In Morrison v. Department of Labor & Industries, electrical contractor John Morrison challenged eight citations totaling $4,000 issued by the Department for violations of electrical laws. He sought to appeal to the Electrical Board but refused to pay the $200-per-citation filing fee required by RCW 19.28.131, claiming the requirement violated due process under the state and federal constitutions because it created a financial barrier. The superior court rejected the constitutional claim, found the fees imposed a hardship, reduced the total fee to $200, and remanded the appeal to the Board contingent on payment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Morrison's interest was solely economic rather than a fundamental liberty interest, the monetary prerequisite to appeal did not violate due process. The court also upheld the fee reduction under the trial court's inherent equitable authority and awarded Morrison his superior court filing fee as the prevailing party.
Wendy Birnbaum sued Pierce County under RCW 64.40 after the county took roughly five years to approve her 2005 application for a conditional-use permit to build an RV park and campground. The county had returned the initial application in 2006 for insufficient information on site plans, traffic, and other details, allowing Birnbaum either to appeal or submit revisions; she chose the latter and received final approval in March 2010. The trial court dismissed the complaint under CR 12(b)(6), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that any claim for exceeding the county’s 120-day decision deadline had to be filed within 30 days after that deadline (as tolled for information requests) rather than after the eventual permit issuance, that statutory “damages” cover only losses incurred between the accrual of a cause of action and the grant of relief, and that the 2006 hearing-examiner decision did not bar the later claims under collateral estoppel or LUPA.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
The case concerned whether Seattle Police Officer Danny Allen, injured while working off-duty directing traffic at a construction site, was an employee of Gary Merlino Construction Company or the City of Seattle for purposes of a workers’ compensation claim. The Department of Labor and Industries initially allowed the claim against the City but denied it against Merlino; the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals and the superior court reversed, finding Merlino was the employer. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Merlino was Allen’s employer because it exercised the right to control the details of his work—assigning him specific locations and tasks, setting his hours, and directing him on site—while Allen consented to that employment by accepting the assignment, reporting to Merlino supervisors, and being paid directly by the contractor. The court found no such control or consent existed with respect to the City, which had no knowledge of the off-duty assignment and did not direct Allen’s conduct.
The case concerned whether the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board had authority under the Growth Management Act (GMA) to review two 2010 Black Diamond city ordinances that approved master planned development permits for large projects proposed by Yarrow Bay. The Board had asserted jurisdiction, treated the ordinances as development regulations or subarea plans subject to GMA review, and remanded them to the city for further compliance proceedings after a citizens group challenged them. The court reversed, holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the 2010 ordinances merely approved site-specific project permits that were consistent with the city’s unchallenged 2009 comprehensive plan and MPD development regulations. Under controlling precedent such as Woods v. Kittitas County, the GMA does not authorize Board review of such permits; any challenge must instead proceed under the Land Use Petition Act in superior court and cannot collaterally attack the prior, unappealed 2009 enactments.
In Griffith v. Seattle School District No. 1, two special education teachers at Green Lake Elementary were suspended for 10 days without pay after refusing to administer the federally mandated Washington Alternative Assessment of Student (WAAS) portfolio to six eligible students, despite explicit instructions from their principal and missing a key December deadline. The teachers claimed their actions aligned with parental wishes or that the test was inappropriate for their students, but a hearing officer found they had declined on principle rather than because of documented parental refusals. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the hearing officer’s decision, holding that the insubordination constituted sufficient cause for the unpaid suspension under state law. The court reasoned that the findings of principled refusal were supported by evidence, including the teachers’ own emails and statements, and that the district’s chosen discipline was neither arbitrary nor contrary to law.
Chris Young sued three Puyallup Tribal Police officers in Washington state court after his brother died during an encounter at a tribal treatment center on the reservation. The brother had acted erratically, refused to leave, and resisted officers who detained him with a stun gun and restraints; the medical examiner ruled the death accidental due to excited delirium syndrome. Young alleged excessive force, wrongful death, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court dismissed the case under CR 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit because the officers acted within the scope of their official tribal authority to enforce law and maintain order on reservation land, with no waiver or congressional abrogation, and § 1983 does not reach tribal officials acting under color of tribal law.