In Oakes v. State, Jason Hardy Oakes appealed his conviction for false imprisonment after a domestic violence incident in which he argued with, struck, and pinned his girlfriend to the floor. He contended the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence failed to prove he confined or restrained the victim against her will. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the victim's testimony about being pinned by the appellant's knees on her shoulders while being hit and choked met the statutory definition of false imprisonment under section 787.02(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The court reasoned that even temporary forcible restraint of movement, without lawful authority, satisfies the elements of the offense, as supported by prior case law requiring only minimal force to restrict freedom.
The case concerned consolidated appeals from orders by the Northwest Florida Water Management District dismissing administrative challenges by Washington County and a land trust to the District's 2008 Region III Regional Water Supply Plan under section 373.709(5), Florida Statutes. The plan identified inland groundwater development as one water supply project option, which later factored into a separate consumptive use permit application by Bay County. The court reversed the District's ruling that the plan could never be challenged under chapter 120 but affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for lack of standing. It reasoned that while the statute permits challenges to plan portions affecting substantial interests, the plan itself had no direct legal effect on the appellants' interests or on their ability to contest the permit in separate proceedings, failing the Agrico standing test.
The case involved a mother appealing a circuit court order that adjudicated her two minor children dependent and placed them in the custody of the Department of Children and Families, based on allegations including the mother's substance abuse, exposure to domestic violence, educational and dental neglect, and psychological instability. The Department of Children and Families had petitioned for dependency after removing the children from the home, and the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the children faced a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect. The appellate court reversed the adjudication, holding that none of the trial court's findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence under Florida statutes defining abuse, abandonment, and neglect. The court specifically determined that the evidence failed to establish a present or imminent threat of harm to the children from the mother's alcohol and drug use, the domestic violence, the lack of dental care, or her self-harm behavior.
In Lewis v. Morgan, Jerry Lewis was arrested by Escambia County Sheriff's deputies for grand theft after a car dealership reported him for failing to return a vehicle when financing fell through on the purchase contract. Lewis had the criminal charge dismissed and then sued the sheriff for false arrest and malicious prosecution; the trial court dismissed those claims without prejudice, finding that the complaint itself showed probable cause for the arrest, and later denied leave to file an amended complaint adding claims for abuse of process and invasion of privacy. The District Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly dismissed the initial claims but abused its discretion by denying amendment, because Lewis was not bound by the prior allegations and could potentially state valid causes of action in a new pleading. The court therefore reversed the dismissal with prejudice and remanded for further proceedings. The decision rested on Florida rules allowing amendment of complaints and the principle that probable cause defeats false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
In Greenwade v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction for cocaine trafficking after officers executing a search warrant found nine bags of white powder that the defendant admitted contained cocaine, along with a digital scale and a residue-covered spoon; the bags were field-tested, their contents combined without individual lab testing, and the resulting mixture weighed 234.5 grams and tested positive for cocaine. The court affirmed the conviction on the trafficking charge, concluding that the state's evidence was sufficient to prove possession of 200 to 400 grams of cocaine or a cocaine mixture. The reasoning emphasized the defendant's admissions, the tools of the drug trade found nearby, the field tests, and the statutory language allowing for mixtures, which together permitted the jury to infer that all bags contained contraband meeting the weight threshold.
This case was a medical malpractice appeal arising from a birth injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff alleged that an obstetrician negligently used a vacuum extractor multiple times during delivery, causing an ischemic stroke and cerebral palsy in the infant. After a jury trial, the defendants prevailed with a verdict finding no negligence that caused injury to the child, and the trial court entered final judgment accordingly. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly excluded causation-related testimony from the plaintiff's standard-of-care expert because he lacked qualification to opine on that issue, and that defense experts' references to supporting studies did not amount to improper bolstering of their opinions.