John Terry

In Tyson v. United States, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of misdemeanor assault on a police officer arising from a struggle at a Metro station in which officers testified that he resisted arrest after being told to leave, while the defense claimed the officers used unprovoked force. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to make a specific finding on whether he had justifiable or excusable cause to resist due to alleged excessive force by the officers. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant waived any right to special findings by not requesting them under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(c) and that the claim was barred by D.C. Code § 22-405(d), which states that using force to resist a known law enforcement officer is neither justifiable nor excusable. The court further reasoned that the trial judge's credibility findings—crediting the officers' account and rejecting the defense version—showed that any claim of excessive force had been considered and rejected on the existing record, with no plain error even if reviewed under that standard.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the revocation of nightclub owner Aziken’s Retailer’s Class CN alcoholic beverage license for Smarta Broadway after a 17-year-old patron was fatally shot inside the club during an altercation involving a previously ejected customer. Aziken challenged the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s action, claiming he was denied due process because some discovery requests were delayed and his subpoena for the Police Chief was denied, and arguing that the evidence was insufficient to justify revocation. The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s revocation order. It held that Aziken received adequate process, as the Board allowed him to recall witnesses after receiving discovery materials, he raised no remaining procedural objections by the final hearing, and the denial of one subpoena did not prejudice him. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence—including repeated police responses to stabbings, shootings, underage drinking, and drug use at the club, plus testimony from officers and a former security supervisor—supported the Board’s findings that the premises posed a public-safety risk.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Anthony Brown, a Metropolitan Police Department officer terminated for conduct unbecoming an officer after repeated unwanted phone calls to his estranged wife following their separation. Brown appealed a Superior Court order upholding a Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) decision that affirmed his termination, arguing that the PERB lost jurisdiction by exceeding the statutory 120-day deadline for its decision and that the arbitrator failed to consider the Douglas factors in determining the penalty. The court affirmed the order, rejecting the jurisdictional claim on the merits after finding it waived because it was not raised below and declining to address the Douglas factors argument for the same reason.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Myers v. United States, the defendant was convicted of assault after an incident on a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) bus in which she allegedly threatened another passenger with a knife. On appeal, she argued that the government's failure to preserve and produce a digital video recording from the bus constituted a discovery violation under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16, claiming the recording was in the government's possession because WMATA is a government agency. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the video was not in the government's possession for discovery purposes. The core reasoning was that WMATA functions as a separate entity performing proprietary activities, the Metro Transit Police were not involved in the case, and the recording was erased per standard WMATA policy unrelated to the prosecution; thus, it was not part of the prosecution team under precedents like United States v. Bryant.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lawler v. United States, six appellants were arrested and convicted for unfurling a large anti-death penalty banner and chanting on the plaza in front of the Supreme Court building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 6135, which bans parades, assemblages, and displays of flags or banners on the Supreme Court grounds. After a bench trial, the Superior Court found them guilty, and they appealed, arguing that the statute infringed their First Amendment rights and that they should have been informed of alternative locations for expression. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the Supreme Court plaza is a non-public forum where reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on speech are permitted, that the statute qualifies as such a restriction under precedent, and that the officers provided multiple warnings before arresting the appellants, with no requirement to offer alternative sites or with ignorance of the law serving as no defense.

free speechcriminal law

This case concerned reciprocal attorney discipline for Edward D. Fagan in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, based on disbarment orders issued by the Supreme Courts of New York and New Jersey. The court had previously suspended Fagan pending further proceedings and directed him to show cause why identical discipline should not apply in D.C., but he neither responded to the order nor filed the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). Applying precedents that establish a rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline when a respondent does not participate, the court ordered Fagan disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia. It further specified that the period of suspension for reinstatement purposes would not commence until he files a fully compliant affidavit.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings in the District of Columbia against Gregory Van Judice. The Supreme Court of Louisiana had disbarred the respondent from the practice of law, prompting the D.C. court to issue an order to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed. The respondent did not file a response or the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g), leading the court to apply a rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline from precedents such as In re Fuller and In re Willingham. As a result, the court ordered Van Judice disbarred from practicing law in the District of Columbia, with the suspension period for reinstatement not beginning until a compliant affidavit is filed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Joyce Benjamin's appeal of a denial of unemployment compensation benefits after she was fired from her job as a unit clerk at Washington Hospital Center for excessive tardiness, which violated a collective bargaining agreement and a last chance agreement following prior warnings and a suspension. A claims examiner and an administrative law judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings found her ineligible for benefits on the ground of misconduct, citing the statute for gross misconduct and imposing its longer disqualification period without explicitly determining whether the conduct amounted to gross misconduct rather than simple misconduct. The court held that remand was required for a de novo determination because the agencies failed to make an explicit finding that the misconduct was willful or deliberate, which is a prerequisite for applying the gross misconduct penalties under D.C. law and regulations. The court noted key distinctions in the consequences for employees between the two categories of misconduct and that prior cases required such findings to be clear. The decision did not address the merits of whether the tardiness qualified as gross misconduct.

labor & employment

The case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals following the disbarment of respondent Vincent J. Krocka by the Supreme Court of Florida. The D.C. court had previously suspended the respondent and directed him to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed, and after reviewing his response and affidavit, the court ordered his disbarment from the practice of law in the District of Columbia. The decision applies a rebuttable presumption favoring identical reciprocal discipline in cases where the respondent does not participate to rebut it, and notes that findings of fact from the reciprocal tribunal cannot be relitigated. The disbarment is deemed to have commenced on August 16, 2010, the date the respondent filed the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

procedure

This case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline in the District of Columbia after the Supreme Court of Florida disbarred Vincent J. Krocka from practicing law in that state. The D.C. court had previously suspended Krocka and ordered him to show cause why the same discipline should not apply, then reviewed the Florida order, bar counsel's statement, and Krocka's response and affidavit. The court ultimately disbarred Krocka from practice in D.C., with the disbarment period starting on the date he filed the required affidavit. The ruling applies the rebuttable presumption favoring identical reciprocal discipline in uncontested cases and holds that the respondent cannot relitigate the facts determined by the Florida tribunal.

procedure

This case concerns reciprocal attorney discipline in the District of Columbia. The Florida Supreme Court had disbarred respondent Ira C. Hatch, Jr., from practice in that state. After the D.C. court suspended the respondent and directed him to show cause why identical discipline should not apply, he failed to respond or submit the required affidavit under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). The court therefore ordered his disbarment in the District of Columbia, relying on precedents that impose a rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline when a respondent does not participate and that treat intentional misappropriation as warranting disbarment. The order further provides that the period of suspension will not begin until the respondent files a compliant affidavit.

procedurecriminal law

In Lewis v. United States, appellants Rodney Lewis and Jonathan Price appealed their convictions for robbery, a lesser-included offense after the jury deadlocked on armed robbery and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence charges arising from the December 2005 robbery of a high school student at gunpoint in Washington, D.C. The appellants argued that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by admitting the victim's prior out-of-court identifications, evidence of an unrelated January 2006 incident in Maryland involving a recovered handgun, and a prosecutor's closing remark suggesting the victim was afraid to identify the defendants in court. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the victim's multiple prior identifications to police, family, and the grand jury, combined with other testimony, provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the robbery charges. The court further concluded that any errors in admitting the Maryland evidence or the prosecutor's comment were harmless because they did not substantially sway the verdict, as the jury rejected the armed robbery counts despite that evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned petitioner Elizabeth Sheppard's 2006 request for permanent partial disability benefits related to a 1983 work injury, after she had previously received temporary total disability benefits. She argued that her claim should be deemed accepted under D.C. Code § 1-623.24(a-3) because the agency failed to decide it within 30 days. The court affirmed the Compensation Review Board's decision that the provision did not apply. The core reasoning was that the statute's 'deemed accepted' rule applies only to initial claims for disability benefits, which require a supervisor's report, and not to later requests for a different type of benefit.

labor & employment

The case involved Sharion Larry's appeal of a denial of unemployment compensation benefits after her termination from National Rehabilitation Hospital for repeated absenteeism under a no-fault attendance policy, which the agency classified as gross misconduct. The court vacated the Office of Administrative Hearings decision and remanded the case because the administrative law judge had not made a factual finding on whether Larry's final absence, attributed to illness, was willful or deliberate. The opinion explained that such a determination is required under D.C. regulations defining gross misconduct before disqualifying an employee from benefits, even when an employer presents evidence of repeated violations following warnings. The court noted that the burden remains on the employer to prove misconduct and that a no-fault policy alone does not satisfy the statutory standard.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a medical malpractice suit in which plaintiff Vivia Sherwood alleged that defendant Dr. Joseph Giordano negligently injured her femoral, sciatic, and obturator nerves while performing a lumbar sympathectomy to treat reflex sympathetic dystrophy following a knee injury. After a jury awarded Sherwood approximately $600,000 in damages, the appellate court held that Dr. Giordano was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court explained that the plaintiff's expert testimony did not establish that the nerve injuries could only have resulted from negligence, because the surgical area involves delicate nerve structures where such injuries can occur even when the surgeon adheres to the applicable standard of care. The court therefore did not reach the alternative claim concerning excluded impeachment evidence.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

This case is an appeal from a conviction for assault in the District of Columbia, where the appellant challenged the admission at trial of three out-of-court statements made by the victim to police officers shortly after the incident. The statements were admitted as excited utterances over hearsay objections, and the victim did not testify. The appellant argued on appeal, after supplemental briefing, that the statements violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington. The court reviewed for plain error because no Confrontation Clause objection was raised at trial and held that the statements were nontestimonial, as they were made to officers responding to an ongoing emergency before the scene was secured. The court affirmed the conviction, rejecting additional claims of insufficient evidence and improper venue findings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Brisbon v. United States, the appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter while armed and three weapons offenses after a jury acquitted him of first- and second-degree murder charges stemming from a shooting in an alley where he claimed self-defense. The trial court excluded testimony from a defense witness about an excited utterance the appellant allegedly made shortly after the incident. On appeal, the court held that this exclusion constituted reversible error because the testimony was admissible and its omission was not harmless.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Charles Bagenstose, a D.C. public school teacher who received a notice of reduction-in-force (RIF) due to a financial crisis and opted to retire rather than face termination. Bagenstose appealed to the Office of Employee Appeals (OEA), arguing his retirement was involuntary because of duress and misleading information in the RIF notice and a personnel phone call, but the OEA ruled it lacked jurisdiction since the retirement was voluntary. The trial court upheld the OEA decision, and the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was substantial evidence that the notice was accurate and non-misleading, that Bagenstose had the option to challenge the RIF instead, and that he retired before the RIF took effect.

labor & employment

This case involved a father's appeal of a trial court order that restricted his visitation with his daughter by requiring therapy sessions before any visits could resume and awarding attorney's fees to the mother. The father had established paternity but had no contact with the child until filing for custody and visitation in 1993; a 1994 consent order set guidelines for supervised visits and therapy, but the father ceased all contact in 1995 and did not seek to resume until 1998. The trial court denied the motion to enforce and expand visitation after hearing testimony, including from the then-12-year-old child who viewed her father as a stranger, and the appellate court affirmed. The court held that the 1999 order was not a modification of the prior decree but a temporary suspension to protect the child's best interests given the multi-year gap, and found no abuse of discretion in requiring counseling or awarding fees.

family law

In Gubbins v. Hurson, the plaintiffs sued an anesthesiologist, surgeon, their practice group, and the hospital for medical malpractice after the patient developed bilateral leg nerve damage following bladder repair surgery, claiming negligence in anesthesia delivery via epidural and leg positioning. The trial court allowed a treating neurologist, disclosed only as a fact witness, to give previously undisclosed expert opinions on causation and declined to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, holding that the expert testimony violated Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(4) because the opinions were not formed during treatment and that the evidence of unexplained injury supported a res ipsa loquitur instruction.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare