The case involved Christopher Lehman, who was convicted in Missouri of the class E felony of loitering within 500 feet of a public park due to a prior incest conviction from another state. Lehman appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he was knowingly within 500 feet of the park or that he was loitering. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the conviction, finding that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence from which the factfinder could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between Lehman's location in the parking lot and community building and the public park was 500 feet or less. As a result, the court entered a judgment of acquittal rather than addressing the constitutional challenges to the statute.
The case concerned whether APLUX, LLC and a related partnership owed Missouri use tax on their out-of-state purchases of two aircraft (a TBM and an Excel) that were brought into the state, or whether they qualified for a resale exemption by leasing the planes. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the leases to Luxco did not constitute a "sale" under the tax statutes because APLUX retained priority use and control, so no exemption applied to either aircraft on that basis. However, the court found that the lease of the Excel to Aero Charter, a common carrier, did transfer use and qualified as a sale, entitling APLUX to the resale exemption for that aircraft under sections 144.018, 144.615, and 144.030. The court therefore affirmed the AHC in part, reversed in part, and remanded for calculation of the tax due.
The case was an original disciplinary proceeding against attorney Eric F. Kayira for misconduct over approximately five years, including failing to notify clients of received funds, using one client's funds to pay others, and misappropriating client money for personal and firm expenses. The Supreme Court of Missouri disbarred Kayira. The court reasoned that disbarment is the baseline sanction for knowingly converting client funds under ABA standards and prior precedent, and that Kayira failed to present adequate medical evidence or follow required procedures to establish mitigating factors such as mental disorders that might support the lesser sanction of indefinite suspension.
In State of Missouri v. Rodney Knox, the defendant appealed his convictions arising from an armed intrusion into an apartment, where he was charged with stealing personal property and cash from multiple victims. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the two class A misdemeanor stealing convictions must be reduced to class D misdemeanors because the jury instructions and evidence did not establish the property's value as required by statute. It further ruled that the felony stealing conviction was supported by sufficient evidence allowing the jury to infer the defendant took more than $750 in cash, but the offense should be classified as a class D felony rather than class C under the applicable 2017 criminal code provisions. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the proper classifications and resentencing on the misdemeanors.
In this wrongful death case arising from a patient's death after gallbladder surgery, the plaintiffs initially sued Mercy Hospital and Dr. Dodson, mistakenly naming the hospital as the doctor's employer. After the three-year statute of limitations expired, they obtained court permission to substitute Mercy Clinic as the employer defendant under Rule 55.33(c) due to the mistaken identity, then later filed a new petition attempting to add Mercy Hospital back and invoke the one-year savings statute applicable to nonsuits. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claim against Mercy Hospital as time-barred. The court reasoned that the substitution of parties did not terminate the suit or qualify as a nonsuit, so the savings statute did not apply, and re-adding the original defendant after the limitations period would improperly bypass rules against adding new parties post-expiration.
The case involved Dreyer Electric Co., LLC's claim for a sales tax refund on electrical equipment it installed as replacement parts in a sawmill's manufacturing facility, which the Director of Revenue denied on the ground that the items were not used directly in manufacturing under section 144.030.2(5). The Administrative Hearing Commission ruled for Dreyer, finding the equipment collectively qualified as exempt under the integrated plant doctrine. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the AHC properly invoked the three-factor integrated plant test from Floyd Charcoal Co. v. Director of Revenue but erred by grouping all items together without separately analyzing whether each type of equipment independently satisfied the test for direct use in manufacturing. The court remanded for individualized application of the doctrine to each category of disputed parts, such as soft starters versus general electrical outlets.
