Moore v. Commercial Aircraft Interiors, LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-29 · cited 11×
Robert Moore sued his former employer, Commercial Aircraft Interiors LLC (CAI), and its owner Jerry Welch, claiming they tortiously interfered with his prospective employment at competitor Volant Aerospace Holdings LLC and violated Washington's blacklisting statute by objecting to his hire. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing both claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On the tortious interference claim, the court held that Moore produced no evidence that CAI lacked a good-faith belief in its position or acted with an improper motive when it threatened litigation to protect its trade secrets and confidential information, and CAI had presented unrebutted evidence supporting its affirmative defense of asserting a legally protected interest. On the blacklisting claim, the court found no evidence that CAI had acted willfully and maliciously.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Quedado v. Boeing Co.
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-14 · cited 16×
In Quedado v. Boeing Co., a long-time Boeing employee sued for wrongful demotion and breach of implied contract after being removed from management for improperly using his influence to help two relatives get hired, which violated the company’s anti-nepotism rules. He claimed that Boeing’s Code of Conduct and two internal policy documents created enforceable promises about how investigations of employee conduct would be conducted and how discipline would be imposed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Boeing. The court held that the documents contained only general statements of company policy, included effective disclaimers, and did not modify the at-will employment relationship or provide promises of specific treatment in specific situations that could support either an implied-contract or equitable-reliance claim.
labor & employment
Lloyd v. Allstate Insurance
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-04-23 · cited 7×
Jerry Lloyd sued Allstate and Deerbrook Insurance after they valued his totaled 2005 Chevrolet Malibu at around $5,100–$7,100 (later adjusted via appraisal to $6,683.79 plus tax and fees) and paid him a net $6,815.16 after subtracting his $500 deductible, following an August 2008 accident. He claimed the insurers undervalued the car by failing to account for its condition and mileage, improperly deducted the deductible from the appraisal award, and owed him extra damages for delay and related costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers, and the appeals court affirmed, holding that Lloyd raised no genuine factual dispute: the policy allowed deduction of the deductible from the actual cash value, the appraisal process conclusively determined that value without including the deductible, and Lloyd had received the full amount owed under the policy after two initial offers and his own decision to retain the salvage vehicle.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Silverhawk, LLC v. Keybank Nat. Ass'n
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-12-19 · cited 6×
Silverhawk LLC sued KeyBank for breach of contract, alleging the bank improperly calculated a $123,167 early termination fee for an interest-rate swap agreement tied to a 2001 loan when Silverhawk sold its collateral property in 2008. The parties had entered a master ISDA swap agreement, schedule, and confirmation that addressed termination payments, including use of market quotations from other institutions under certain conditions. KeyBank moved for summary judgment, contending the fee resulted from a mutual agreement to terminate rather than an early termination event that triggered the quotation requirement. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, holding that Silverhawk failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing the contract mandated market quotations for this mutual termination and that payment of the agreed fee created an accord and satisfaction.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State v. Crawford
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-11-07 · cited 9×
In State v. Crawford, the defendant pled guilty to perjury after testifying falsely in an earlier criminal trial while he was incarcerated pending that trial; at sentencing, his offender score was calculated as 8, which included an extra point on the ground that the perjury was committed while he was under community custody from a prior conviction. Crawford later moved to correct the sentence, arguing the score should have been 7 because incarceration tolled his community-custody term and he therefore could not have been “under community custody” when he committed the new offense. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying relief. The court reasoned that, under the Sentencing Reform Act, community custody is a portion of a sentence served in the community and is expressly tolled during any period of confinement; an offender cannot simultaneously be incarcerated and under community custody, so the extra point was unauthorized. The court remanded for recalculation of the offender score and resentencing, rejecting the State’s argument that Crawford’s plea agreement waived the legal error.
criminal law
State v. Cuellar
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-11-07
Cynthia Cuellar was convicted of third degree assault after biting a police officer during a response to a domestic disturbance; she claimed self-defense and argued that the jury should have been instructed on resisting arrest as a lesser included offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that resisting arrest is not a lesser included offense of third degree assault under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) because the assault statute does not require intent to resist arrest and can be committed during official duties unrelated to an arrest, while resisting arrest does not require assaultive conduct. The court also upheld the first aggressor instruction, finding evidence that Cuellar ignored warnings and aggressively approached officers supported an inference she provoked the confrontation, and concluded that the prosecutor's improper closing argument was not prejudicial enough to affect the verdict.
criminal lawprocedure