Cites Com. of Ky. v. Moore — The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an opinion of the Court of Appeals, which vacated and remanded the Carroll Circuit Court's affirmation of the Carroll District Court's imposition of a fine up
The case involved Christian Dominguez, who had pleaded guilty to felony drug possession and misdemeanor terroristic threatening and was placed in a felony diversion program with conditions including compliance with all laws. After his arrest in Ohio on a domestic violence charge, which violated the program terms, the Campbell Circuit Court terminated his diversion and imposed probation rather than incarceration. Dominguez appealed, arguing that the court failed to make the factual findings required by KRS 439.3106(1) before taking that action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that those findings apply only when revocation leads to incarceration under subsection (1)(a), whereas the lesser sanction of probation under subsection (1)(b) requires only a determination that the violation occurred and a balancing of the offender’s risk of future crime against the availability of community interventions. The trial court satisfied the applicable requirements by finding the violation and selecting probation as the sanction.
The case concerned H.M.’s appeal of the Larue Circuit Court’s termination of her parental rights to her two minor children and its approval of stepparent adoptions by the children’s paternal grandparents. After the Cabinet removed the children in 2023 based on neglect petitions involving domestic violence allegations and substance abuse concerns, H.M. stipulated to neglect, received a case plan requiring treatment and sobriety, but repeatedly failed drug screens, attempted to falsify tests, did not complete any substance abuse program, accrued new drug-related charges, and lacked stable housing or employment. The circuit court found that KRS 199.502(1)(e) was satisfied because H.M. had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide essential parental care for more than six months with no reasonable expectation of improvement, and that adoption served the children’s best interests; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding these findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court was not required to apply the specific best-interest factors listed in KRS 625.090(3).
In a divorce case, Michael Brewington appealed a Ballard Circuit Court order directing him to pay his ex-wife Lisa $10,000 under their agreed mediation order—under which he kept the marital home and was to pay her that sum—plus $2,000 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Lisa’s motion to compel after Michael failed to make the payment, rejecting his claim that he was entitled to offset the amount because she had continued receiving full Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System benefits due to problems with a separate qualified domestic relations order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mediation order’s payment term was unambiguous and enforceable, and that Michael’s self-help defense was irrelevant because he had not filed his own motion asking the trial court to address the retirement payments issue. The court emphasized that parties must seek judicial resolution of disputes rather than unilaterally withholding performance.
Blake Haddix appealed the Breathitt Circuit Court’s denial of his CR 60.02 motion to vacate his 2006 convictions for murder and second-degree assault. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that Haddix’s claims—primarily ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a directed verdict or an extreme emotional disturbance instruction, plus alleged defects in the trial record—were not properly raised under CR 60.02. The court reasoned that Kentucky’s post-conviction structure requires such issues to be pursued first through direct appeal or RCr 11.42, and CR 60.02 is available only for extraordinary relief not obtainable by those means; Haddix had already litigated or could have raised these arguments in his prior proceedings (Haddix III and IV), which disposed of them. The opinion further noted that some claims lacked supporting evidence or development in the current briefing.
In E.N.C. v. A.W.H., the biological father appealed a Hopkins Family Court judgment that terminated his parental rights to his young child and granted an adoption petition filed by the child’s maternal aunt and uncle, who had become the child’s de facto custodians after the mother’s death in 2021. The family court found that the father had abandoned the child, failed to provide any financial or parental support despite having income, and met statutory grounds for involuntary termination under KRS 625.090. The Court of Appeals, reviewing the record after an Anders brief from counsel, independently confirmed that all four required factors were satisfied by clear and convincing evidence: the child was neglected through abandonment, a proper petition was filed, termination served the child’s best interests given the stable care provided by the petitioners, and the father had continuously failed to supply essential care or support with no reasonable expectation of improvement. The court therefore affirmed the termination of parental rights and the judgment of adoption.
In B.R. v. M.W., a mother appealed Grayson Circuit Court judgments that terminated her parental rights to two young daughters and allowed their maternal grandparents to adopt them without her consent. The children had been removed from the parents shortly after birth due to neglect and abuse findings, placed in the grandparents’ custody, and had no contact with the parents for several years after the district court suspended visitation; the grandparents later petitioned for adoption, citing abandonment and lack of support. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned the children for well over the statutory 90-day minimum under KRS 199.502(1)(a) by failing to seek visitation or reopen the cases until 2023. The court rejected the mother’s arguments that court orders and her later sobriety efforts excused the prolonged separation, noting that only one statutory ground was required for termination.