Glenn Acree

The case involved Christian Dominguez, who had pleaded guilty to felony drug possession and misdemeanor terroristic threatening and was placed in a felony diversion program with conditions including compliance with all laws. After his arrest in Ohio on a domestic violence charge, which violated the program terms, the Campbell Circuit Court terminated his diversion and imposed probation rather than incarceration. Dominguez appealed, arguing that the court failed to make the factual findings required by KRS 439.3106(1) before taking that action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that those findings apply only when revocation leads to incarceration under subsection (1)(a), whereas the lesser sanction of probation under subsection (1)(b) requires only a determination that the violation occurred and a balancing of the offender’s risk of future crime against the availability of community interventions. The trial court satisfied the applicable requirements by finding the violation and selecting probation as the sanction.

criminal law

The case concerned H.M.’s appeal of the Larue Circuit Court’s termination of her parental rights to her two minor children and its approval of stepparent adoptions by the children’s paternal grandparents. After the Cabinet removed the children in 2023 based on neglect petitions involving domestic violence allegations and substance abuse concerns, H.M. stipulated to neglect, received a case plan requiring treatment and sobriety, but repeatedly failed drug screens, attempted to falsify tests, did not complete any substance abuse program, accrued new drug-related charges, and lacked stable housing or employment. The circuit court found that KRS 199.502(1)(e) was satisfied because H.M. had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide essential parental care for more than six months with no reasonable expectation of improvement, and that adoption served the children’s best interests; the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding these findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the trial court was not required to apply the specific best-interest factors listed in KRS 625.090(3).

family law

In a divorce case, Michael Brewington appealed a Ballard Circuit Court order directing him to pay his ex-wife Lisa $10,000 under their agreed mediation order—under which he kept the marital home and was to pay her that sum—plus $2,000 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Lisa’s motion to compel after Michael failed to make the payment, rejecting his claim that he was entitled to offset the amount because she had continued receiving full Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System benefits due to problems with a separate qualified domestic relations order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mediation order’s payment term was unambiguous and enforceable, and that Michael’s self-help defense was irrelevant because he had not filed his own motion asking the trial court to address the retirement payments issue. The court emphasized that parties must seek judicial resolution of disputes rather than unilaterally withholding performance.

family lawprocedure

Blake Haddix appealed the Breathitt Circuit Court’s denial of his CR 60.02 motion to vacate his 2006 convictions for murder and second-degree assault. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that Haddix’s claims—primarily ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a directed verdict or an extreme emotional disturbance instruction, plus alleged defects in the trial record—were not properly raised under CR 60.02. The court reasoned that Kentucky’s post-conviction structure requires such issues to be pursued first through direct appeal or RCr 11.42, and CR 60.02 is available only for extraordinary relief not obtainable by those means; Haddix had already litigated or could have raised these arguments in his prior proceedings (Haddix III and IV), which disposed of them. The opinion further noted that some claims lacked supporting evidence or development in the current briefing.

criminal lawprocedure

In E.N.C. v. A.W.H., the biological father appealed a Hopkins Family Court judgment that terminated his parental rights to his young child and granted an adoption petition filed by the child’s maternal aunt and uncle, who had become the child’s de facto custodians after the mother’s death in 2021. The family court found that the father had abandoned the child, failed to provide any financial or parental support despite having income, and met statutory grounds for involuntary termination under KRS 625.090. The Court of Appeals, reviewing the record after an Anders brief from counsel, independently confirmed that all four required factors were satisfied by clear and convincing evidence: the child was neglected through abandonment, a proper petition was filed, termination served the child’s best interests given the stable care provided by the petitioners, and the father had continuously failed to supply essential care or support with no reasonable expectation of improvement. The court therefore affirmed the termination of parental rights and the judgment of adoption.

family law

In B.R. v. M.W., a mother appealed Grayson Circuit Court judgments that terminated her parental rights to two young daughters and allowed their maternal grandparents to adopt them without her consent. The children had been removed from the parents shortly after birth due to neglect and abuse findings, placed in the grandparents’ custody, and had no contact with the parents for several years after the district court suspended visitation; the grandparents later petitioned for adoption, citing abandonment and lack of support. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned the children for well over the statutory 90-day minimum under KRS 199.502(1)(a) by failing to seek visitation or reopen the cases until 2023. The court rejected the mother’s arguments that court orders and her later sobriety efforts excused the prolonged separation, noting that only one statutory ground was required for termination.

family law

Kendall Paul Scott was convicted by a Warren Circuit Court jury of first-degree promoting contraband after fentanyl was discovered in a jail booking-area dressing room shortly after he was taken into custody and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender; he received a 12-year sentence that was ordered to run consecutively to two prior sentences for a total of 22 years. On appeal, Scott argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict, by imposing consecutive sentences that exceeded a statutory cap, and by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted promoting contraband. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the multi-angle video and surrounding circumstances constituted sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that KRS 533.060(2) required consecutive sentencing for an offense committed while on probation and that the aggregate-sentence cap in KRS 532.110(1)(c) does not apply to prior separate convictions; and that an attempt instruction was unwarranted because Scott had already introduced the contraband into the detention facility.

criminal lawprocedure

In Timothy Taylor v. Jonathan Singleton, the case involved a dispute over an oral loan contract in which a Daviess Circuit Court jury found for plaintiff Jonathan Singleton and awarded him damages. Taylor appealed, arguing only that the trial court should have granted his pretrial motion to transfer venue under KRS 452.105. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that Taylor failed to preserve the venue issue because he did not cite KRS 452.480 or present supporting authority to the trial court until his reply brief on appeal. The court explained that new arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief and that a trial court must have the opportunity to rule on issues before they can be reviewed on appeal.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved consolidated appeals by I.R. III (Father), an adoptive and foster parent, challenging the Greenup Circuit Court’s removal of six minor children from his home following a dependency, neglect, and abuse petition filed by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. The family court found that Father had sexually abused two daughters (A.R. and M.R.) through repeated inappropriate touching and demands, physically abused a son (I.R. IV) by inflicting injuries, and posed a risk of harm to the remaining children. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the removal orders. It held that the family court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, primarily the detailed testimony of the affected children describing the incidents, and were not clearly erroneous under the applicable standard of review; credibility assessments and inferences from the evidence were within the family court’s discretion. The court further concluded that the established abuse in the home provided a sufficient basis for the risk determination regarding the other children without speculation.

family law

Darren Wilson appealed the Harrison Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Cynthiana-Harrison County-Berry Joint Planning Commission, which rejected his claim that his long-running junkyard operation on agriculturally zoned land qualified as a permissible nonconforming use under KRS 100.253(3). Wilson had used the property as a junkyard since at least 2002 and argued he met the statute’s ten-year continuous-use requirement because no qualifying adverse actions had interrupted that period. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute requires an illegal use to exist for ten uninterrupted years free of any adverse order or action by local administrative officials. Multiple enforcement steps—including fiscal court proceedings in 2003 and 2004, criminal convictions in 2013, and a 2018 jury finding of 245 ordinance violations—occurred within the relevant timeframe and therefore disqualified Wilson’s property from nonconforming-use status.

propertybusiness & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

Ivan Starbuck sued landlords Joseph and Trina Burnett and their tenant Bunny Kay Waterman after Waterman’s three dogs attacked him while he walked past the rental property, alleging the Burnetts negligently allowed the dogs to remain despite their violent history. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the Burnetts on Starbuck’s claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Starbuck’s statutory claims were conceded and his common-law negligence claim failed because a landlord is not liable for injuries from a tenant’s dogs when the attack occurs off the leased premises and the landlord is not the dogs’ statutory owner. The court relied on precedent establishing a “premises-only rule” for such landlord liability, noting that Starbuck alleged only an off-premises attack and did not claim the Burnetts owned the dogs under the relevant statute.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involved Carmine Salerno’s appeal of a Garrard Family Court divorce decree that awarded Allison Salerno the Kentucky marital residence (valued at $350,000–$550,000 with an $80,000 mortgage), associated farm assets, pets, livestock, and related debts, plus $7,500 per month in permanent spousal maintenance. The Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings. Under KRS 403.190, the trial court has broad discretion to divide marital property in just proportions after considering factors such as each spouse’s contributions, the length of the marriage, economic circumstances, and the desirability of awarding the family home to the custodial parent; under KRS 403.200, it may award maintenance when the recipient lacks sufficient property or earning capacity to meet reasonable needs. The appellate court found the family court’s extensive findings on the parties’ income, lifestyle, and resources—supported by substantial evidence—showed no abuse of discretion.

family lawproperty

The case involved a dispute over whether an arbitration agreement signed during Eva Nell Sumner's admission to Chautauqua Health and Rehabilitation was enforceable. Maranda Hall, acting under a power of attorney as Sumner's attorney-in-fact, signed the optional agreement as "Authorized Representative" when Sumner was admitted; Sumner fell hours later, was hospitalized, and died days afterward. Hall later sued the facility and related entities as executrix of Sumner's estate, and the defendants moved to compel arbitration under the agreement. The trial court denied the motion, concluding Hall had signed only in her personal capacity as Sumner's friend. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hall's signature on the authorized-representative line bound Sumner, that Kentucky law does not require explicit disclosure of attorney-in-fact status, and that the agreement's delegation clause assigned questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator rather than the court.

healthcareprocedure

The case concerned an appeal by adjacent landowner Doug Daniel challenging the Henry Circuit Court’s upholding of the Henry County Fiscal Court’s approval of a zoning map amendment and conditional use permit for the Malins’ property. The Malins had sought to rezone 8.5 acres from A-1 (agricultural) to B-2 (business) to operate a retail store, event barn, amphitheater, and related agritourism activities. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the approval void because the Fiscal Court never enacted the zoning change through a written ordinance, as required by statute. The court explained that a zoning map amendment is a legislative act that must follow formal procedures, including two readings of an ordinance, and that merely signing a document titled “Zone Change Approval” or relying on planning commission minutes fails to satisfy these requirements; substantial compliance does not excuse such defects in the enactment of ordinances.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Angela Sexton v. Jeffrey Edward Dunn, Angela Sexton appealed an interpersonal protective order (IPO) entered against her by the Nicholas Family Court after her former boyfriend, Jeffrey Dunn, petitioned for protection based on a pattern of alleged stalking following their breakup. Dunn described Sexton faking a pregnancy for nine months, sending fabricated photos and messages about a nonexistent child, repeatedly contacting him and his new girlfriend over two years, following his family in public, driving past his home while honking and screaming, attempting to sabotage his employment, and other harassing acts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the IPO, holding that the evidence established stalking under KRS 508.150 because Sexton’s cumulative course of conduct served no legitimate purpose, caused Dunn substantial mental distress, and implicitly threatened harm, meeting the statutory criteria as found credible by the family court.

family lawcriminal law

The case concerned whether the Energy and Environment Cabinet properly revoked McCoy Elkhorn Coal’s surface coal mining permit after McCoy failed to file a timely answer to a Show Cause Order alleging permit violations. The Cabinet served the order in November 2019; McCoy filed its answer 56 days later without first obtaining an extension. The hearing officer recommended default, the Secretary revoked the permit, and the Franklin Circuit Court initially granted summary judgment to the Cabinet but later vacated that judgment after finding that McCoy had made a verbal request for more time. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with directions to reinstate summary judgment for the Cabinet. It held that 400 KAR 1:090 requires any request for an extension of time to be made by formal written motion accompanied by a supporting memorandum and proposed order, and that a verbal request does not satisfy the regulation.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In L.R. v. S.A., a biological father appealed a Powell Family Court order that terminated his parental rights to his child and granted a private adoption petition filed by the child’s half-sibling’s adoptive grandparents under KRS 199.502. The family court had found clear and convincing evidence of abandonment after a March 2025 hearing and later entered termination and adoption judgments. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence of abandonment because the father had attempted to secure visitation compatible with his work schedule and had arranged for his mother to attend proceedings on his behalf. The court noted that the child’s custody status would remain governed by the separate, still-active juvenile action rather than the adoption proceeding.

family law

The case involved the Cabinet for Health and Family Services appealing a final order of the Kentucky Personnel Board to Franklin Circuit Court concerning Rita Richardson, as authorized by statute. The Cabinet initiated the appeal in October 2023 and issued summons but failed to properly serve the Board through the Attorney General for more than six months, prompting the Board to move for dismissal. The circuit court granted the motion, finding the Cabinet had engaged in unreasonable delay. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court's factual finding of delay was supported by substantial evidence showing no service efforts until after the motion was filed, which defeated any claim of good faith and required dismissal under rules for perfecting statutory appeals.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case arose from a motor vehicle accident in which Viviane Renot sued Secura Supreme Insurance Company over disputed causation of her subsequent health problems. After the Kentucky Supreme Court ordered a new trial due to improper medical-causation testimony by Secura’s biomechanics expert, a second jury again returned a verdict for Secura, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Renot failed to preserve her objections to the expert’s testimony by making timely, contemporaneous objections; that her Batson and for-cause juror challenges were either unpreserved or lacked merit because no extrajudicial bias was shown; and that the trial court properly excluded irrelevant testimony from Secura’s corporate representative. The court therefore found no reversible error in the second trial’s proceedings.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

Marcus S. Minix, Sr., an optician who owned a Medicaid-participating vision practice, was convicted after a jury trial on one count of theft by unlawful taking ($1,000–$10,000) by complicity and one count of devising a scheme to defraud the Kentucky Medical Assistance Program by complicity, based on evidence that his office submitted bills for unperformed services. The Franklin Circuit Court entered judgment on the verdicts, and Minix, who represented himself at trial after appointed counsel withdrew following jury selection, appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the indictment satisfied the requirements of RCr 6.10, that claims of defective venue and denial of a preliminary hearing lacked merit under current law, and that Minix knowingly and voluntarily proceeded pro se without objecting to counsel’s withdrawal. The court noted that Minix had not requested palpable-error review of unpreserved issues but nevertheless found no basis for reversal after examining both preserved and unpreserved claims.

criminal lawhealthcareprocedure