This case involved Paramount Contractors, a company seeking to erect and maintain supergraphic signs at two locations in Los Angeles, which sued the City after its permit applications were not accepted or processed under the City's sign regulations, including the Hollywood Signage Supplemental Use District. Paramount raised claims under the First Amendment, equal protection, and takings clauses, along with related allegations of discriminatory treatment and improper permit conditions, following an earlier similar lawsuit that had been dismissed. The court granted the City's motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in full and with prejudice, finding that many claims were moot due to a 2010 amendment banning such signs, that Paramount could not pursue damages after disavowing them in prior proceedings, and that the remaining as-applied, equal protection, and takings claims failed as a matter of law because no pattern of favoritism was shown and the City was not liable for actions by the Community Redevelopment Agency.
free speechbusiness & regulatorypropertycivil rights
The case involved Reuland Electric Company's motion to enforce a 2008 CERCLA consent decree it entered with the EPA and enjoin Northrop Grumman's pending state court contribution action. The underlying dispute concerned VOC groundwater contamination in the San Gabriel Basin's Puente Valley Operable Unit, where Reuland had settled its federal liability but Northrop Grumman, after settling separately with a private water company for well-treatment costs, sought equitable indemnity from non-settling parties including Reuland. The court denied the motion, ruling that the decree's contribution protection extended only to EPA "response costs" and "Matters Addressed" under CERCLA and did not encompass the water company's separate pre- and post-remedy damages. It further held that the Anti-Injunction Act barred enjoining the state action, as no statutory exception applied and the state claims were not preempted by the federal decree.
This case involves a trademark dispute over the mark "Would You Rather ... ?" used for board games and books. Zobmondo Entertainment filed a counterclaim seeking to cancel Spin Master's federal trademark registration on the grounds of fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, alleging lack of bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce at the time of the intent-to-use application. The court granted Spin Master's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the counterclaim. The reasoning was that the undisputed facts demonstrated efforts by Spin Master's predecessors to develop and commercialize the game, such as preparing materials and seeking contacts, which established a bona fide intent, and there was no evidence of a subjective intent to deceive the PTO.
This case is a class action brought by mobility- and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees against Orange County, California, alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the county jail system. Following a bench trial after remand from the Ninth Circuit, the court found that the County violated the ADA by maintaining inaccessible facilities, categorically excluding disabled detainees from programs and services available to others when viewed in their entirety, and failing to provide adequate ADA notice and grievance procedures. The court concluded that reasonable accommodations exist to remedy these violations. It therefore ordered the County to submit a remedial plan within 45 days addressing the identified deficiencies, while limiting the class to pretrial detainees with mobility or dexterity impairments.
This case involved plaintiffs Wayne Charles and Fort Self Storage, Inc. challenging the City of Los Angeles's classification of their proposed temporary off-site signs (including one promoting E! News) as commercial under the City's Sign Ordinance, which generally prohibits or restricts such signs while allowing noncommercial messages. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, claiming the signs were noncommercial and thus permitted. The court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the signs were properly classified as commercial speech because they promoted a business, product, or service not located on the premises, applying the Bolger factors and related precedents to distinguish commercial from noncommercial content. The court found no viable First Amendment or state constitutional claim on this basis and denied the motion for a more definite statement as moot.
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