Diana Terry

The case involved K9Shrink, LLC and Gail Clark challenging the enforcement of homeowners association covenants that prohibited commercial pet-related activities on Clark's residential property, where she operated a canine behavioral training business. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment and injunction in favor of the Ridgewood Meadows Water and Homeowners Association, upholding the validity of the 2007 amendments to the covenants and finding that the business violated the restrictions. The court reasoned that issue preclusion barred challenges to the amendments due to Clark's prior opportunity to litigate, and interpreted the covenant language as clearly prohibiting the activities based on its plain meaning and context.

propertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Brian Neil Kiniston, who pled guilty to felony theft in 2007 and received a deferred judgment and sentence. After he committed additional felonies, the deferred judgment was revoked in 2009, and the trial court sentenced him to community corrections, ruling that the new felony convictions counted as two prior felonies under section 18-1.3-201(2)(a.5), which bars probation eligibility for defendants with two or more prior felony convictions. The defendant appealed, arguing that the term 'conviction' in the statute referred to his 2007 guilty plea rather than the later revocation and judgment, so the additional convictions could not be considered prior. The appellate court agreed, holding that the plain language of the statute, read in context with other provisions and consistent with precedents distinguishing 'conviction' from 'judgment of conviction,' meant the trial court was not barred from considering probation. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between two adoptive parents of a minor child over compliance with temporary court orders regarding daycare enrollment and contact information. After one parent was found in contempt by a magistrate following a hearing and ordered to pay $1,500 in attorney fees via a signed July 7 minute order, the magistrate issued a new July 13 order with different findings that vacated the contempt ruling and fee award. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's orders adopting the later magistrate order, holding that under the Colorado Rules for Magistrates and Rules of Civil Procedure, a magistrate may not sua sponte reconsider and amend the substance of a prior written and signed order except to correct clerical errors. The court remanded the case for reinstatement of the July 7 order, while allowing for timely district court review.

family lawprocedure

The case involved James Wylie, who was convicted of four counts of second-degree assault for assaulting correctional officers with urine and feces while incarcerated at the Colorado State Penitentiary. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing a specific jury instruction on considering his mental illness for the culpable mental state, and also challenged his sentence on equal protection grounds. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, reasoning that the jury instructions as a whole properly informed the jury about the mental state requirements and the prosecution's burden, and that the sentencing scheme had a rational basis.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Thornton, the defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated motor vehicle theft after a jury found that the value of the stolen car exceeded $15,000. The primary issue on appeal was whether the prosecution could rely on a Kelley Blue Book valuation obtained by a police officer from the website to prove the car's value, without expert testimony. The court held that the Blue Book evidence was admissible under C.R.S. section 18-4-414(2), which permits hearsay in theft value cases, and under the market reports exception in CRE 803(17), and that such evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court also rejected challenges to a witness's mention of the defendant's homelessness and to the trial court's refusal to provide a supplemental jury instruction defining value.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Romantix, an adult video arcade operator in Commerce City, seeking a refund of sales taxes it paid on customers' purchases of prepaid cards to view films using arcade equipment. The district court granted summary judgment to Romantix, finding the transactions nontaxable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the transactions were subject to the city's sales tax because customers were granted a license to use tangible personal property in the form of film viewing equipment over which they exercised control, such as selecting channels and adjusting playback. The court distinguished this from passive movie theater viewing, noting the per-minute payment and customer control made it akin to equipment rental, taxable under the code's provision on grants of licenses to use tangible personal property.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether a commercial tenant's liability insurance policy provided additional insured coverage to the landlord and property manager for a customer's slip-and-fall injury in a shopping center parking lot. The court held that the policy did not cover the claim because the injury did not arise out of the tenant's use of the leased premises (suite 290), which excluded common areas like the parking lot. The reasoning focused on the policy language requiring that liability originate from, grow out of, or flow from the use of the specifically leased space, finding no sufficient causal nexus since the fall occurred outside the premises, the landlord alone maintained the lot, and a mere but-for connection from the customer's restaurant visit was insufficient. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance Exchange, denying Travelers' claim for contribution.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case concerns a partition action involving three parcels of land (totaling 1,440 acres) owned by tenants-in-common, where the parties could not agree on division and a court-appointed commissioner evaluated options for partition in kind. The trial court found partition in kind feasible based on land values without manifest prejudice to the owners and largely adopted the commissioner's recommendations but awarded one co-owner an extra 40-acre parcel, resulting in shares of 25%, 29%, and 46% of total value rather than the ownership interests of 25%, 25%, and 50%. The appellate court affirmed that Colorado law permits value-based partition in kind and that no manifest prejudice was shown here, consistent with the statutory preference for in-kind division over sale, but reversed the specific allocation as an abuse of discretion because it deviated from the determined values without supporting evidence or equitable basis like contributions to the property. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the allocation, with the remainder of the judgment affirmed.

property

The case involved defendant Ross Alley, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree assault on one victim and second-degree assault on another after an incident in a motel room where he beat both with a cane following a rejected sexual advance. Alley appealed the convictions and his consecutive sentences of forty-eight and sixteen years, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a continuance, failing to hold a hearing on an intoxicated witness's competency to testify, and imposing an excessive sentence. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance because Alley failed to show actual prejudice, that the trial court properly evaluated the witness's competency without a separate hearing, and that the sentences were within statutory ranges and based on appropriate considerations like the nature of the offenses and the defendant's danger to the public.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved PurCo Fleet Services, as assignee of a car rental company, suing Judith Koenig for breach of a rental contract after she damaged a vehicle by hitting a deer, seeking recovery for physical damage (already paid by her insurer), loss of use damages, and an administrative charge under the contract's terms. The trial court granted summary judgment to Koenig on the loss of use and administrative charge claims, finding insufficient proof of actual economic loss and an invalid liquidated damages provision, but dismissed her counterclaim alleging violations of the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. On appeal, the court reversed the summary judgments against PurCo, reasoning that the contract's "loss of use (regardless of fleet utilization)" language modified traditional proof requirements for damages and that the administrative charge was enforceable as a contractual term, while affirming the CFDCPA dismissal and remanding for determinations on attorney fees, costs, and prevailing party status.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, the plaintiff landlord sought to pierce the corporate veil of Manitoba Investment Advisors, Inc., to hold Marc Winger (a non-shareholder manager) and Karen Winger (a shareholder, officer, and director) personally liable for the insolvent corporation's unpaid lease obligations, property taxes, and a $76,224 judgment. The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the burden of proof to pierce the corporate veil is a preponderance of the evidence under C.R.S. section 13-25-127(1), rather than clear and convincing evidence, and that the veil may be pierced in appropriate circumstances to reach a non-shareholder corporate insider who defeats creditors' claims. The court reversed the judgment for Marc Winger and remanded for the trial court to apply the preponderance standard to the remaining veil-piercing prong, but affirmed the judgment for Karen Winger because the distributions she received predated the corporation's insolvency and did not cause it.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, a company challenged a city's use tax assessment after an audit, requesting a hearing under the city's municipal code to contest the reduced amount of over $1 million in taxes, interest, and penalties. The city refused to hold the hearing, asserting that the company had lost appeal rights because no final decision after a hearing had been issued, and the district court dismissed the company's claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the estoppel and waiver claims but reversed the dismissal of claims seeking judicial review under state statute section 29-2-106.1(9), the municipal code, mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2), and relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). The court reasoned that when a local government establishes its own appeal process requiring a final decision after a hearing as a prerequisite, it cannot rely on state statutory provisions to deny the taxpayer a hearing and the resulting right to appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a business dispute between Madison Capital and Star Acquisition over financing and operation of oil and gas properties, where the parties had entered a stipulated court order requiring Star to provide books, records, and remit funds. After Star failed to comply, the trial court found Star in indirect contempt and imposed remedial sanctions including a daily fine and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the court dismissed the challenge to the contempt order because it was final and appealable when issued but the notice of appeal was untimely. It affirmed the attorney fees award except for reversing the portion covering a 2.5% client surcharge that was deemed firm overhead rather than litigation-specific costs, and it remanded for determination of appellate fees related to the contempt proceedings.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In People v. Barnum, defendant Dennis Barnum appealed his convictions for second degree burglary, first and second degree criminal trespass, and theft by receiving, along with his adjudication as a habitual criminal and the resulting sentence. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and habitual criminal adjudication after reviewing claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of an uncharged home invasion under CRE 404(b), by rejecting part of a proposed theory-of-defense jury instruction on eyewitness identification, and by reinstating habitual criminal charges in violation of double jeopardy or by rejecting a collateral attack on prior convictions based on mental health issues. The court concluded any evidentiary error was harmless given the acquittals on related counts, the instructions adequately conveyed the defense, jeopardy had not attached when the habitual counts were dismissed and later reinstated, and the record supported the trial court's finding of no justifiable excuse for the untimely attack; it remanded only to correct the mittimus for inaccurate offense dates.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Judith Rider's claim for uninsured motorist benefits from State Farm following a January 2004 car accident with an uninsured driver, where Rider had notified State Farm of the uninsured status shortly after the accident but filed suit against both the driver and the insurer in January 2007. The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm, ruling the claim untimely under a two-year limitations period from discovery of the uninsured status. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that section 13-80-107.5(1)(a) establishes a three-year limitations period from the date the cause of action accrues for suits against the insurer, with the two-year discovery grace period serving only to potentially extend that timeframe when the insured has timely sued the tortfeasor. The court clarified that the grace period cannot shorten the three-year period and distinguished prior precedent based on the specific facts presented.

procedure

This case involved Colorado Ethics Watch alleging that the City of Broomfield violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act by using city staff time to research and provide questionnaire answers and other public information to some candidates for city council and mayor but not others, which was then used in a candidates' forum. The administrative law judge ruled for the City, finding no violation of the Act's prohibition on political subdivisions making contributions in campaigns, and the appellate court affirmed. The court interpreted the constitutional definition of "contribution"—anything of value given "for the purpose of promoting" a candidate's election—as requiring proof of intent rather than mere effect or knowledge of helpfulness, and it concluded the City's even-handed responses to information requests under its neutral public policy did not meet that standard. The decision rested on the plain meaning of the statutory language, deference to the ALJ's factual findings on intent, and rejection of an interpretation that would equate any beneficial effect with a prohibited contribution.

electionsprocedure

This case involved residents of Franktown, Colorado (referred to by petitioners as the town of Frankstown), who filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel a nonexistent Board of Trustees to hold a municipal reorganization election under C.R.S. section 31-2-301. Petitioners argued that the town had been incorporated by the Colorado Territorial Legislature before July 3, 1877, which would entitle it to reorganize under current law, and they challenged the trial court's refusal to order the election or appoint officials to oversee it. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that petitioners failed to establish incorporation prior to the statutory cutoff date. The core reasoning was based on a review of pre- and post-1861 territorial statutes, historical records, and legislative acts, which showed no valid incorporation of Frankstown as a town or city before 1877, rendering the election provisions inapplicable. The court also found that petitioners had waived their objection to the county's intervention.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned whether services performed by Gino Lucero and similarly situated workers for Long View Systems Corp. under a consulting agreement constituted "employment" under the Colorado Employment Security Act, thereby requiring Long View to report wages and pay unemployment insurance taxes. A deputy and hearing officer found that direction and control existed and that Lucero was not an independent contractor, and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed. The court set aside the Panel's order and remanded for additional findings, holding that the consulting agreement did not create a rebuttable presumption of independent contractor status and that the statutory test requires the putative employer to prove both freedom from control and direction and customary engagement in an independent trade. The court further clarified that control by a third party such as client Anadarko does not establish employment absent evidence that the third party acted as the putative employer's agent.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a dissolution of marriage between Antoinette F. Thornhill and Chuck E. Thornhill. The court found the parties' separation agreement to be unconscionable due to the wife's lack of legal representation and understanding of the marital assets during negotiation, despite the substantial value of those assets. It upheld the trial court's application of a marketability discount in valuing the husband's closely held business. However, the court reversed the award of temporary maintenance because the trial court's findings on the wife's ability to meet her needs were contradictory and did not properly apply the statutory threshold test. The case was remanded for further proceedings on property division, maintenance, and attorney fees.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In Vogan v. County of San Diego, a Colorado resident sued California county agencies after they continued enforcing a 1998 California child support order and wage assignment against her Colorado wages, despite a 2002 Colorado court order vacating the California judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that personal jurisdiction existed under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act because the defendants had used UIFSA procedures to collect from the plaintiff in Colorado and the court had continuing authority to enforce its prior vacating order, and that jurisdiction over the civil theft claim was proper under the long-arm statute due to the defendants' alleged tortious conduct causing harm in Colorado.

family lawproceduretorts & liability