Judge, Court of Appeals of Washington
Ferguson v. City of Dayton
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-06-05 · cited 4×
In Ferguson v. City of Dayton, Laurie Ferguson challenged the City of Dayton's approval of a building permit for a pole structure on neighboring property, disputing the city's changed interpretation of height limits under its municipal code; after the city council referred the matter for review, the Planning Commission affirmed the planner's interpretation in July 2010, and Ferguson filed a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) action in superior court shortly thereafter. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely under LUPA's 21-day filing deadline, treating the original August 2009 building permit as the final land use decision. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the petition was timely because it was filed within 21 days of the Planning Commission's ruling. The court reasoned that LUPA defines a "land use decision" as a final determination by the local body with ultimate authority, including those hearing appeals, and that an available administrative review process must be exhausted before a permit becomes final for purposes of judicial review.
propertyprocedure
State v. Singh
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-03 · cited 4×
Jasmine Singh was convicted of first-degree perjury after testifying at an ER 404(b) hearing in her brother Anthony Singh’s criminal case that she had not discussed the case, its witnesses, or related facts with him during recorded jail phone calls. The State introduced those recordings—made with the parties’ knowledge—as evidence that she had in fact spoken with her brother about expected prosecution witnesses, gang-related testimony, discovery materials, and her own planned testimony denying his gang membership. In a bench trial, the court found the statements false, knowingly made, and material, and concluded that the recordings themselves supplied the heightened quantum of proof traditionally required in perjury prosecutions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the recorded evidence was sufficient to establish each element beyond a reasonable doubt even without independent corroborating witnesses.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Turner
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-01 · cited 22×
The case involved Waymond Turner’s appeal of his convictions for second-degree malicious mischief and third-degree assault arising from a domestic dispute at his parents’ home. After police responded, Turner resisted arrest by grabbing an officer around the waist, later head-butted the officer while being placed in a patrol car, and kicked out the car’s window, rendering the vehicle unusable for a day. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient because RCW 9A.48.080(1)(b) requires only that the defendant create a substantial risk of interrupting public service, not an actual interruption, and that Turner failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error from his counsel’s performance in addressing the State’s theory of assault. A partial dissent would have reversed the assault conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance for not seeking a bill of particulars to clarify the factual basis of the charge.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Clark
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-04-12 · cited 10×
In State v. Clark, Michael Clark, an enrolled Colville tribal member, was convicted of first-degree theft after police executed a state-issued search warrant at his home on reservation trust land and recovered items stolen from a railroad workshop located on fee land within the reservation boundaries. Clark challenged the conviction on two grounds: that Okanogan County courts lacked authority to issue the warrant for trust land and that the county’s jury summons process systematically excluded tribal members living on the reservation, resulting in an unrepresentative venire. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that state courts had jurisdiction to issue the warrant because the underlying crime occurred on fee land and U.S. Supreme Court precedent permits such warrants in these circumstances. On the jury issue, the court found no evidence of systematic exclusion, noting that Native Americans comprise 11 percent of the county population, routinely serve on juries, and that the record showed no pattern of non-response or exclusion from venires.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedurefederal power
State v. Lawrence
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-02-02 · cited 14×
In State v. Lawrence, the defendant was charged with three counts of attempted first-degree murder after shooting at acquaintances he believed were threatening his family; he appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in repeatedly finding him competent to stand trial and in allowing him to represent himself. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. It held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining competency, as it properly relied on evaluations from Eastern State Hospital and independent experts showing that Lawrence’s mental condition had stabilized sufficiently for trial, despite earlier periods of incompetence and a fluid mental illness involving psychosis and bipolar features. The appellate court further concluded that the trial judge conducted an adequate colloquy and had tenable grounds to grant self-representation once Lawrence was found competent, as the record showed he understood the proceedings and could present his defense without the prior mental-health issues impairing his ability at that time.
criminal lawprocedure
Desmon v. Washington Dept. of Licensing
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-01-31
The case involved Rebecca Desmon, a school bus driver whose commercial driver’s license was canceled by the Washington Department of of Licensing after she failed a skills retest required as part of DOL’s annual audit of third-party testers. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to DOL, concluding that the department lacked authority to cancel her license solely on the basis of the failed audit retest. Under the plain language of RCW 46.20.305, DOL may require an examination only when it has good cause to believe a driver is incompetent or unqualified, after which it may suspend or revoke—but not cancel—the license if the driver fails or refuses a retest; the audit process did not originate from such good cause, and cancellation was not an authorized remedy.
business & regulatory