The case concerned whether Florida State Representative Rick Kriseman and his aide could invoke legislative privilege to avoid testifying in depositions about how they obtained and distributed confidential documents related to tax litigation involving Expedia and Florida counties. The underlying dispute involved challenges to tourist development tax assessments and claims of privilege waiver. The court held that the subpoenas must be quashed because a legislative privilege exists under common law, is implicit in the Florida Constitution's separation of powers, and covers the gathering and sharing of information on pending legislation. It reasoned that the requested testimony fell squarely within protected legislative functions and extended to staff, though the privilege is not absolute.
In Bush v. State, the defendant was arrested on armed robbery and related felony charges and, at his first appearance hearing, was released on $60,000 bail after the prosecutor agreed to the amounts set by the local bail schedule. Later the same day, a different prosecutor moved for pretrial detention under section 907.041 before a circuit judge, who overruled the defense objection, heard additional evidence, and ordered the defendant held without bail. The District Court of Appeal granted the defendant's habeas corpus petition and quashed the detention order, holding that the state lacked good cause to modify the earlier bail determination because the second prosecutor's claim that the first prosecutor had made an error did not constitute a change in circumstances or new information unknown at the first hearing. The court reasoned that once a defendant is admitted to bail, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131 requires good cause supported by evidence of changed circumstances before a modification can be granted.
In Austin v. State, the defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after a traffic stop in which cocaine was found in a rental car he was driving, which had been rented in his wife's name. The key issue on appeal was the trial court's decision to allow a Florida Highway Patrol trooper to testify, based on his training and experience, about how drug traffickers commonly use third-party rentals to distance themselves from contraband if stopped. The appellate court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that such testimony about the general behavior patterns of drug offenders was inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt because it invited the jury to convict by association rather than on the specific facts. The court further reasoned that the error was not harmless, as the testimony directly undermined the defense that the defendant lacked knowledge of the drugs and the state presented no other evidence of knowledge.
This case involved an appeal by Austin Thomas Beahan from a trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop that led to charges of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle. The majority reasoned that the defendant's slow driving, stops in a residential area, and U-turn over the curb, even in a known drug area, did not indicate impairment or justify the stop for driving under the influence. A dissenting judge argued that the erratic driving combined with the location provided sufficient basis for suspicion.
The case involved former Broward County Sheriff Ken Jenne's appeal of an administrative order forfeiting his state retirement benefits after his federal guilty plea to conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The court affirmed the forfeiture, holding that Jenne's conviction qualified as a 'specified offense' under section 112.3173(2)(e)6., Florida Statutes (2001), because the admitted facts showed the crime was committed through misuse of his public office in dealings with a real estate developer and others, including undisclosed benefits like home demolition, loans, payments funneled through secretaries, and a company car. The reasoning emphasized the catch-all statutory provision covering any felony involving breach of public trust when committed in the described manner, distinguishing prior precedent and aligning with the state constitution's allowance for legislative definition of such forfeitures.
The case involved an appeal by Roadrunner Construction, Inc. from a final administrative order by the Department of Financial Services imposing a $667,000 penalty for noncompliance with a workers' compensation order. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because both the original notice filed with the agency clerk and the duplicate filed with the appellate court clerk were untimely under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(c), as the 30-day deadline fell on December 24, 2009, which was not a legal holiday for the agency clerk's office. The core reasoning was that Article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 59.081, Florida Statutes, make timely filing jurisdictional, and rule 9.420(f) defines holidays strictly without extending the deadline based on the appellate court's closure or other clerks' practices. The majority rejected arguments that the duplicate filing or ambiguous holiday definitions could cure the defect, while a dissent advocated construing the rules to allow adjudication on the merits.