In Tyson v. United States, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of misdemeanor assault on a police officer arising from a struggle at a Metro station in which officers testified that he resisted arrest after being told to leave, while the defense claimed the officers used unprovoked force. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to make a specific finding on whether he had justifiable or excusable cause to resist due to alleged excessive force by the officers. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant waived any right to special findings by not requesting them under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(c) and that the claim was barred by D.C. Code § 22-405(d), which states that using force to resist a known law enforcement officer is neither justifiable nor excusable. The court further reasoned that the trial judge's credibility findings—crediting the officers' account and rejecting the defense version—showed that any claim of excessive force had been considered and rejected on the existing record, with no plain error even if reviewed under that standard.
The case concerned the revocation of nightclub owner Aziken’s Retailer’s Class CN alcoholic beverage license for Smarta Broadway after a 17-year-old patron was fatally shot inside the club during an altercation involving a previously ejected customer. Aziken challenged the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s action, claiming he was denied due process because some discovery requests were delayed and his subpoena for the Police Chief was denied, and arguing that the evidence was insufficient to justify revocation. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s revocation order. It held that Aziken received adequate process, as the Board allowed him to recall witnesses after receiving discovery materials, he raised no remaining procedural objections by the final hearing, and the denial of one subpoena did not prejudice him. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence—including repeated police responses to stabbings, shootings, underage drinking, and drug use at the club, plus testimony from officers and a former security supervisor—supported the Board’s findings that the premises posed a public-safety risk.
The case involved Anthony Brown, a Metropolitan Police Department officer terminated for conduct unbecoming an officer after repeated unwanted phone calls to his estranged wife following their separation. Brown appealed a Superior Court order upholding a Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) decision that affirmed his termination, arguing that the PERB lost jurisdiction by exceeding the statutory 120-day deadline for its decision and that the arbitrator failed to consider the Douglas factors in determining the penalty. The court affirmed the order, rejecting the jurisdictional claim on the merits after finding it waived because it was not raised below and declining to address the Douglas factors argument for the same reason.
In Myers v. United States, the defendant was convicted of assault after an incident on a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) bus in which she allegedly threatened another passenger with a knife. On appeal, she argued that the government's failure to preserve and produce a digital video recording from the bus constituted a discovery violation under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, claiming the recording was in the government's possession because WMATA is a government agency. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the video was not in the government's possession for discovery purposes. The core reasoning was that WMATA functions as a separate entity performing proprietary activities, the Metro Transit Police were not involved in the case, and the recording was erased per standard WMATA policy unrelated to the prosecution; thus, it was not part of the prosecution team under precedents like United States v. Bryant.
In Lawler v. United States, six appellants were arrested and convicted for unfurling a large anti-death penalty banner and chanting on the plaza in front of the Supreme Court building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 6135, which bans parades, assemblages, and displays of flags or banners on the Supreme Court grounds. After a bench trial, the Superior Court found them guilty, and they appealed, arguing that the statute infringed their First Amendment rights and that they should have been informed of alternative locations for expression. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the Supreme Court plaza is a non-public forum where reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on speech are permitted, that the statute qualifies as such a restriction under precedent, and that the officers provided multiple warnings before arresting the appellants, with no requirement to offer alternative sites or with ignorance of the law serving as no defense.
This case concerned reciprocal attorney discipline for Edward D. Fagan in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based on disbarment orders issued by the Supreme Courts of New York and New Jersey. The court had previously suspended Fagan pending further proceedings and directed him to show cause why identical discipline should not apply in D.C., but he neither responded to the order nor filed the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). Applying precedents that establish a rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline when a respondent does not participate, the court ordered Fagan disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia. It further specified that the period of suspension for reinstatement purposes would not commence until he files a fully compliant affidavit.