This case involved Roger Taylor's appeal of a decision by the Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) denying him unemployment compensation benefits after his termination from Discount Furniture Mart. Taylor had been fired after providing doctor's notes indicating he could not return to work due to health issues, and the UAC found he had quit or abandoned his job. The court reversed the UAC's ruling, determining that the appeals referee's decision in favor of Taylor was supported by competent substantial evidence and that the UAC had improperly substituted its judgment for that of the referee. The reasoning centered on the fact that the employer did not inform Taylor of the acceptable terms of his leave, so his absence did not constitute voluntary departure or misconduct under the relevant statute.
This case involved a rear-end auto collision in which plaintiff Dianna Douglas-Seibert sued defendants Louis Riccucci and Tarmac America, LLC, alleging negligence by the driver and owner of the cement truck that struck her vehicle from behind. After the close of evidence, the trial court denied her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of Riccucci's negligence but granted it on her own lack of comparative negligence; the jury then returned a verdict for the defendants. The appellate court reversed, holding that Florida law creates a presumption of negligence by the rear driver in such collisions and that the defendants failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption under recognized exceptions, such as a sudden or improper stop by the lead driver that could not reasonably have been anticipated.
In Bridges v. State, the defendant appealed the trial court's summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, which alleged two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the State's late notice of Williams rule evidence and counsel's advice to enter a nolo contendere plea to lewd or lascivious molestation charges. The appellate court reversed the denial of ground one, finding that the trial court improperly rejected the claim about a potential motion to exclude the evidence based solely on the shared statute violated, without considering the factual differences alleged between the incidents. It also reversed because the trial court failed to address or provide rationale for denying the second claim regarding counsel's alleged statements about jury bias and harsh sentencing. The court remanded for attachment of record portions refuting the claims or for an evidentiary hearing, while affirming the denial of the motion's other grounds.
Richard Lamerton appealed his convictions for one count of use of a child in a sexual performance and five counts of possession of child pornography, as well as his sentence. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error. However, it determined that a probation condition prohibiting contact with anyone under age 18 was improperly broad, as established by precedent in Rowles v. State. The court therefore reversed the probation order and remanded the case for entry of a revised order. During the appeal, Lamerton had also raised the probation issue in a separate motion, but no new order had been entered at the trial level.
In Glenn v. State, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm and resisting an officer with violence after an altercation with a police officer who responded to the defendant driving his car into a lake. The defendant and the officer provided conflicting accounts of the incident, with the defendant claiming the officer struck him first with a baton without provocation. The trial court denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the justifiable use of non-deadly force in self-defense. On appeal, the court reversed those convictions, ruling that the trial court abused its discretion because the defendant's version of events was sufficient to support the instruction when the evidence was conflicting, and it remanded for a new trial on those counts while affirming the rest of the judgment.
The case involved the State appealing the trial court's dismissal of an aggravated battery by a detained person charge against Samantha Converse, who had thrown hot coffee at another inmate while in prison, resulting in her receiving disciplinary confinement from the Department of Corrections. Converse argued that the criminal prosecution violated double jeopardy because the administrative discipline already punished her for the same incident. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that the motion was legally insufficient because Converse did not show that the discipline was criminal under the controlling statute or rule, or that the scheme was so punitive in purpose or effect as to transform it into a criminal penalty. Relying on Hudson v. United States, the court explained that double jeopardy protects only against multiple criminal punishments and requires a facial two-step statutory analysis, which could not be performed without the relevant statute or regulation.