial disparity in pay or treatment and because his repeated performance problems (including fuel spills, missed deliveries, and safety violations) supplied legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that he did not show were pretextual. The court likewise found insufficient evidence of retaliation, noting that the termination followed multiple documented incidents after a final warning and that Johnson had not produced evidence of a causal link to his protected activity. Johnson did not oppose summary judgment on the defamation claim.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved defendant Larry Corbett, charged with kidnapping, murder, and related drug and firearms offenses, who moved to suppress oral and written statements made to police after his arrest on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. The court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Corbett had signed a notice of rights form, was questioned after being shown crime scene photos, invoked his right to counsel, but then reinitiated communication with Detective Brown by referencing their shared Masonic affiliation and speaking with his grandfather. The court concluded that Corbett's waivers were valid and his statements voluntary, as the detective's responses did not involve coercive promises or psychological pressure under Edwards v. Arizona and related precedents, and a friendly or sympathetic approach by police does not render a confession involuntary. The motion to suppress was therefore denied.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Palmieri v. Kammerer, plaintiff Gloria Palmieri sued East Haven police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering her home without a warrant, seizing her lawfully possessed handgun from the kitchen table, and later obtaining and executing a search warrant based on allegedly false statements. The officers had responded to a report from a utility worker who had seen the gun during a visit, and after Palmieri made statements about using the gun for protection, they seized the weapon, applied for a warrant, and returned to confiscate additional firearms and her permit. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, reasoning that qualified immunity and the existence of consent or exigent circumstances barred some claims while others, including aspects of the warrant application and seizure, presented triable issues under Fourth Amendment standards.

criminal lawcivil rightsgunsprocedure

The case concerned Greystone's claims against Berean for breaches of confidentiality, contract, and fiduciary duties, along with related tort and statutory violations arising from the alleged misuse of Greystone's investment product idea. After Berean transferred substantially all its assets to Jackson Securities in a 2005 transaction, Greystone amended its complaint to assert successor liability against Jackson. Both parties moved for summary judgment on that issue, and Jackson alternatively sought to sever it for a separate trial. The court ruled that Illinois law applies based on the transaction agreement's choice-of-law clause and denied the summary judgment motions, finding genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether the deal constituted a merger or de facto merger that would impose successor liability. The motion for severance was also denied.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved claims by an African American mother and her biracial children against the Westport Board of Education and several school officials, alleging racial discrimination under Title VI and §1981, First Amendment retaliation and equal protection violations under §1983, violations of Connecticut's anti-bullying statute, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from alleged hostile treatment, inadequate responses to the children's educational needs, and retaliation after the mother raised concerns about diversity and her daughter's dyslexia. The court granted the motions to dismiss in part, dismissing all claims related to insufficient special educational services due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA, claims against Principal Kaye May, all §1981 claims, claims under the state bullying statute, intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the Board, and Title VI claims against individual defendants or those arising from discrimination against the mother. It denied the motions without prejudice as to Title VI racial discrimination claims against the children by the Board, equal protection claims, First Amendment retaliation claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the remaining individual defendants, deferring those issues along with qualified immunity to the summary judgment ruling. The core reasoning centered on statutory exhaustion requirements for IDEA-based claims and deficiencies in pleading or legal applicability for the dismissed counts.

civil rightsfree speechproceduretorts & liability

This diversity case involved LucidRisk, LLC suing two officers of a hedge fund management company for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and CUTPA violations stemming from a 2008 software licensing agreement for risk-analysis tools. The plaintiff claimed the defendants were personally liable and subject to Connecticut jurisdiction because the contract ambiguously identified the principal as "East Avenue Capital Mgmnt" rather than the full legal name of the entity. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction because Ogden signed the contract solely in his representative capacity on behalf of a clearly identifiable managing entity, the minor name discrepancies were de minimis, and the sophisticated plaintiff had previously sued the correct LLC in related state court proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved two female Yale Law School students suing numerous anonymous individuals, including defendant Ryan, who posted allegedly defamatory, threatening, and harassing statements about them on the AutoAdmit.com website, along with a copyright infringement claim by one plaintiff regarding her photographs. Ryan moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (2) for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The court ruled that subject matter jurisdiction exists under federal question authority due to the copyright claim under 17 U.S.C. § 501, with supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims for appropriation, false light, emotional distress, and libel, as well as diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 despite unidentified Doe defendants. It further found personal jurisdiction proper under Connecticut's long-arm statute based on the defendant's alleged tortious conduct directed at Connecticut residents. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.

proceduretorts & liabilityfree speech

In Shrack v. Astrue, the plaintiff appealed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) the Commissioner's denial of his application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, challenging the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding at step five of the sequential evaluation process. The court determined that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to mention or assign any weight to the opinions and findings of the plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Cretella, as required by the treating physician rule. The court also held that new and material medical evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, including additional records from the treating physician relating to the period before the ALJ's decision, must be specifically addressed on remand in accordance with the rule. The court therefore denied the cross-motions for judgment and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.

federal powerhealthcare

Fresh Start Substance Services, LLC sued the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Health in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the Department refused to grant a license to operate a methadone clinic in Bridgeport. The plaintiff alleged violations of its equal protection and due process rights under the federal and state constitutions, seeking prospective relief and monetary damages. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It found no genuine issues of material fact, as Fresh Start's policies and procedures failed to comply with state regulations, investigations uncovered prohibited pre-licensure activities and staff misconduct, and the plaintiff refused required site inspections and consent orders.

business & regulatoryhealthcarecivil rights

Athena Wagner, a black female correctional officer, sued the Connecticut Department of Correction and several employees, claiming race and gender discrimination, retaliation, and due process violations under Title VII, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Section 1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment after her 2006 termination for excessive absenteeism. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Wagner's claims relied on her history of absences, some disputed as unauthorized under DOC policy AD 2.11, and prior incidents involving a supervisor; however, the court found no evidence linking her termination to discrimination, with most earlier events time-barred and no adequate comparators showing differential treatment. The court also found no due process violation in the application of the dependability policy.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves Michael McMullen, former Captain of the Vernon Police Department, who sued the town of Vernon and its former mayor after his 2003 layoff due to budget shortfalls and the town's later failure to rehire him for the position. McMullen claimed wrongful discharge, breach of his employment contract under the town charter's merit system, and violations of his due process and equal protection rights under federal and state constitutions, stemming from the termination as well as prior denials of requests for a salary increase, vehicle replacement, and additional training. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that the layoff was a permissible reduction in force due to necessary economics under the town charter, that McMullen's grievance was not properly filed or applicable to staffing decisions, that he was not among the top-ranked candidates for rehire based on competitive evaluations, and that there was no evidence supporting the constitutional claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Martires v. Connecticut Dept. of Transp., a black woman of Hispanic origin employed by the state DOT since 1989 sued her employer under Title VII for race and sex discrimination and harassment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under state law for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision. The claims centered on conflicts with a supervisor, including an alleged sexual proposition, changes in job duties after a department reorganization, and alleged favoritism, which the plaintiff said created a hostile environment and led to her medical leave. The district court granted the DOT's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had not produced evidence showing an adverse employment action, a hostile work environment based on a protected characteristic, or a causal link to her complaints; the § 1981 claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; and the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Maria C. Serrano brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability benefits based on mental health conditions. The court determined that the ALJ erred at step two of the sequential evaluation by failing to consider her later diagnoses of Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar I Disorder, and related conditions, did not properly apply the required framework for rating functional limitations from mental impairments, and neglected to develop the record with current functional assessments from treating sources. These omissions affected the analysis at step three and the overall disability determination, leading the court to order remand under sentence four of § 405(g) for further proceedings.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved defendant Vida Deas, who was arrested in March 2007 on a criminal complaint for cocaine-related conspiracy and was timely indicted the following month; after other defendants pleaded guilty, a superseding indictment expanded the dates of the two conspiracy counts based on later interviews with a cooperating witness, and Deas moved to dismiss all counts, claiming the expansions violated the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day indictment deadline. The court denied the second motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the original indictment satisfied the statutory timing requirement, the superseding charges were identical in all material respects except for the expanded periods, and the government was not obligated to indict on the broader conspiracy allegations when the supporting information was initially uncorroborated and unreliable.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a Chapter 13 debtor who sought to modify his confirmed bankruptcy plan after confirmation to bifurcate a mortgage creditor's undersecured claim into secured and unsecured portions and switch from a cure-and-maintain payment approach to a strip-and-pay approach, following an increase in the property's value. The bankruptcy court granted the modification over the creditor's objection, finding it permissible under 11 U.S.C. § 1329. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that § 1329 allows modifications only to payments on claims of a particular class rather than an individual creditor and that the confirmed plan remained binding under § 1327(a). The court further noted the absence of any required § 1325(a) analysis or change-in-circumstances finding.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

Phina Kwentoh, a dark-skinned Nigerian-born nurse, sued her employer, the Connecticut Department of Children and Families Juvenile Training School, and her supervisor, Patricia Colonghi, alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act based on racial discrimination, retaliation, and a class-of-one equal protection theory arising from conflicts over scheduling, supervisory skills, and patient care that led to her 2003 termination. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion as to the class-of-one equal protection claim, holding that such claims cannot be brought against public employers under Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, and as to the First Amendment retaliation claim, but denied it as to the Title VII claims and the remaining equal protection claims, finding triable issues of fact on those counts.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves an appeal from a bankruptcy court's approval of interim attorney fees for Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., counsel for debtor Ahead Communications Systems, Inc., in its Chapter 11 reorganization. The district court reversed the fee award for work on the debtor's proposed reorganization plan, finding that the plan violated 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(6) by providing for non-voting equity securities that disenfranchised the secured creditor. The court reasoned that the plan was not confirmable as a matter of law, Zeisler should have known this, and thus the services were not reasonably likely to benefit the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I), precluding compensation for that portion of the work.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Connecticut Bar Association, bankruptcy attorneys, and related parties challenging sections 526, 527, and 528 of the Bankruptcy Code, added by the 2005 BAPCPA, which regulate 'debt relief agencies' and impose requirements like disclosures in advertising; the plaintiffs argued these provisions were unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments if applied to licensed attorneys. The court addressed motions for a preliminary injunction and to dismiss, analyzing whether attorneys qualify as debt relief agencies and whether the provisions compel false or misleading speech or restrict legal practice. It concluded that certain compelled advertising disclosures under section 528 violate the First Amendment when applied to attorneys who do not provide bankruptcy assistance, as they force inaccurate statements, while upholding other aspects or finding insufficient grounds for dismissal on some claims. The ruling granted injunctive relief against enforcement of the unconstitutional provisions due to irreparable harm from compelled speech.

free speechbusiness & regulatoryfederal power