In this personal injury case, plaintiff Duplantis sued multiple defendants, including Brock Specialty Services, after a car accident, alleging negligence by the driver and vicarious liability by the owners and employer. Brock Specialty made an offer of judgment for $300,000 that required Duplantis to release all defendants and dismiss the entire case, which he rejected; the jury later awarded him only $18,400. The trial court granted Brock Specialty attorney’s fees and costs based on the rejected offer under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 and section 768.79. The appellate court reversed, holding the offer invalid because it was a joint proposal that failed to apportion amounts and terms among defendants, and vicarious liability remained disputed, preventing the plaintiff from independently evaluating each party’s offer.
In this case, Fort Plantation Investments borrowed $1,035,000 from Ironstone Bank via a construction loan secured by a mortgage on property in St. Johns County and absolute, unconditional guaranties from multiple parties. After default, the bank sued Fort Plantation on the note and to foreclose the mortgage while also seeking money judgments against the guarantors. The trial court entered summary judgment for the bank, awarding damages against the guarantors and ordering a foreclosure sale while retaining jurisdiction for a potential deficiency. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida law permits simultaneous pursuit of an absolute guaranty and foreclosure in the same action, but allowing the guarantors to seek set-off from sale proceeds.
The case involved Mr. Shade's conviction for attempted second-degree murder. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case. It did so because the jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter was fundamentally erroneous. This conclusion followed from multiple prior decisions of the same court, while noting conflict with a decision from another district court.
Christina Hamilton appealed a final judgment of paternity, contesting the trial court's grant of visitation to the child's natural father and possibly the paternity determination itself. The record included a DNA test confirming paternity but lacked a transcript of proceedings, limiting appellate review. Visitation and shared parenting matters are fact-intensive, and absent a transcript or any defect apparent on the face of the judgment, such issues cannot be reviewed on appeal. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision.
France Etienne appealed the denial of his motion to correct a sentencing error after he admitted to violating community control and received a sixty-month prison sentence as a youthful offender. The court determined that the violation was based on being out of place under condition eleven of community control rather than other alleged new offenses, but the sentencing order had omitted reference to the specific condition. Finding no error in the underlying sentence, the court affirmed the denial while remanding the case for entry of an amended order to reflect the violation of condition eleven.
In this dependency case, the Department of Children and Families took two surviving children into custody after their infant sibling died, with a pending report on the mother's substance abuse and the infant's positive drug test at birth. The trial court adjudicated the children dependent based on the mother's consent by default and, after a hearing as to the father, found he had not abused or neglected the children but still determined they faced a substantial risk of prospective harm due to his awareness of the mother's issues and leaving them unsupervised with her, leading to a case plan and non-relative placement. The appellate court reversed, holding that section 39.507(7) permits only one dependency adjudication order and requires an evidentiary hearing focused on whether each parent actually abused, abandoned, or neglected the children rather than prospective risk, following the procedure outlined in prior precedent like P.S. v. Department of Children and Families.
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