In J.R.B. v. J.L.B., a father appealed a trial court order granting temporary custody of his two minor daughters to the grandparents under Florida Statutes chapter 751. The grandparents had filed an emergency petition while the children were staying with them during court-ordered make-up visitation after the father had previously withheld access. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, reversed the order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition, ruling that the grandparents lacked standing because the statute requires an extended family member to be caring for a child full time in the role of a substitute parent with whom the child is presently living, and temporary visitation does not meet that requirement. The court noted that the grandparents or the Department of Children and Families could still pursue a dependency action under chapter 39 or obtain parental consent for custody.
The case involved a former husband's appeal from a trial court's denial of his petition to modify custody and visitation arrangements for his two children following two divorces from his former wife. The trial court had based its denial on the conclusion that a 2007 agreed order designating the former husband as primary residential custodian was superseded by the 2006 final judgment due to a filing error, and found no substantial change in circumstances since 2006. The appellate court reversed, holding that the 2007 order validly modified the 2006 judgment and that the trial court's reversion to the 2006 arrangements improperly modified the parenting plan without the required showing of changed circumstances. The court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing to assess whether a substantial, material, and unanticipated change had occurred since the 2007 order and whether modification would be in the children's best interests.
The case involved Tillman Moore's appeal of his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse of his three-month-old son. Moore argued that the crimes merged and that evidence of prior burn injuries to the victim was improperly admitted under the Williams rule. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the crimes did not merge and that the prior burn incidents were admissible to prove absence of mistake or accident given Moore's sole care of the victim and his accident claims. The court reasoned that no additional factual similarity was required beyond the physical abuse context and that the evidence was relevant to rebut the defense of accidental injury.
In Walker v. State, Eric Walker appealed his convictions and life sentences for robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery while armed with a firearm and wearing a mask. The sole issue addressed on appeal was whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to use a .38 caliber revolver as a demonstrative aid during the victim's testimony, even though no firearm was recovered in the case and the aid was not the weapon actually used. The victim had described the gun used in the crime as a snub-nose .38 revolver, and the state used the demonstrative aid to illustrate how the victim could see bullets in the chamber. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the aid was similar enough to the described weapon, was never admitted as evidence, was accompanied by clear jury instructions that it was unrelated to the case, and was relevant to the victim's identification of the firearm and its connection to .38 caliber ammunition found on Walker at arrest.
This case involved a failed business relationship between JMA and Firstate over an agreement for Firstate to market JMA's automotive extended warranty contracts in Puerto Rico, leading to disputes over payment timing, contract amendments, termination, and resulting lawsuits. JMA sued for breach of contract, breach of a promissory note, and related claims, while Firstate countersued for tortious interference and defamation; after a jury trial, it awarded Firstate $6,750,000 on the counterclaims and rejected the other claims. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment on all contract claims but reversed on the tortious interference and defamation counterclaims, holding that Firstate failed to present proof on the correct measure of damages for tortious interference and evidence of any actionable defamatory statements by JMA, and directed entry of judgment for JMA on those counts.
In Canady v. State, the appellant challenged his convictions for delivery of cocaine and dealing in stolen property after an undercover officer sold him an Xbox and radio in exchange for cash and crack cocaine. The court affirmed the cocaine conviction but reversed the dealing in stolen property conviction. The core reasoning was that although evidence showed Canady should have known the items were stolen, no evidence supported the required element that he intended to traffic in or sell the property afterward, as the purchase was consistent with personal use and lacked any indication of future sale plans under Florida Statutes sections 812.019 and 812.012.