The case involved professional boxer Antonio Margarito appealing the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate to overturn the State Athletic Commission's revocation of his boxing license. The Commission revoked the license after inspectors discovered gauze knuckle pads adulterated with a hard, plaster-like substance in Margarito's hand wraps before a championship fight, in violation of professional boxing rule 323. Margarito argued that his trainer had inserted the pads without his knowledge, that strict or vicarious liability was improper, and that due process violations occurred due to a changed theory of liability and withheld forensic evidence. The court affirmed the revocation, holding that the boxing rules permitted strict liability for the violation without requiring proof of the boxer's knowledge or intent, and that no due process violations took place because the evidence supported the findings and the forensic results were not available at the time of the hearing.
The case concerned a challenge by City of Los Angeles employee Dan Mariscal to an administrative decision by the Employee Relations Board recognizing SEIU Local 721 as the exclusive bargaining representative for roughly 9,000 employees after the international SEIU consolidated several locals, including former Local 347, into the new regional entity. Mariscal petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the merger process violated due process, that affected members should have voted separately, and that the changes raised a question of representation requiring a new election. The trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statewide vote and hearings provided adequate process, that the merger produced no substantial change in representation or bargaining procedures, and that the ERB's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that Local 347's own governing documents were subordinate to the international union's authority to restructure locals.
In this case, petitioner Nicholas Torres, who had been released on a five-year parole term in 2005 after a conviction for a lewd act on a child, sought habeas corpus relief after the Board of Parole Hearings revoked his parole in February 2009 and retained him on parole in March 2009. Torres argued that under Penal Code section 3001(a), his parole had expired by operation of law in December 2008 because he had served three continuous years on parole without the Board retaining him during the required 30-day review period, even though he was returned to custody on a violation charge during that period. The court granted the petition, holding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to act in 2009. The core reasoning was that the statute mandates discharge unless the Board affirmatively retains the parolee for good cause within the 30-day window following three years of continuous parole, and the Board's inaction caused the term to expire regardless of the later custody status.
The case concerned a minor's appeal from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for willfully violating a civil gang injunction by breaking its curfew provision on one occasion. The juvenile court had sustained one petition alleging the violation and dismissed another, placing the minor on informal probation. The appellate court affirmed the order, holding that the minor was subject to the injunction because he was a documented gang member who had received personal service and had knowledge of its terms, that service on a parent was not required under applicable law, and that the injunction's restrictions did not violate the minor's constitutional rights to association or movement. The court also directed correction of certain minute orders to accurately reflect which petition was sustained.
The case concerned a postjudgment motion to offset two monetary awards arising from a commercial dispute over a failed electronics joint venture and agency agreement between Pou Chen Corporation and MTS Products/Hsia. After trial, judgments were entered in favor of both sides, with BHE/GBMI receiving a much larger award against the MTS defendants; BHE/GBMI later assigned their unpaid judgment to Pou Chen, who sought to apply it against the smaller judgment it owed MTS. The MTS defendants opposed the offset, claiming priority for three contractual liens held by their attorneys and a bank. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of the offset motion, holding that the assigned BHE/GBMI judgment was superior to the liens under rules governing judgment priorities in the same action, as the liens were either subordinate by timing or did not qualify for special equitable treatment.
The case involved the City of Anaheim's assessment of over $21 million in transient occupancy taxes, plus interest, against online travel companies for their hotel booking services, followed by the companies' filing of superior court actions for mandamus and declaratory relief without first paying the disputed amounts. The City demurred, arguing that article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution (the "pay first" rule) required payment before litigation, but the superior court overruled the demurrers. The Court of Appeal held that the constitutional provision applies only to actions against the state or state officers and does not extend to local tax disputes like this one. It further found no alternative legal basis in the city's ordinance, common law, or public policy to impose a pay-first requirement, particularly since the city had not previously collected or relied on such taxes from the companies. The petition for writ of mandate was therefore denied.