The case involved Wendy Ann Steller's appeal from a judgment enforcing a $95,000 settlement agreement with Sears under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 in her civil action for disability discrimination arising from a back injury. Steller argued that the agreement covered only the civil suit and not her related workers' compensation claim, which requires separate approval by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board under Labor Code section 5001, while Sears contended that the broad language in the section 998 offer encompassed both. The trial court found the settlement language unambiguous and enforced it as covering all employment-related claims without considering extrinsic evidence of intent. The Court of Appeal affirmed, construing the judgment to require WCAB approval for the workers' compensation portion and holding that any error in ignoring extrinsic evidence was harmless because the evidence confirmed the parties intended to settle both claims.
This case concerned a dispute over the ownership of a Bank of America savings account that was part of the Lucia Howery Living Trust. After Howery's death, the successor trustee sought to transfer the account to Gabriella Reeves as named in the trust, but appellant Lori Younkin, the originally designated beneficiary, objected claiming she remained the owner because the trust documents did not validly change the beneficiary under Probate Code section 5303. The trial court ruled that the trust changed the beneficiary to Reeves. On appeal, the court affirmed, holding that the trust documents effectively transferred the account and that Younkin's additional argument under Probate Code section 21350 (presumptive invalidity due to the drafting attorney's relationship to Reeves) had been forfeited by not being timely raised or ruled upon in the trial court.
This case involves Edwin Baker, an independent wholesale sales representative who sued his former employer, American Horticulture Supply, Inc., alleging violations of the Independent Wholesale Sales Representatives Contractual Relations Act of 1990 along with claims for breach of contract, promissory fraud, and quantum meruit related to unpaid or underpaid commissions on sales. The trial court granted the employer's motion for a directed verdict on the statutory claim, finding no evidence of willfulness despite noncompliance with the Act's requirements for written contracts and commission statements, while a jury found for Baker on the other claims; the trial court then ordered a new trial on those claims due to insufficient evidence, excessive damages, and juror misconduct. On appeal, the court reversed the directed verdict on the statutory claim, holding that a reasonable good-faith belief in a legal defense could negate willfulness under the Act, and affirmed the new trial order as within the trial court's gatekeeping discretion to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The decision construes the Act for the first time to fulfill its purpose of providing unique protections to qualifying sales representatives while avoiding absurd results.
In Camp v. State of California, plaintiff Melissa Camp sued the State and a CHP officer for negligence after sustaining severe spinal injuries in a rollover car accident caused by an intoxicated driver, resulting in her paraplegia; she alleged the officer failed to call an ambulance despite her visible condition at the scene. A jury awarded her over $2.6 million in damages, but the appellate court reversed the judgment and directed entry of judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officer owed no legal duty to Camp because his conduct constituted nonfeasance—a failure to provide assistance after she repeatedly declined an ambulance—rather than misfeasance that created or increased the risk of harm. Under California Supreme Court precedent, police officers do not have a duty to respond to emergencies or force medical aid in a manner that would expose them to tort liability absent an affirmative act establishing a special relationship.
In this habeas corpus petition, Karl Loresch challenged the Governor's reversal of the Board of Parole Hearings' 2008 decision granting him parole for his 1982 first-degree murder conviction. The court granted the petition, vacated the Governor's order, reinstated the Board's parole release decision, and directed Loresch's release. The core reasoning was that the record contained no evidence supporting the Governor's finding of current dangerousness, which rested only on speculation about possible future relapse rather than any rational inference from facts about Loresch's insight, remorse, rehabilitation, or other factors.
The case involved a taxpayer who transferred title to his original residence to a corporation he controlled, sold that property, and had the corporation purchase a replacement residence, after which he sought to claim a homeowner’s property tax exemption and transfer the base year value to reduce taxes on the new home. The trial court ruled in his favor, treating him as the alter ego of the corporation and ordering a tax refund. The appellate court reversed, holding that the relevant statutes limit eligibility to natural persons and explicitly exclude corporations, with no provision allowing an alter ego theory to override the ownership requirements or permit the transfer. The court reasoned that the taxpayer did not personally own or purchase the properties as required, and equitable arguments could not expand the statutory scheme beyond its plain terms.