In Cardoso v. Soldo, Maria Cardoso appealed a superior court decision continuing an order of protection that her former husband, Paul Soldo, had obtained against her in municipal court based on allegations of ongoing harassment through texts and emails. The order, which barred Cardoso from contacting Soldo and a third party, expired before the appeal could be heard, raising a threshold question of mootness. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the appeal was not moot due to potential collateral consequences of protective orders but affirmed the continuation of the order, finding that Cardoso's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, procedural fairness, alleged judicial bias, and lack of findings were all unsupported by the record. The court reasoned that the superior court had properly conducted an evidentiary hearing, implicitly rejected Cardoso's requested findings, and followed applicable protective order procedures.
The case arose from an insurance dispute in which the Nardellis sued MetLife for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing after MetLife declined to declare their stolen and extensively damaged Ford Explorer a total loss and instead authorized repairs estimated at around $11,000. A jury found MetLife liable, awarding $155,000 in compensatory damages and $55 million in punitive damages; the trial court upheld the compensatory award but reduced the punitive award to $620,000. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of bad-faith liability and the Nardellis' entitlement to punitive damages, concluding that the evidence showed MetLife had acted with an "evil mind" by prioritizing company severity and profitability targets over a fair assessment of whether the vehicle could be restored to its pre-loss condition. The court reduced the punitive damages award to $155,000 to match the compensatory damages, holding that this amount was the appropriate measure under Arizona law.
The case concerned whether Val-Pak East Valley, an Arizona franchisee selling cooperative direct mail advertising, owed Arizona use tax on transactions with its Florida affiliate for the design, printing, and mailing of advertising coupons to Arizona residents. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Val-Pak was not subject to the use tax. The court reasoned that the governing statutes tax the storage, use, or consumption in Arizona of tangible personal property, but Val-Pak purchased and paid for services rather than tangible property; the coupons were not owned, stored, or used by Val-Pak itself but instead mailed directly to third-party recipients; and the arrangement therefore fell outside the statutory definition of taxable use. The court distinguished contrary precedent and an agency policy statement as inapplicable or non-controlling.
The case concerned whether Arizona’s Proposition 204, a voter-approved initiative that expanded Medicaid (AHCCCS) eligibility to all persons up to 100% of the federal poverty level and required the tobacco-litigation-settlement fund to be supplemented “as necessary” by legislative appropriations or other available sources, obligated the Legislature to provide additional funding when the settlement fund proved inadequate. Petitioners sought to compel continued enrollment and funding for the expanded population after the Legislature, facing a budget crisis, passed measures authorizing a federal waiver and freezing new enrollment for certain adults once available monies were exhausted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of relief. It held that, although Proposition 204 directs supplemental funding, the question of whether the Legislature has satisfied that directive by drawing on “any other available sources” is a non-justiciable political question because resolving it would require the judiciary to set spending priorities and make appropriations decisions constitutionally entrusted to the other branches.
The case concerned claims brought by the Arizona Attorney General against AutoZone under the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) alleging that the retailer engaged in deceptive pricing practices by offering goods with inaccurate shelf prices or without any displayed prices, based on data from state inspections under a separate pricing statute. The Court of Appeals clarified the elements of CFA violations, holding that the act clause requires proof the retailer acted voluntarily but neither imposes strict liability nor demands an intent to deceive, that evidence of a deceptive act creates a rebuttable presumption of voluntariness, that nondisclosure can qualify as a deceptive practice only if the retailer had a legal duty to disclose, and that disgorgement is an authorized remedy to ensure compliance. The court rejected the superior court's rulings requiring proof of intent to post inaccurate prices or to induce reliance on omissions, reversed the grant of summary judgment to AutoZone, and remanded for further proceedings on liability and remedies.
The case involved Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC suing the City of Cottonwood for a writ of mandamus to compel rebidding of a construction contract under Arizona procurement statutes after the City awarded it to another bidder. The superior court found the City had violated the statutes but denied mandamus relief because the City had terminated the contract to self-perform the work, intentionally mooting the claim; it then awarded Mulcaire attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12-2030 as the prevailing party. On appeal, the court held that a party generally must obtain mandamus or similar relief to qualify for fees under the statute but affirmed the award here under equitable principles, given the City's actions to moot the case and prevent adjudication. The core reasoning focused on the statute's requirement of prevailing by adjudication on the merits in a mandamus action, balanced against the unique circumstances where the City deliberately avoided the relief sought.