Cynthia Bowdoin died intestate, survived by her husband George Bowdoin and a minor child. Her mother, Mary Rinnier, petitioned to be appointed personal representative of the estate, while the husband filed a counter-petition seeking the appointment as surviving spouse. The circuit court granted the mother's petition after finding it in the best interest of the parties. The appellate court reversed, holding that under Florida Statutes section 733.301 the surviving spouse has statutory priority for appointment, and that absent evidence showing the preferred person is unfit to serve, the court must appoint the spouse. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the husband lacks the necessary qualities to administer the estate.
This case involves a custody dispute between Edward Thomas Slover, the natural father, and Phyllis Meyer, the maternal step-grandmother, over Slover's child following the mother's death. After the father complied with a prior parenting plan that awarded legal and physical custody to Meyer due to his substance abuse issues, he petitioned in Florida to modify the Colorado custody order, citing his recovery, stable marriage, employment, and suitable home. The trial court denied the petition, finding both parties fit and applying a standard that required showing a substantial change in circumstances not contemplated at the time of the original order plus that modification would serve the child's best interest. The appellate court reversed and remanded, ruling that the proper standard in a dispute between a fit natural parent and a third party is whether the parent is fit and whether awarding custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child.
The case involved M.A.F., a juvenile, who was charged with introducing contraband into a county detention facility and possessing marijuana after a small amount was found in his backpack at the jail. The trial court adjudicated him delinquent on both charges, but on appeal, the court affirmed the possession finding and reversed the introduction charge. The core reasoning was that while M.A.F. knew the backpack contained marijuana and was entering the facility, he lacked the ability to maintain control over it once separated from the deputy, negating constructive possession necessary for the introduction offense.
This case arose from an eminent domain proceeding in which the condemning authority appealed a trial court fee award to the defendant landowners, the heirs and beneficiaries of Prince Griffin's estate. The landowners moved for appellate attorney's fees and costs, which the appellate court initially denied but later granted on rehearing. The court remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of the award. It relied on Florida precedents holding that a prevailing defendant landowner is entitled to such fees and costs when the condemning authority appeals a fee award, pursuant to section 73.131(2), Florida Statutes.
The case involves Otis Eugene Harrell challenging his convictions and sentences for attempted robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery with great bodily harm. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences without comment but remanded the matter for correction of scrivener’s errors in the written judgment. The judgment incorrectly indicated a guilty plea and conviction for robbery with a firearm rather than attempted robbery, and it failed to reflect the aggravated battery conviction that appeared in the trial transcript. The court directed entry of a corrected written judgment to match the actual convictions, citing prior precedent on such corrections.
The case involved former spouses disputing enforcement of child support obligations and division of proceeds from a "Turley Note Receivable" asset under two mediation agreements incorporated into their divorce judgment. The former wife appealed the trial court's denial of her contempt motion against the former husband and its grant of his motion to enforce the second agreement by awarding him all note funds. The appellate court reversed, ruling that the agreements were unambiguous: the second one settled only the pending custody modification issue and expressly left the prior equal-sharing provision for the note and other terms of the final judgment unmodified. It also reversed the denial of contempt relief and remanded for determination of the child support arrearage amount owed.
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