Jon W. Thompson

In State v. Mendoza-Tapia, the defendant appealed his jury convictions and sentences for kidnapping and theft by extortion, both class-two dangerous felonies, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument during the ransom demands, that the trial court erred in denying a retroactive competency hearing, and that his presentence incarceration credit was miscalculated. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the victim's and his wife's testimony about threats involving a knife and gun, combined with the circumstances of the abduction and ransom calls, provided sufficient evidence to support the dangerous-offense findings and that the law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply from a co-defendant's separate trial. The court further concluded that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the competency hearing because the record lacked clear evidence of incompetence before trial. It remanded solely for recalculation of the presentence credit after noting a possible 24-day discrepancy.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Bustamante, defendant Martin Abel Bustamante appealed his convictions for kidnapping, theft by extortion, aggravated assault, and misconduct involving weapons, which arose from a ransom kidnapping in which he and accomplices abducted a victim at gunpoint from a parking lot, demanded a Mercedes-Benz and cash from the victim's girlfriend, and were apprehended at the drop-off site. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error on either the sufficiency of the evidence or the Batson challenge to jury selection. The court held that circumstantial evidence—including the defendant's presence in the getaway car with the ransom cell phone, his proximity to a visible loaded handgun as a convicted felon, and his role in the ongoing restraint of the victim—permitted the jury to conclude he participated as a principal or accomplice. It also ruled that the prosecutor provided credible, race-neutral reasons for striking a prospective juror, and the defendant had not met his burden to show those reasons were pretextual.

criminal lawgunscivil rightsprocedure

In this case, the Thomases sued Montelucia Villas after backing out of a $3.295 million contract to purchase a luxury villa, alleging breaches including failure to complete infrastructure, provide ownership privileges, and obtain a certificate of occupancy by the scheduled May 2008 closing; they sought return of their $659,000 earnest money deposits. Montelucia counterclaimed that the Thomases breached by refusing to close. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Thomases, but the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, directing judgment for Montelucia. The court held that the Thomases’ May 6, 2008 letter was an anticipatory repudiation that unequivocally terminated the contract without following the purchase agreement’s Section 12 notice-and-cure process, thereby excusing Montelucia from further performance or proof of its own readiness to close.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether a supplier's lawsuit against a property owner and its surety bond was timely filed after a mechanic's lien was recorded on a commercial construction project. Alliance TruTrus recorded a lien in September 2008 for unpaid materials, Carlson posted a discharge bond in February 2009, and Alliance sued on the bond in May 2009—more than six months after the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to Alliance, interpreting A.R.S. § 33-1004(D)(2) to give it ninety days from service of the bond to file suit. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute's ninety-day extension applies only to adding the bond's principal and sureties as parties to a lien foreclosure action that was already timely commenced under the six-month limit of A.R.S. § 33-998; it does not extend the deadline for initially filing suit. Because Alliance filed no action within six months of recording its lien, the bond and underlying claim were discharged as a matter of law.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Bonfiglio, Austin James Bonfiglio was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony, after a large party fight in which one attendee was stabbed multiple times; the evidence included eyewitness identification, testimony that Bonfiglio later admitted the stabbing, and recorded jail calls in which he threatened a potential witness. On appeal, Bonfiglio argued that the prosecutor’s rebuttal comment about the absence of additional witnesses amounted to improper vouching and that the trial court improperly used a jury-found aggravating factor (“ability to walk away”) to impose a sentence above the presumptive term. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed both the conviction and the 13-year aggravated sentence. It held that the prosecutor’s remark drew a permissible inference from admitted evidence of witness intimidation rather than suggesting undisclosed facts, and therefore did not constitute misconduct. The court further held that Bonfiglio’s two admitted historical prior felonies automatically exposed him to the enhanced sentencing range under A.R.S. § 13-702, so the trial court’s consideration of the additional jury-found aggravator did not violate due process or require resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

In Cliff Findlay Automotive, LLC v. Olson, the seller sued Susan Olson for the full unpaid balance on a vehicle purchase contract after her adult daughter filed for bankruptcy, the car was sold by the trustee, and the seller recovered only a partial distribution as an unsecured creditor. Olson had signed the documents alongside her daughter but claimed she did so only as an accommodation party without intending to own or use the car; she argued that the seller’s failure to perfect its lien within the required twenty days impaired the collateral and entitled her to a reduction in liability under Arizona’s version of the UCC. The trial court granted summary judgment to the seller, finding Olson liable despite recognizing her accommodation status and the seller’s delay. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that material factual and legal questions remained about whether Olson qualified as an accommodation party, the extent to which the lien failure impaired the collateral’s value, and whether she had abandoned any defenses by later releasing her interest in the vehicle. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine any offset Olson might be owed based on the vehicle’s value and the seller’s prior recovery.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Cotten, Joseph Ken Cotten appealed his convictions for one count of theft and three counts of misconduct involving weapons after police found three guns, two of them stolen, at his girlfriend’s home where he was a prohibited possessor. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting Cotten’s claims that the theft indictment was duplicitous because it allowed conviction under either of two theft theories without a special verdict, that consecutive sentences were improper for the theft and one weapons count based on the same gun, and that a prior California felony conviction was too old to enhance his sentence. The court held that theft under A.R.S. § 13-1802 is a single unified offense, so the jury need only unanimously agree that a theft occurred, not on the precise manner; the offenses remain separate for sentencing purposes even when involving the same weapon; and the prior conviction fell within the five-year window for enhancement.

criminal lawguns

The case involved a dispute over the enforcement in Arizona of a 1986 California divorce property settlement judgment that had been domesticated in Yavapai County Superior Court in 1996. Robert Cristall filed multiple motions in 2009 challenging the judgment's validity, arguing that Barbara Cristall's 2002 and 2007 renewal affidavits were untimely under Arizona statutes and that an alleged assignment of collection rights to Paragon Financial Fitness, Inc. deprived Barbara of authority to pursue enforcement. The trial court denied the motions, finding the renewals timely and no credible issue regarding ownership or Barbara's right to collect. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding after de novo review that the renewals complied with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and related statutes, that any assignment did not invalidate Barbara's actions, and that the trial court properly exercised discretion in denying additional discovery or argument.

family lawprocedure

This case involved a special action challenging the transfer of venue in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a 2008 plane crash in Apache County that injured the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court for negligence and related claims, after which one defendant successfully moved to transfer venue to Apache County under A.R.S. § 12-401(12) on the ground that the action concerned real property. The Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the transfer, holding that the complaint sought damages for personal injuries sounding in tort and did not involve recovery of, damages to, or other actions concerning real property within the meaning of the venue statute. The court reasoned that the catch-all provision in § 12-401(12) applies only when real property is the subject matter of the action, not merely when the underlying events occurred on or involved real property, and therefore venue was improperly transferred.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Hatch, the defendant appealed his convictions for burglary and possession of burglary tools after being interrupted by police during a break-in at a vitamin store; he had admitted those charges at trial while contesting only an aggravated assault count. The key issue was whether his prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia, sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-901.01(A) (Proposition 200), could be used for impeachment under Arizona Rule of Evidence 609(a), which requires the offense to be punishable by more than one year in prison. The trial court allowed the impeachment, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that Proposition 302 amendments made imprisonment possible in certain circumstances, satisfying Rule 609(a). The court further concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant had explicitly admitted the elements of the burglary and burglary-tools offenses during his testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Fisher, the defendant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale, arguing that police discovered the drugs during an unlawful protective sweep of his apartment while investigating a prior aggravated assault, so the evidence and subsequent consent to search should have been suppressed. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding that the sweep was lawful. Officers had responded to a report of a pistol-whipping, followed a description of the suspect and vehicle to the apartment, detained the defendant (identified as "Taz") and others outside, and performed the sweep because the assault weapon was missing and they could not confirm whether additional people remained inside. The court held that the protective sweep was justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts indicating potential danger to officers, even absent an arrest, and that the marijuana was found in plain view during the limited sweep.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a DUI prosecution in which the defendant was arrested, invoked his right to counsel, left a voicemail for his attorney, and had his blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant before the attorney later called the jail. The municipal court dismissed the charges on the ground that jail personnel had interfered with the defendant's right to counsel by not allowing him to take the return call, and the superior court affirmed that dismissal. On special action review, the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed, holding that the stipulated facts showed no violation warranting dismissal. The court reasoned that the investigatory phase had already ended with the lawful collection of blood evidence, the attorney's call occurred after the defendant was in sheriff custody awaiting an initial appearance, and an initial appearance is not a critical stage at which counsel must be provided.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (DVCC) and homeowners in multiple sections of a retirement community over the validity of 2003-2004 amendments to original deed restrictions (Declarations) recorded in the 1960s and 1970s. The amendments purported to create a mandatory homeowners' association, impose annual and special assessments on all lot owners, and require membership in DVCC, even though most original Declarations contained no mention of DVCC, assessments, or common areas. The trial court had partially upheld the amendments for certain sections while denying attorneys' fees. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that the amendments were invalid for sections other than 18 because the original Declarations did not authorize the creation of new obligations such as mandatory assessments or a homeowners' association, and the absence of common areas precluded any implied authority to impose such burdens by majority vote.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Monica and Walter Lips appealing the dismissal of their spoliation of evidence claim against Scottsdale Healthcare. After Monica Lips underwent hip replacement revision surgery at the hospital, the explanted prosthetic components were lost or destroyed despite a request to preserve them, which allegedly harmed the Lips' separate products liability lawsuit against the device's manufacturer. The trial court dismissed the claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Arizona does not recognize an independent tort for intentional or negligent spoliation of evidence by either a party to litigation or a third party. The court relied on prior Arizona Supreme Court precedent declining to create such a cause of action and noted that other remedies, such as evidentiary sanctions or traditional negligence claims, were available instead.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. LeBrun, a priest was charged with multiple counts of sexual conduct with a minor and child molestation based on accusations from six victims spanning 1986 to 1991, plus similar acts in Indiana. The trial court joined all counts for a single trial and admitted the out-of-state evidence under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) as proof of aberrant sexual propensity, relying on audio and video statements from the victims rather than holding a live evidentiary hearing. The jury convicted the defendant on six counts, and he received consecutive sentences totaling 111 years. On appeal, the defendant argued that joinder was improper and that an evidentiary hearing was required to assess credibility under Rule 404(c) and State v. Aguilar. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the recorded statements provided sufficient clear and convincing evidence for cross-admissibility, no material factual dispute existed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance or an evidentiary hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

In Watts v. Arizona Department of Revenue, taxpayers who indirectly owned an equipment leasing company appealed a tax court ruling denying them pollution control income tax credits under A.R.S. §§ 43-1170 and 43-1081 for the cost of water trucks and wagons they leased to construction customers from 1998 to 2001. The court affirmed summary judgment for the Department of Revenue, holding that the taxpayers were ineligible for the credits. The core reasoning was that the leased equipment did not qualify because it was not used directly by the taxpayers in their own trade or business to control pollution, it was attached to motor vehicles (expressly excluded by the 2000 clarifying amendments to the statutes), and the amendments applied retroactively to the relevant tax years without violating due process, as taxpayers had no vested rights to the credits.

taxesenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiffs sued defendant doctors for medical malpractice after the death of a patient following cardiac surgery. The defendants sought to enforce A.R.S. § 12-2603, which requires plaintiffs to certify whether expert testimony is needed on the standard of care and, if so, to serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit with initial disclosures. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 16(c) and 26.1 on expert disclosure timing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute constitutional as it supplements rather than conflicts with the rules, since the affidavit is preliminary and provisional, the statute permits extensions for good cause, and similar requirements had been upheld in prior precedent.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

The case involved Mario Gonzalez's appeal of his conviction for unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle after he did not stop when a police officer attempted a traffic stop due to a suspended license. Gonzalez contended that the trial court committed fundamental error by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of failure to obey a traffic officer. The court affirmed the conviction, ruling that failure to obey an officer is not a lesser-included offense because it requires proof of additional elements, such as a lawful order from an officer authorized to direct traffic, which are not necessary for unlawful flight. The decision was based on comparing the statutory elements of the two offenses and finding that the lesser offense includes requirements absent from the greater one.

criminal lawprocedure

South West Sand & Gravel sued the Central Arizona Water Conservation District after the District began recharging CAP water into the Agua Fria River under state permits, which raised the local water table and allegedly interfered with South West’s sand and gravel mining on nearby properties. The company asserted claims for negligence, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. The court affirmed summary judgment for the District, concluding that Arizona statutes and precedent, including A.R.S. § 45-173 and West Maricopa Combine, recognize the right to use natural watercourses for storage and recharge and that South West had no protected property interest against such activity when groundwater movement followed natural hydrologic connections and stayed within historic capacities.

propertytorts & liabilityenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned Tamula Bogard, an electrician employed by Cannon & Wendt Electric Co., who filed EEOC charges alleging gender discrimination in a promotion decision, followed by additional charges claiming retaliation through a job transfer, pay reduction, and eventual termination. Bogard sued the employer under Title VII and the Arizona Civil Rights Act for gender discrimination and retaliation, also seeking emotional distress and other damages. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the discrimination claim and emotional distress damages while denying it on retaliation, and the parties later submitted stipulated facts on the remaining claims. On appeal, the court vacated the portion of the judgment awarding damages for mental pain and suffering and affirmed the remainder of the judgment as modified.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure