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Party: Democratic →Business Administration, University of California-Los AngelesBusiness Administration, University of California-Los AngelesBusiness Administration, University of California-Los AngelesJD, University of California-Los Angeles
EG
Elwood G. H. Lui
ad-pres-jus, California Court of Appeal, 2nd District · Los Angeles, CA
Business Administration, University of California-Los Angeles
Business Administration, University of California-Los Angeles
Business Administration, University of California-Los Angeles
JD, University of California-Los Angeles
Affiliations
California Court of Appeal, 2nd District — appointed by Edmund Gerald Brown
California Court of Appeal, 2nd District — appointed by Edmund Gerald Brown
California Court of Appeal, 2nd District — appointed by Edmund Gerald Brown
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles — appointed by Edmund Gerald Brown
In Melander v. Hughes Aircraft Co., an employee appealed the denial of his petition to vacate an arbitration award that arose from his suspension and discharge under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between his employer and union. The court held that the employee lacked standing to petition to vacate the award because the CBA allowed grievances to be submitted to arbitration only by the union or management, and the employee was not made a party to the arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1280. The core reasoning was that under sections 1285 and 1280, only parties to the arbitration agreement may seek to vacate an award, and here the union represented the employee without any provision granting individuals independent arbitration rights. The judgment denying the petition was therefore affirmed.
In this 1987 California Court of Appeal case, the law firm Shea & Gould appealed a trial court order imposing $2,500 in sanctions against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 for filing a motion for a protective order to limit or stay a deposition in a pending lawsuit between Weisman and Bower involving claims such as conversion, fraud, and breach of contract. The appellate court held that sanctions were not warranted because the motion was not totally without merit in light of the case circumstances and the trial court's broad discretion to grant protective orders, and the record showed no bad faith or intent to harass or delay. However, the court noted that the trial court had separate authority under section 2019(b)(1) to require payment of the opposing party's costs and expenses. The matter was reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider exercising that discretion.
Patrick O'Shea sued his former employer, General Telephone Company of California, for slander, interference with prospective advantage, and related claims after his supervisors provided information about his termination and work history to the California Highway Patrol during a background investigation for O'Shea's application as a patrol officer. The statements described O'Shea's suspensions, customer disputes, and discharge for violating company ethics. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that the communications were absolutely privileged, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court held that an absolute privilege applies to statements made in response to official inquiries by law enforcement agencies investigating candidates for public-safety positions, rendering questions of truth, malice, or consent unnecessary to resolve.
This case involved a will contest by Berenice Moises challenging an undated and unsigned addition to the back of a 1971 holographic codicil to her uncle Earl Archer's 1966 will, which left the residue of the estate to Donald Belcher instead of other heirs. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the contest and admitting the full codicil to probate. The Court of Appeal held that the addition validly adopted the signature from the front of the integrated codicil as a matter of law, satisfying execution requirements under the Probate Code. However, the allegation that Archer lacked testamentary intent was a legal conclusion rather than an ultimate fact, though the defect could potentially be cured by amendment, so the court erred in denying leave to amend on that ground and remanded the case accordingly.
The case involved the heirs of Charles Coates, who was fatally injured while riding a dirtbike on a trail in a recreational park owned by the defendants; the heirs sued for wrongful death alleging negligence in the trail's design and maintenance. Before entering the park, Coates had signed a general release assuming the risks of the activity. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the release, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that a decedent's preinjury express assumption of risk via contract bars a wrongful death action if the contract does not violate public policy and the risk encountered was inherent in the activity or contemplated by the parties, as was true here under the standards from Tunkl v. Regents of University of California.
The case involved a doctor suing an expert accounting witness who allegedly prepared a false valuation of goodwill in the doctor's medical practice and gave false testimony during the doctor's divorce proceedings, leading to the doctor paying his ex-wife for nonexistent goodwill. The plaintiff claimed abuse of process and infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the case, which the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the absolute privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision 2, for statements made in judicial proceedings barred the claims regardless of whether the testimony was false.