The case involved Anthony Nash, who was charged and pleaded guilty to violating Kentucky's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) for failing to report a change of address, along with being a persistent felony offender, based on his 1993 convictions for third-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court of Kentucky vacated the convictions and remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment. The court reasoned that the original 1994 SORA and all subsequent amendments applied only to persons convicted of qualifying sex offenses after the Act's effective date of July 15, 1994, and Nash's 1993 convictions fell outside that requirement, meaning he had no duty to register under any version of the statute.
In Gamble v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after passing a note to a bank teller stating he had a gun and verbally threatening its use during a theft, though no gun was seen or recovered. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether the trial court properly denied a directed verdict on the first-degree robbery charge under KRS 515.020(1)(c), which elevates second-degree robbery when a defendant uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument. The court held that the evidence was sufficient because the defendant's explicit statements about possessing a gun constituted a threat of a dangerous instrument, even without proof that one was actually present or used. It distinguished this from requirements for being armed with a deadly weapon and affirmed the conviction based on the plain language of the statute and supporting precedent. The decision clarified that such verbal threats alone can satisfy the aggravating element for first-degree robbery.
This case concerned whether Sanitation District No. 1 of Northern Kentucky had authority under KRS Chapter 220 to manage separate storm water drainage systems and impose fees for that service after entering interlocal agreements with local governments. The Boone Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the district, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court concluded that KRS 220.030(6) expressly authorizes districts to develop and implement plans for storm drainage collection and disposal, while KRS 220.515 and 510 allow the assessment of reasonable surcharges to fund those services. The decision rested on the plain meaning of the statutes as amended, without reference to unpassed legislation or other extrinsic materials.
In Deboy v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his conviction and five-year sentence for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon after a traffic stop led to the discovery of three loaded handguns in his vehicle. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the stop was lawful because the officer had reasonable suspicion based on recent knowledge that Deboy's license was suspended and that the evidence supported constructive possession given Deboy's ownership and operation of the vehicle with a handgun under his seat. The court further determined that challenges to the evidence's admissibility were not preserved due to the absence of a contemporaneous objection at trial. The ruling applied Kentucky precedents on investigatory stops under the totality of circumstances and on constructive possession of vehicle contents.
The case concerned whether double jeopardy principles barred the retrial of David Ray on lesser-included assault charges after a jury unanimously acquitted him of first-degree assault but deadlocked on the lesser offenses, resulting in a mistrial. The trial court granted Ray's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the acquittal on the greater charge prohibited further prosecution. The appellate court reversed, holding that a partial verdict acquitting on the greater offense does not bar retrial on lesser included offenses where the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The core reasoning was that implied acquittals apply upward to greater offenses but not downward to lesser ones, and manifest necessity due to a hung jury permits retrial on unresolved charges, consistent with federal and other state precedents.
The case involved the Fairbankses attempting to enforce two Florida judgments against the Larges in Kentucky circuit court, both through a civil action and by filing under Kentucky's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, after the judgments had accumulated significant interest. The Grayson Circuit Court dismissed the actions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Kentucky's fifteen-year statute of limitations under KRS 413.090 barred enforcement even though Florida's twenty-year period had not expired. The court reasoned that prior precedents established the forum state's limitations period applies to foreign judgments, and the UEFJA provides an alternative procedure but does not exempt such judgments from the limitations statute, as the legislature did not indicate otherwise.