The case involved Christopher Lehman, who was convicted in Missouri of the class E felony of loitering within 500 feet of a public park due to a prior incest conviction from another state. Lehman appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show he was knowingly within 500 feet of the park or that he was loitering. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the conviction, finding that the state failed to provide sufficient evidence from which the factfinder could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance between Lehman's location in the parking lot and community building and the public park was 500 feet or less. As a result, the court entered a judgment of acquittal rather than addressing the constitutional challenges to the statute.
The case concerned whether APLUX, LLC and a related partnership owed Missouri use tax on their out-of-state purchases of two aircraft (a TBM and an Excel) that were brought into the state, or whether they qualified for a resale exemption by leasing the planes. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the leases to Luxco did not constitute a "sale" under the tax statutes because APLUX retained priority use and control, so no exemption applied to either aircraft on that basis. However, the court found that the lease of the Excel to Aero Charter, a common carrier, did transfer use and qualified as a sale, entitling APLUX to the resale exemption for that aircraft under sections 144.018, 144.615, and 144.030. The court therefore affirmed the AHC in part, reversed in part, and remanded for calculation of the tax due.
The case was an original disciplinary proceeding against attorney Eric F. Kayira for misconduct over approximately five years, including failing to notify clients of received funds, using one client's funds to pay others, and misappropriating client money for personal and firm expenses. The Supreme Court of Missouri disbarred Kayira. The court reasoned that disbarment is the baseline sanction for knowingly converting client funds under ABA standards and prior precedent, and that Kayira failed to present adequate medical evidence or follow required procedures to establish mitigating factors such as mental disorders that might support the lesser sanction of indefinite suspension.
In State of Missouri v. Rodney Knox, the defendant appealed his convictions arising from an armed intrusion into an apartment, where he was charged with stealing personal property and cash from multiple victims. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the two class A misdemeanor stealing convictions must be reduced to class D misdemeanors because the jury instructions and evidence did not establish the property's value as required by statute. It further ruled that the felony stealing conviction was supported by sufficient evidence allowing the jury to infer the defendant took more than $750 in cash, but the offense should be classified as a class D felony rather than class C under the applicable 2017 criminal code provisions. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the proper classifications and resentencing on the misdemeanors.
In this wrongful death case arising from a patient's death after gallbladder surgery, the plaintiffs initially sued Mercy Hospital and Dr. Dodson, mistakenly naming the hospital as the doctor's employer. After the three-year statute of limitations expired, they obtained court permission to substitute Mercy Clinic as the employer defendant under Rule 55.33(c) due to the mistaken identity, then later filed a new petition attempting to add Mercy Hospital back and invoke the one-year savings statute applicable to nonsuits. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claim against Mercy Hospital as time-barred. The court reasoned that the substitution of parties did not terminate the suit or qualify as a nonsuit, so the savings statute did not apply, and re-adding the original defendant after the limitations period would improperly bypass rules against adding new parties post-expiration.
The case involved Dreyer Electric Co., LLC's claim for a sales tax refund on electrical equipment it installed as replacement parts in a sawmill's manufacturing facility, which the Director of Revenue denied on the ground that the items were not used directly in manufacturing under section 144.030.2(5). The Administrative Hearing Commission ruled for Dreyer, finding the equipment collectively qualified as exempt under the integrated plant doctrine. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the AHC properly invoked the three-factor integrated plant test from Floyd Charcoal Co. v. Director of Revenue but erred by grouping all items together without separately analyzing whether each type of equipment independently satisfied the test for direct use in manufacturing. The court remanded for individualized application of the doctrine to each category of disputed parts, such as soft starters versus general electrical outlets.
The case concerned whether the Kansas City Chiefs football team was liable for Missouri sales and use taxes as the "purchaser" of materials and equipment used to renovate Arrowhead Stadium, which is owned by Jackson County and subleased to the team. The Administrative Hearing Commission ruled that the team qualified as the purchaser and owed the taxes. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county and its sports complex authority were the purchasers because they owned the project, controlled the project fund, and provided the consideration through voter-approved taxes and bonds; the team's cash contributions in exchange for tax credits did not make it the purchaser under the tax statutes. The court emphasized that the team managed construction but did not supply the funds used for the purchases, so the tax liability did not attach to the team.
This case concerned a dispute among three siblings who were equal shareholders and directors of the closely held Perma-Jack Company, in which plaintiff Joan Robinson alleged that defendants John Langenbach and Judy Lanfri breached their fiduciary duties as directors and majority shareholders by removing her as president in bad faith and excluding her from company involvement, resulting in loss of benefits from her minority ownership. Robinson also claimed shareholder oppression, while the defendants argued her claim was an impermissible wrongful termination suit by an at-will employee. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment on a jury verdict for breach of fiduciary duty, its finding of oppression, and its order requiring the defendants to buy out Robinson's shares. It upheld the circuit court's exercise of discretion in applying discounts to determine fair value of the shares, denying prejudgment interest on an unliquidated amount, and denying attorney fees, finding the evidence supported the verdicts and remedies and that no abuse of discretion occurred.
In State of Missouri v. Jason Russell, the defendant appealed his 2017 sentencing for stealing as a class C felony after pleading guilty in 2013. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Russell was entitled to the benefit of its 2016 decision in State v. Bazell, which ruled that stealing under section 570.030 is a class A misdemeanor that cannot be enhanced to a felony. The court decided that a claim of excessive sentence can be raised on direct appeal even after a guilty plea, as the statutory right to appeal under section 547.070 is not limited by rules or the plea itself, and Russell preserved the issue by objecting at sentencing. It reversed the judgment and remanded for resentencing as a class A misdemeanor.
Heather Hamilton appealed the denial of her Rule 24.035 postconviction motion after receiving two five-year sentences for class C felony stealing. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment, ruling that the sentences exceeded what was authorized by law. The court held that Hamilton's offenses were properly classified as class A misdemeanors under its prior decision in State v. Bazell because her case was not yet final when Bazell was issued. The reasoning centered on the prospective application of Bazell to all non-final cases, including those like Hamilton's where a guilty plea had occurred but sentence had not yet been imposed at the time of the Bazell ruling.
The case concerned a challenge by the Missouri Coalition for the Environment and Thomas J. Sager to Senate Bill 35, which amended section 34.030 to impose notice, hearing, and size/price thresholds on land purchases by the commissioner of administration and the Department of Natural Resources. The coalition alleged violations of the Missouri Constitution’s single-subject, clear-title, original-purpose, and full-text requirements under article III, sections 21, 23, and 28, as well as the prohibition on special or local laws under article III, section 40(30). The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. The Court held that the bill’s single subject of state land purchases was clearly expressed in its title, its purpose of increasing transparency remained unchanged, no implicit amendment of other statutes occurred that required reprinting their full text, and the law was general and statewide rather than special or local because it uniformly regulated a constitutionally created statewide agency’s operations. The judgment was therefore affirmed.
The case concerned David Roland's sunshine law request to the St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners for absentee ballot applications and ballot envelopes from prior elections. The board refused production, relying on confidentiality provisions in sections 115.289 and 115.493, prompting Roland to seek a declaratory judgment that the refusal violated the sunshine law. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that the records were open public records and that the board had violated the sunshine law by withholding them. The court reversed the taxation of costs against Roland, ruling that the board was not a prevailing party entitled to costs under either the sunshine law or the general costs statute because the knowing-or-purposeful violation claim was not a separate cause of action.
This case involved Darrell Williams Sr.'s appeal from the denial of his motions to intervene in and set aside the voluntary dismissal of a wrongful death lawsuit filed by his son's grandmother, Delores Henry, against police officers following the 2009 shooting death of Williams's son. The grandmother filed the suit despite not being a proper plaintiff under Missouri's wrongful death statute because the parents were alive, and Williams, who was incarcerated, later attempted to join as a plaintiff via letters and a motion that did not comply with intervention rules. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's rulings, holding that Williams never became a party because his motion failed to meet Rule 52.12 requirements such as service on other parties and attachment of a pleading, the grandmother's voluntary dismissal under Rule 67.02(a) took effect immediately without a court order and left no judgment, and Rule 74.06(b) relief is unavailable to non-parties. The core reasoning focused on strict adherence to procedural rules governing intervention and dismissal, which prevented Williams from pursuing the claim after the suit ended.
This case involved a dispute over restrictive covenants in the indentures of the Clayton Terrace subdivision in Missouri, including a right of first refusal on lot sales and a prohibition on building more than one residence per lot. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the validity of the sale of Lot 6 by the trustee of the Huey trust, finding that the trustees' enforcement efforts did not constitute an abuse of process because there was no improper use of legal process beyond an allegedly improper purpose, and it reversed the related award of attorney's fees. The court also affirmed that the one-residence-per-lot restriction could not be avoided by subdividing the lot, as the covenant must be strictly construed without inferring additional prohibitions. However, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees against the purchaser, 6 Clayton Terrace, LLC, holding that an arms-length buyer had no duty to disclose its plans to subdivide and that losing a claim does not alone justify such fees.
The case was a medical negligence action brought by parents against a doctor and her medical practice for the wrongful death of their daughter during delivery. After a jury verdict for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to permit additional voir dire questioning about potential connections to the defendants' malpractice insurer after their counsel inadvertently omitted the question during initial questioning. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment, reasoning that although parties have a right to ask the insurance question under Ivy v. Hawk if done without undue emphasis, trial courts retain discretion over the timing and manner of voir dire, and allowing the question only after voir dire had otherwise concluded would have improperly highlighted the insurance issue.
The case involved Travis Jones, who was on probation for felonious restraint until an earned discharge date in December 2017, seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from holding a probation revocation hearing after that date. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the circuit court lost authority to revoke probation because it did not make every reasonable effort to hold the hearing before the term expired, despite timely notice and scheduling. The court reasoned that the circuit court and prosecutor knew Jones was incarcerated in a nearby county but made no attempt to secure his presence via writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum until after expiration, unlike their later actions. As a result, the writ was made permanent, ordering Jones's discharge from probation.
The case involved a dispute between the Incline Village Board of Trustees and homeowners Matthew and Andrea Edler over a dock the Edlers constructed on Main Lake, an artificial lake owned by the trustees' subdivision that borders the Edlers' property in another subdivision. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the lower court's order requiring the Edlers to remove the dock, holding that owners of land abutting an artificial body of water do not acquire riparian rights absent an easement or ownership interest in the lakebed. The court reasoned that Missouri law distinguishes between natural and artificial waters for riparian rights, and the Edlers had neither an easement nor any other basis for such rights. However, the court reversed the award of attorney's fees to the trustees, finding no special circumstances justified the award as the Edlers had pursued their claims in good faith.
Matthew Vacca, an administrative law judge with muscular dystrophy, sued the Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations and former division director Brian May, claiming retaliation for filing complaints with the MCHR and EEOC alleging disability discrimination. A jury awarded Vacca actual and punitive damages that included substantial future lost wages based on his assertion that he could have continued working as an ALJ for 20 years with reasonable accommodations. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment, ruling that judicial estoppel should have prevented Vacca from making that claim because he had successfully asserted total disability and inability to work in his ongoing divorce proceedings to obtain maintenance and in applications for long-term disability benefits from MOSERS. The court remanded the case for consideration of any other damages not dependent on the estopped future-wage claim.
The case involved Matthew Carvalho appealing the suspension of his driver's license after a breath test showed a blood alcohol content of .087 percent, above the legal limit of .08. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the suspension, holding that the blood alcohol report was admissible even without evidence of timely filing with the Department of Health and Senior Services because such filing was a collateral requirement that did not affect the test's validity. The court further ruled that the implied consent notice accurately stated the immediate suspension consequence for refusal and that due process did not require informing the driver of the consequences of taking the test or the specific burdens of proof the director would bear at any hearing.
Mary Doe sued to enjoin enforcement of parts of Missouri’s Informed Consent Law, alleging that requirements to be offered a booklet containing statements that life begins at conception, an ultrasound opportunity, and a 72-hour waiting period before an abortion violated the Establishment Clause and the state Religious Freedom Restoration Act because they conflicted with her religious belief that a fetus is not a person. She did not claim the requirements imposed an undue burden on abortion access. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the petition for failure to state a claim. The Court reasoned that the statute does not adopt or require acceptance of any religious tenet, does not mandate reading the booklet or undergoing an ultrasound, and that Doe failed to allege how the waiting period conflicted with her religion or to challenge the underlying statute setting out the statements at issue.
