In this case, Xavier Chariot appealed his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing that the trial court should have granted a motion for judgment of acquittal because the weapon was not concealed and that the court erred by failing to hold a Faretta hearing. The defendant had opposed his counsel's request for a continuance to file a motion to suppress or locate a witness, choosing instead to proceed to trial immediately. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the state presented sufficient evidence on concealment to create a jury question. On the Faretta issue, the court reasoned that the defendant never sought to represent himself, so no Faretta inquiry was required, and the trial court's colloquy adequately confirmed that his opposition to the continuance was knowing and intelligent, consistent with precedents like Curtis v. State and Boyd v. State.
In Brown v. State, the appellant, convicted of burglary and grand theft, challenged only the grand theft conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to show he possessed the stolen jewelry and cash and that the state failed to prove the specific values of the items. The court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient under a circumstantial evidence standard because the victim identified the appellant leaving the ransacked unit, the appellant fled the scene, and this was inconsistent with his defense theory. The court further held that the claim regarding proof of the jewelry's value was not preserved for appeal, as it was not raised in the motion for judgment of acquittal at trial.
In Smith v. State, the appellant sought to vacate his 1986 conviction for possession of cannabis with intent to deliver through a postconviction motion, asserting that neither counsel nor the court had advised him during the plea hearing that the conviction could trigger deportation proceedings, which began in 2010, and that he would not have pled guilty if so informed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. The decision rested on three grounds: the motion was filed outside the two-year time limit established in State v. Green for claims involving potential deportation; the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, which recognized ineffective assistance claims based on deportation advice, does not apply retroactively under Florida precedent; and the appellant's separate firearm conviction could independently render him deportable under federal law, so the drug conviction was not shown to be the sole basis for removal proceedings.
This case concerned a mother's appeal of a final judgment terminating her parental rights to her child S.A. The mother argued that termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child because the court had not terminated her rights to the child's half-siblings. The appellate court affirmed the termination, holding that each child's circumstances must be assessed individually under the least restrictive means test. Here, the mother had made no progress on her case plan, had no contact with S.A. for over a year, and was out of state, while the half-siblings remained in a stable placement with their father who was also caring for S.A. The court found termination appropriate to achieve permanency for S.A. based on these distinct facts.
In this case, a petitioner filed a mandamus petition in circuit court to enforce a public records request under section 119.11, Florida Statutes, but no hearing was set after eight months despite an order for response. The appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to schedule an immediate hearing as required by the statute. The court reasoned that the statute mandates an immediate hearing with priority over other cases, and eight months delay does not satisfy that requirement, imposing a ministerial duty on the trial court.
In Smith v. State, the appellant was convicted of organized scheme to defraud after a joint trial with a co-defendant, during which the jury was instructed that the state must prove the defendants 'and/or' engaged in a scheme to defraud and obtained property through it. Smith appealed, arguing that the 'and/or' conjunction in the elements instruction constituted fundamental error because it potentially allowed the jury to convict him based solely on the co-defendant's actions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that Smith waived the claim by affirmatively requesting the 'and/or' language and that, under the totality of the circumstances, no fundamental error occurred. The core reasoning was that the trial court also gave standard instructions on multiple defendants and principals, the parties' closing arguments repeatedly emphasized separate consideration of each defendant, and separate verdict forms were used, ensuring the jury did not misapply the law.