The case involved Susan Farrell appealing a trial court's post-dissolution order that denied her motion for attorney's fees incurred while defending against her former husband's contempt and sanctions motion. At an evidentiary hearing on the fees motion, the former wife could not finish presenting her case and the former husband presented none of his evidence, yet the trial court sua sponte denied the motion before the scheduled continuation hearing. The appellate court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the failure to allow parties to fully present evidence violated due process and required reversal.
This case involved a dependency proceeding for sixteen-year-old G.S. after his mother C.T. was arrested in Florida on a California warrant, leaving no caregiver available. The mother consented to the dependency finding but challenged the Department of Children and Family Services' case plan, which required her to complete domestic violence evaluation, parenting classes, and prescription drug monitoring—tasks she had already finished in prior California proceedings. The trial court accepted the full case plan, partly to mirror requirements for the father. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed the dependency adjudication but reversed acceptance of the case plan, holding that under sections 39.6011, 39.6012, and 39.603, Florida Statutes, tasks must be tailored to the specific facts causing the dependency, here the mother's arrest and extradition rather than unrelated issues. The court remanded for an amended case plan addressing only those circumstances.
In State v. Kotecki, the State appealed a trial court's dismissal of a charge of unlawful sexual activity with a minor, which had been transferred from Manatee County to Sarasota County at the defendant's request before dismissal on venue grounds. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant had waived any right to trial in Manatee County by electing the transfer under Article I, section 16(a) of the Florida Constitution, which permits alternative county allegations when the exact location is uncertain due to equivocal testimony. The court further reasoned that the civil venue statute limiting second transfers did not apply to criminal cases and that transfer, not dismissal, is the preferred remedy for venue issues, with waiver occurring upon a defendant's venue election as confirmed by statute and precedent.
In Norwood v. State, the appellant challenged a postconviction court's order vacating all orders it had entered on his motion for postconviction relief after an appellate mandate was inadvertently issued while a motion for rehearing remained pending. The court affirmed the vacating order, holding that the postconviction court lacked jurisdiction to act on the motion while rehearing was still pending in the appellate court. However, because Norwood had amended one claim to make it facially sufficient in reliance on the postconviction court's erroneous orders, the court remanded with directions for the postconviction court to consider the merits of that claim under the unique circumstances of the case.
In Carter v. State, the defendant appealed his convictions for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft after being seen removing a TV from a victim's home. The court affirmed the burglary conviction but reduced the grand theft conviction to petit theft. The core reasoning was that while the evidence established a theft occurred, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the TV's value met or exceeded $300 as required for third-degree grand theft under Florida law. Specifically, the victim's testimony about monthly payments on a plan provided no information on original cost, market value at the time of the offense, condition, depreciation, or other required factors for establishing value. The case was remanded for resentencing on the reduced charge.
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida sought certiorari review after a trial court denied its motion for summary judgment in an eminent domain action brought by the Department of Environmental Protection to acquire three parcels of land in Collier County for an Everglades restoration project. The Tribe argued that sovereign immunity and the federal Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, barred the taking of land it had purchased in fee simple on the open market. The court denied the petition, holding that the trial court’s ruling did not depart from the essential requirements of the law. The core reasoning was that an eminent domain proceeding is an in rem action against the property itself, to which sovereign immunity does not apply, and that the Nonintercourse Act protections do not extend to land acquired by a tribe in fee simple after it had been freely alienable and held by private parties.