Moore v. Commercial Aircraft Interiors, LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-29 · cited 11×
Robert Moore sued his former employer, Commercial Aircraft Interiors LLC (CAI), and its owner Jerry Welch, claiming they tortiously interfered with his prospective employment at competitor Volant Aerospace Holdings LLC and violated Washington's blacklisting statute by objecting to his hire. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing both claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On the tortious interference claim, the court held that Moore produced no evidence that CAI lacked a good-faith belief in its position or acted with an improper motive when it threatened litigation to protect its trade secrets and confidential information, and CAI had presented unrebutted evidence supporting its affirmative defense of asserting a legally protected interest. On the blacklisting claim, the court found no evidence that CAI had acted willfully and maliciously.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Quedado v. Boeing Co.
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-05-14 · cited 16×
In Quedado v. Boeing Co., a long-time Boeing employee sued for wrongful demotion and breach of implied contract after being removed from management for improperly using his influence to help two relatives get hired, which violated the company’s anti-nepotism rules. He claimed that Boeing’s Code of Conduct and two internal policy documents created enforceable promises about how investigations of employee conduct would be conducted and how discipline would be imposed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Boeing. The court held that the documents contained only general statements of company policy, included effective disclaimers, and did not modify the at-will employment relationship or provide promises of specific treatment in specific situations that could support either an implied-contract or equitable-reliance claim.
labor & employment
Lloyd v. Allstate Insurance
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2012-04-23 · cited 7×
Jerry Lloyd sued Allstate and Deerbrook Insurance after they valued his totaled 2005 Chevrolet Malibu at around $5,100–$7,100 (later adjusted via appraisal to $6,683.79 plus tax and fees) and paid him a net $6,815.16 after subtracting his $500 deductible, following an August 2008 accident. He claimed the insurers undervalued the car by failing to account for its condition and mileage, improperly deducted the deductible from the appraisal award, and owed him extra damages for delay and related costs. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers, and the appeals court affirmed, holding that Lloyd raised no genuine factual dispute: the policy allowed deduction of the deductible from the actual cash value, the appraisal process conclusively determined that value without including the deductible, and Lloyd had received the full amount owed under the policy after two initial offers and his own decision to retain the salvage vehicle.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Silverhawk, LLC v. Keybank Nat. Ass'n
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-12-19 · cited 6×
Silverhawk LLC sued KeyBank for breach of contract, alleging the bank improperly calculated a $123,167 early termination fee for an interest-rate swap agreement tied to a 2001 loan when Silverhawk sold its collateral property in 2008. The parties had entered a master ISDA swap agreement, schedule, and confirmation that addressed termination payments, including use of market quotations from other institutions under certain conditions. KeyBank moved for summary judgment, contending the fee resulted from a mutual agreement to terminate rather than an early termination event that triggered the quotation requirement. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, holding that Silverhawk failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact showing the contract mandated market quotations for this mutual termination and that payment of the agreed fee created an accord and satisfaction.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State v. Crawford
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-11-07 · cited 9×
In State v. Crawford, the defendant pled guilty to perjury after testifying falsely in an earlier criminal trial while he was incarcerated pending that trial; at sentencing, his offender score was calculated as 8, which included an extra point on the ground that the perjury was committed while he was under community custody from a prior conviction. Crawford later moved to correct the sentence, arguing the score should have been 7 because incarceration tolled his community-custody term and he therefore could not have been “under community custody” when he committed the new offense. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying relief. The court reasoned that, under the Sentencing Reform Act, community custody is a portion of a sentence served in the community and is expressly tolled during any period of confinement; an offender cannot simultaneously be incarcerated and under community custody, so the extra point was unauthorized. The court remanded for recalculation of the offender score and resentencing, rejecting the State’s argument that Crawford’s plea agreement waived the legal error.
criminal law
State v. Cuellar
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-11-07
Cynthia Cuellar was convicted of third degree assault after biting a police officer during a response to a domestic disturbance; she claimed self-defense and argued that the jury should have been instructed on resisting arrest as a lesser included offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that resisting arrest is not a lesser included offense of third degree assault under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) because the assault statute does not require intent to resist arrest and can be committed during official duties unrelated to an arrest, while resisting arrest does not require assaultive conduct. The court also upheld the first aggressor instruction, finding evidence that Cuellar ignored warnings and aggressively approached officers supported an inference she provoked the confrontation, and concluded that the prosecutor's improper closing argument was not prejudicial enough to affect the verdict.
criminal lawprocedure
Foster v. Gilliam
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-10-31 · cited 22×
The case concerned the administration of the estate and revocable living trust of Lloyd and Alice Foster after their deaths, which left assets primarily in Hawaii real estate and a bank account to be divided among their sons Alan and Laurance, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, with distributions to minors delayed until age 30. Special representatives Jennifer Gilliam and Sandra Bates Gay were appointed to protect the minor beneficiaries' interests amid disputes over trustee appointments, asset distributions, accountings, and fees; the trial court found that Laurance Foster, who served as a trustee, had violated his fiduciary duties through improper distributions and mismanagement, and it denied his request for a jury trial while holding him personally liable for amounts owed to the minors and for the special appointees' expenses. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed these rulings in full, concluding that the trial court properly exercised its broad statutory authority under RCW 11.96A to oversee trust and estate matters, that no jury trial right applied, and that personal liability was warranted due to Laurance's breaches. The court also awarded appellate fees and costs against Laurance.
family lawpropertyproceduretorts & liability
State v. Hayes
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-10-24 · cited 32×
In State v. Hayes, Larry Hayes was tried on fifteen criminal counts (later consolidated), including leading organized crime, identity theft, possession of stolen property, and possession of stolen vehicles, based on evidence that he manufactured false IDs and credit cards, directed others in using them to obtain merchandise, and possessed stolen Great Clips receipts and two rental vehicles. The Court of Appeals reversed the leading organized crime conviction, holding that the offense requires proof the defendant was a leader who organized, managed, directed, or supervised the enterprise, and that the trial court’s accomplice-liability instructions erroneously permitted conviction if the jury found Hayes was merely aiding or abetting the actual leader. The court also reversed the two stolen-vehicle convictions but affirmed the remaining twelve, noting that reversal of the leading-organized-crime count eliminated any double-jeopardy or merger issues regarding the underlying offenses.
criminal lawprocedure
CITY OF SEATTLE, POLICE DEPT. v. Werner
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-19 · cited 3×
The case arose after the Seattle Police Department fired Officer Eric Werner for violating its honesty policy by lying during an internal investigation into excessive force, when he initially denied striking a suspect but later admitted the lie. The Seattle Public Safety Civil Service Commission upheld the finding of dishonesty but reduced the penalty to a 30-day suspension, concluding that the department had not applied its rules evenhandedly and that Werner had an otherwise unblemished record. On appeal by the department, the superior court determined that the commission’s finding of uneven discipline lacked substantial evidence and remanded for reconsideration; this court affirmed that ruling. The core reasoning was that the prior cases relied on by the commission involved different facts and lacked sustained dishonesty findings comparable to Werner’s, so they did not demonstrate inconsistent enforcement of the honesty rule. The unchallenged finding that Werner had been dishonest remained intact, leaving only his prior record as a possible basis for reduced discipline, which the commission must now re-evaluate on remand.
labor & employment
Housing Authority of City of Seattle v. Bin
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-06 · cited 40×
The Seattle Housing Authority sued tenant Khadija Bin in superior court for unlawful detainer after a grievance hearing officer denied her request for a continuance and had an ex parte discussion with a coordinator, leading to a decision upholding her eviction for alleged rent underpayments and lease violations. The trial court granted Bin’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action, finding that the housing authority had failed to comply with required grievance procedures, and awarded her attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under a lease provision. On appeal, the court held that dismissal was required because procedural irregularities in the administrative hearing barred the housing authority from proceeding with eviction, not because of any lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court further reasoned that the lease authorized fees to the prevailing party in any action and that Bin’s success in obtaining dismissal entitled her to them, including time spent on related issues not ultimately decided. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and fee award.
propertyprocedure
Cummings v. Budget Tank Removal & Environmental Services, LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-06 · cited 31×
The case arose from a contract dispute in which Budget Tank Removal billed Dougherty nearly $639,000 for petroleum tank removal and soil remediation work that had been estimated at about $21,500; Dougherty paid $100,000 and refused the balance, prompting arbitration under the contract, while a similar billing dispute with another customer, Cummings, led to a separate arbitration. The superior court consolidated the two proceedings over Budget’s objection under RCW 7.04A.100, after which the arbitrator issued a substantial award to Dougherty on breach-of-contract and Consumer Protection Act claims. Budget moved to vacate the award, but the trial court confirmed it (with added attorney fees and interest) and Budget appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the consolidation order was reviewable and proper because the statutory criteria were satisfied, that the award could not be vacated for legal error on its face, and that the trial court lacked authority to add pre-award interest beyond what the arbitrator had granted. The judgment was therefore affirmed in part and reversed only as to the extra interest amount.
business & regulatoryprocedure
State v. AM
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-09-06 · cited 1×
In State v. A.M., an 11-year-old juvenile was charged in Washington juvenile court with first-degree child rape (and alternatively first-degree child molestation) based on allegations that he penetrated the buttocks of a 7-year-old neighbor boy with his penis during an incident in 2008. The trial court convicted him of rape after finding that penetration of the buttocks occurred but explicitly stating there was no penetration of the anus. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the statutory definition of "sexual intercourse" under RCW 9A.44.010 requires penetration of the anus (however slight) and that buttocks penetration alone does not satisfy this element or support the rape charge. The court further determined that remand for an attempted rape conviction was unwarranted on the facts and that remand to enter a molestation conviction would violate double jeopardy, since the absence of written findings on the alternative charge implied acquittal; the case was therefore dismissed with prejudice.
criminal law
State v. DeLAURO
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-08-29 · cited 3×
The case concerned whether competency evaluation reports prepared by Western State Hospital and considered by the trial court in determining a defendant's fitness to stand trial must be placed in the court file under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution, which makes documents used in judicial decision-making presumptively open to the public. In consolidated prosecutions against DeLauro and Hernandez, the superior court denied the State's motions to file the reports after finding the defendants competent, reasoning that statutory procedures protected the defendants' privacy interests. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because the trial court explicitly read and considered the reports in its competency rulings, they became part of the decision-making process and therefore subject to the constitutional presumption of public access, though defendants could still seek sealing under GR 15.
criminal lawprocedure
Skagit County v. WALDAL
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-08-29 · cited 7×
Skagit County sued Scott Waldal and related entities for nuisance abatement to stop solid waste handling activities without a required permit. After Waldal filed a counterclaim alleging bias by county commissioners, all Skagit County superior court judges recused themselves due to personal allegations involving the commissioners, but one judge nonetheless issued orders quashing subpoenas, denying reconsideration, and granting sanctions both before and after the recusal. The Court of Appeals reversed all of the recused judge's orders under the appearance of fairness doctrine, adopting a bright-line rule that a judge who has recused must take no further action except necessary ministerial tasks to transfer the case, and affirmed the injunction preventing Waldal from conducting unpermitted solid waste activities.
procedurebusiness & regulatoryenvironment
Cole v. HARVEYLAND, LLC
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-08-22 · cited 78×
This case involved a claim by Deborah Cole against Harveyland LLC and related defendants under the Washington Law Against Discrimination for firing her due to a knee injury without reasonable accommodation. A jury found for Cole and awarded damages, but on appeal the defendants argued that Cole had not proven they employed at least eight people, a threshold required for private suits under the statute. The court held that the eight-employee requirement is not jurisdictional, so the defendants' failure to raise the issue at trial waived it under RAP 2.5(a) and barred appellate review. The court also upheld the trial judge's exclusion of evidence about advice the defendants received from a state agency. The judgment for Cole was affirmed.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure
Thompson v. King County
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-08-22 · cited 5×
In this case, plaintiff Kirk Thompson, a former inmate, sued two King County correctional officers in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law, alleging they failed to protect him from sexual harassment and rape at the county jail; that action ended in a voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Thompson later filed a new complaint in state superior court against King County alone, alleging the county was vicariously liable for its employees' negligence in failing to protect him from the same assault. The superior court dismissed the second action on res judicata grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that res judicata did not apply because there was no identity of parties between the suits against the individual officers and the suit against the county, and no identity of claims, as the second action did not depend on proving the officers' personal misconduct and the county's potential liability would not impair the prior judgment exonerating the officers.
procedurecivil rights
Dutch Village Mall, LLC v. Pelletti
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-07-05 · cited 24×
This case involved a dispute over unpaid rent where Dutch Village Mall, LLC, filed a complaint against its tenant Raymond Pelletti without being represented by an attorney; instead, its sole owner Jay Lei signed the pleadings himself. The court addressed whether a single-member LLC could proceed pro se through its owner. The court decided that the LLC must obtain legal representation to litigate, affirming the order striking the pleadings unless signed by an attorney within 30 days, while reversing the imposition of CR 11 sanctions. The reasoning is that representing another entity in court constitutes the practice of law, which requires a license, and this rule applies equally to all artificial entities including LLCs, regardless of the number of members, as the right to self-representation applies only to individuals acting on their own behalf.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
DIVERSIFIED WOOD RECYCLING, INC. v. Johnson
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-05-16 · cited 23×
This case involved a dispute over a construction lien filed by Diversified Wood Recycling, Inc. against property in Spokane County after the company performed unpaid land clearing work hired by the younger Harold Johnson, who had held himself out as the owner. The younger Johnson appealed the trial court's judgment of foreclosure, contending that the lien claim was filed late, that service of the foreclosure action was defective, and that the true owner (allegedly Kuleana LLC) had not been properly joined. The Court of Appeals affirmed the foreclosure judgment, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding that the lien was filed within 90 days of the last work performed, that service on the younger Johnson complied with statutory notice requirements given the merged identities in public records, and that the statute does not require joinder of the owner as a prerequisite to maintaining the action.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
DIVERSIFIED WOOD RECYCLING, INC. v. Johnson
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-05-16 · cited 5×
This case concerns a post-judgment motion to intervene in a construction lien foreclosure action. Diversified Wood Recycling obtained a judgment against Harold Johnson Junior after performing unpaid cleanup work on property in Spokane County. Harold Johnson Senior and Kuleana LLC, claiming ownership of the property, sought to intervene after the judgment to vacate it on grounds that they were not joined as parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of intervention, holding that the motion was untimely and that failure to join an owner does not void a foreclosure judgment but leaves the owner's interest unaffected.
propertyprocedure
State v. Neal
Court of Appeals of Washington · 2011-04-11 · cited 3×
The case involved Troy Neal's appeal of his residential burglary conviction after he was discovered inside the tool room of an apartment building putting tools into bags, along with possessing a stolen credit card and crack cocaine. Neal argued there was insufficient evidence that he entered a "dwelling" because no one lived or slept in the tool room itself, and he also challenged the jury instruction defining that term by omitting the phrase "or a portion thereof." The court affirmed the conviction, interpreting the statute to mean that a dwelling includes a building used for lodging, so the apartment building qualified even if the specific tool room did not. The court further held that the jury instruction was proper and not misleading because the state's theory relied on the building as a whole being a dwelling, and Neal could still argue his defense.
criminal lawprocedure