The case involved K9Shrink, LLC and Gail Clark challenging the enforcement of homeowners association covenants that prohibited commercial pet-related activities on Clark's residential property, where she operated a canine behavioral training business. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment and injunction in favor of the Ridgewood Meadows Water and Homeowners Association, upholding the validity of the 2007 amendments to the covenants and finding that the business violated the restrictions. The court reasoned that issue preclusion barred challenges to the amendments due to Clark's prior opportunity to litigate, and interpreted the covenant language as clearly prohibiting the activities based on its plain meaning and context.
The case involved defendant Brian Neil Kiniston, who pled guilty to felony theft in 2007 and received a deferred judgment and sentence. After he committed additional felonies, the deferred judgment was revoked in 2009, and the trial court sentenced him to community corrections, ruling that the new felony convictions counted as two prior felonies under section 18-1.3-201(2)(a.5), which bars probation eligibility for defendants with two or more prior felony convictions. The defendant appealed, arguing that the term 'conviction' in the statute referred to his 2007 guilty plea rather than the later revocation and judgment, so the additional convictions could not be considered prior. The appellate court agreed, holding that the plain language of the statute, read in context with other provisions and consistent with precedents distinguishing 'conviction' from 'judgment of conviction,' meant the trial court was not barred from considering probation. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
The case involved a dispute between two adoptive parents of a minor child over compliance with temporary court orders regarding daycare enrollment and contact information. After one parent was found in contempt by a magistrate following a hearing and ordered to pay $1,500 in attorney fees via a signed July 7 minute order, the magistrate issued a new July 13 order with different findings that vacated the contempt ruling and fee award. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's orders adopting the later magistrate order, holding that under the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and Rules of Civil Procedure, a magistrate may not sua sponte reconsider and amend the substance of a prior written and signed order except to correct clerical errors. The court remanded the case for reinstatement of the July 7 order, while allowing for timely district court review.
The case involved James Wylie, who was convicted of four counts of second-degree assault for assaulting correctional officers with urine and feces while incarcerated at the Colorado State Penitentiary. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing a specific jury instruction on considering his mental illness for the culpable mental state, and also challenged his sentence on equal protection grounds. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, reasoning that the jury instructions as a whole properly informed the jury about the mental state requirements and the prosecution's burden, and that the sentencing scheme had a rational basis.
In People v. Thornton, the defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated motor vehicle theft after a jury found that the value of the stolen car exceeded $15,000. The primary issue on appeal was whether the prosecution could rely on a Kelley Blue Book valuation obtained by a police officer from the website to prove the car's value, without expert testimony. The court held that the Blue Book evidence was admissible under C.R.S. section 18-4-414(2), which permits hearsay in theft value cases, and under the market reports exception in CRE 803(17), and that such evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also rejected challenges to a witness's mention of the defendant's homelessness and to the trial court's refusal to provide a supplemental jury instruction defining value.
The case involved Romantix, an adult video arcade operator in Commerce City, seeking a refund of sales taxes it paid on customers' purchases of prepaid cards to view films using arcade equipment. The district court granted summary judgment to Romantix, finding the transactions nontaxable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the transactions were subject to the city's sales tax because customers were granted a license to use tangible personal property in the form of film viewing equipment over which they exercised control, such as selecting channels and adjusting playback. The court distinguished this from passive movie theater viewing, noting the per-minute payment and customer control made it akin to equipment rental, taxable under the code's provision on grants of licenses to use tangible personal property.