In this dependency and neglect case, the father appealed a jury adjudication finding his six-year-old daughter dependent and neglected based on allegations of sexual abuse, contending that the jury findings did not support the adjudication under the statute and that permitting the child to testify via closed-circuit television violated his confrontation rights and due process. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudication, concluding that the closed-circuit procedure properly protected the child from trauma while allowing the father real-time communication with counsel for cross-examination. The court further held that the jury instructions and verdict form using past tense were appropriate to assess the child's status at the time of the petition filing, as the present tense would risk confusing the jury about conditions in foster care, and that the findings satisfied the definitions in section 19-3-102(1)(b) and (c), C.R.S. 2010; issues concerning the treatment plan were not reviewable because the father had not appealed the dispositional order.
Randy Kailey, serving a sentence for aggravated incest, filed a motion seeking either appointment of a special prosecutor under C.R.S. § 16-5-209 or an arrest warrant under C.R.S. § 16-3-108 to pursue charges against DMB for alleged sexual assaults on his daughters and granddaughter. The district court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that Kailey had not overcome the presumption that the district attorney's non-prosecution decision was proper by showing it was arbitrary and capricious. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that district attorneys possess broad executive discretion in charging decisions that courts may override only upon clear and convincing evidence of arbitrariness, and that private citizens lack authority to demand arrest warrants. The court reasoned that investigative and charging functions belong to law enforcement and prosecutors, not individuals, and that Kailey's submissions did not meet the statutory threshold for judicial intervention.
In this case, Rebecca Jackson sued American Family Mutual Insurance Company for breach of contract, alleging the insurer failed to offer her the option to purchase extended personal injury protection (PIP) coverage required by Colorado law at the time of her 2002 car accident. A jury awarded her damages on the contract claim, but the trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a prior class action (Hicks) did not preclude the insurer from raising the limitations defense because that case was limited to policy reformation and expressly excluded individual damage claims. The court reasoned there was no identity of claims between the reformation-only class proceeding and Jackson's separate damages action, so the limitations period was not tolled by the earlier suit and had expired.
This case concerns whether services performed by a truck driver for SZL, Inc. under a short-term lease agreement constituted covered employment under the Colorado Employment Security Act, thereby requiring SZL to pay unemployment taxes on those services. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and hearing officer determined that the driver was an employee rather than an independent contractor, and the court affirmed that ruling. The core reasoning focused on section 8-70-115(1)(b), which presumes employment unless the putative employer proves both that the worker is free from control and direction and is customarily engaged in an independent trade or business related to the services; SZL failed to establish the second condition because the driver did not provide similar services to others during the engagement. The court also rejected challenges based on the parties' contract, preemption under federal law, and transcript irregularities.
This case involves a post-divorce dispute between Gail Nguyen (formerly Davis) and Jeffrey Davis over modification of child support, along with requests to hold the husband in contempt and for attorney fees. The trial court modified child support and denied the contempt and fee requests. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that an amended version of Colorado's child support statute allowing deductions for after-born children could not be applied retroactively to obligations accruing before its January 1, 2008 effective date, but could apply prospectively thereafter because child support is a continuing obligation. The court found no error in the trial court's handling of contempt or attorney fees, including its consideration of the wife's overall economic circumstances from gifts by her new spouse, and remanded for recalculation of pre-2008 support amounts.
The case was an attorney fees dispute in which client Cathy Berra sued her former law firm, Springer and Steinberg, P.C., seeking a refund of part of a 30% contingent fee the firm had received after collecting on a preexisting $500,000 judgment plus interest. The trial court found the fee unreasonable and excessive under Colo. RPC 1.5 factors because the recovery resulted largely from fortuitous events rather than substantial effort by the firm and the risk of non-recovery was not substantial, then calculated a reasonable fee via quantum meruit analysis and ordered a refund of approximately $185,750. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the contingent fee agreement was unenforceable to the extent the charged fee was unreasonable and that the trial court had properly determined the reasonable value of the firm's services.