This case arose from a failed business arrangement in which Washington Investment Partners (WIP) agreed to help a Kuwaiti investment firm and its affiliates acquire and manage the Transpoint Building in Washington, D.C., under two successive contracts: a Letter Agreement and a later Asset Management Agreement (AMA). After the AMA took effect, the appellees terminated WIP for nonperformance and an executive’s departure; they later sold the building profitably and refused to pay WIP further fees, prompting WIP to sue for hundreds of millions in damages on breach-of-contract, fiduciary-duty, and related claims while the appellees counterclaimed for fees already paid. The trial court granted summary judgment to the appellees on the Letter Agreement claim, and a jury found for the appellees on all remaining claims while awarding them $636,000 on the counterclaim plus prejudgment interest. On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the AMA’s integration clause plainly terminated the Letter Agreement, that WIP’s challenges to the AMA’s validity were without merit, and that the trial court committed no reversible error in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.
The case involved Robert A. Russell's convictions for armed carjacking, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and theft, stemming from an incident where a victim was robbed at gunpoint and his car stolen. The main issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by not allowing expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The court reversed the convictions and remanded the case, reasoning that recent scientific developments and case law require a more thorough, case-specific analysis of factors like the current state of research, whether the information is beyond common juror knowledge, and the probative value to the specific identification in the case.
This case concerned Bar Counsel's request to revoke the probation of attorney Timothy Brown, which had been referred to a Hearing Committee of the Board on Professional Responsibility. After reviewing the Committee's report and recommendation along with the full record, the court granted the motion to revoke probation. It ordered Brown suspended from the practice of law for two years, with any reinstatement conditioned on a finding of fitness and reasonable progress toward repaying amounts owed to the Clients’ Security Fund. The suspension period does not begin until Brown files an affidavit complying with D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).
This case concerns the probate of Anna Creech's estate and whether her 1992 will or a 1995 codicil should control distribution of her property. The trial court rejected a copy of the 1995 codicil due to uncertainty over the missing original and admitted the full 1992 will to probate. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that even if the testator had revoked the codicil by destroying it, D.C. Code § 18-109(b) prevents automatic revival of the portions of the 1992 will that the codicil had expressly revoked; revival requires re-execution or a new codicil showing intent to revive. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the codicil was in fact revoked.
This case involved a dispute between tenant Donna Sanders and landlord Berhanu Molla over whether a lease renewal provision allowed the tenant to unilaterally extend the term for five years or required mutual consent, after the landlord sought to raise rent and the tenant refused to pay. The trial court found the provision ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence including testimony about the original lease negotiations, and ruled that renewal required both parties' agreement, leading to a judgment for the landlord on possession. The appellate court affirmed this interpretation, holding that the language was indeed ambiguous and that the trial court's factual finding based on extrinsic evidence was not clearly erroneous. The court dismissed the tenant's challenge to the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for lack of jurisdiction because the order was nonfinal and had not determined the amount of the award.
In this case, a scholarship student at the University of the District of Columbia was attacked by two armed assailants in a campus parking garage and, along with her husband, sued the university for negligence in failing to provide adequate security. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $400,000 in damages, but the university appealed the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to establish the university's liability. Under District of Columbia law, a defendant can be held liable for injuries from intervening criminal acts only upon a heightened showing of foreseeability that creates a duty to guard against such acts; the court found that evidence of prior crimes on campus was too general and unrelated to the specific attack to meet this standard.