This case arose from a declaratory judgment action by Shannon Robinson and others against the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services challenging the validity of certain DHSS regulations (19 CSR 20-20.010 et seq.) that authorized local health officers to issue rules and orders with independent discretion, including closing businesses. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, invalidating the regulations and related local orders. After the attorney general declined to appeal on behalf of DHSS, St. Louis and Jackson counties along with several local health boards and administrators filed post-judgment motions to intervene as of right and permissively to pursue an appeal. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court correctly denied intervention to the Cooper and Livingston County entities because they failed to file the required pleading under Rule 52.12(c), but erred in denying the counties' timely motion, as they satisfied the criteria for intervention as of right to protect their regulatory authority; the judgment was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to allow the counties to intervene and amend the judgment.
Christina Forester sued Crystal May, a Missouri children's division caseworker, for the wrongful death of her granddaughter M.S., alleging that May failed to complete and submit a required SAFE-CARE Provider Evaluation Referral form within 72 hours during a child abuse investigation, which allowed the child to return to unsafe conditions where she died from a fentanyl overdose. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that May was entitled to official immunity. The court reasoned that the children's division manual granted May discretion to decide whether to complete the form, including exceptions if the child had already been seen by or would be referred to a SAFE-CARE provider, making the duty discretionary rather than ministerial. Because the petition's allegations established immunity as a matter of law, it failed to state a claim. The court did not reach the separate issue of whether causation was adequately pled.
Jenette Konopasek sued Douglas and Laura Konopasek seeking to avoid transfers Douglas made by depositing workers’ compensation and personal injury settlement proceeds into a bank account held with Laura as tenants by the entirety, alleging the transfers were made to hinder collection on her two prior judgments against Douglas. The Taney County circuit court dismissed the petition without prejudice. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, holding that Jenette adequately pleaded claims under sections 428.024.1(1) and 428.029.1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act by alleging she was a creditor, that Douglas transferred assets with actual intent to hinder or defraud her, and that he made at least one transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value while insolvent or becoming insolvent as a result. The Court reasoned that intent may be averred generally under Rule 55.15 and that the pleaded facts regarding the deposits satisfied the statutory elements for relief.
The case involved David Wilmoth's appeal of a circuit court judgment upholding the Director of Revenue's suspension of his driver's license under section 302.505, following his arrest for an alcohol-related traffic offense where he was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher. Wilmoth challenged the admission of testimony regarding the numerical result of a preliminary breath test administered before his arrest, arguing it violated section 577.021.3, and contended that the finding of probable cause lacked substantial evidence or was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the numerical result of a preliminary breath test is admissible as evidence of probable cause to arrest under section 577.021.3, as it reflects facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. The Court further determined that the circuit court's judgment was supported by substantial evidence, including the preliminary breath test result of 0.11 percent, the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and Wilmoth's admission of drinking, and was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment sustaining the license suspension.
John Lisle sued Meyer Electric Co., Inc., claiming the company violated section 287.780 by refusing to rehire him in June 2019 in retaliation for his exercise of workers' compensation rights during prior employment with the company. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Meyer Electric. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that section 287.780 applies only to current employment relationships. The court reasoned that the statutory terms "employer" and "employee" must be strictly construed under section 287.800.1 to require a present employment relationship at the time of the alleged discrimination, which was absent here since Lisle was a former employee.
The case concerned whether Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) qualified for manufacturing sales and use tax exemptions under sections 144.030.2(4) and 144.054.2 for replacement equipment it purchased in 2011 and 2012 to operate its Missouri telecommunications network. The Director of Revenue denied refund claims totaling over $1.5 million, but the Administrative Hearing Commission ruled in CCE I's favor, finding that the company's provision of telecommunications services constituted manufacturing and that the equipment was used directly in that process. On review, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that transforming voice signals through the network infrastructure qualifies as manufacturing under the statutes and that CCE I satisfied the integrated plant doctrine without needing to prove substantial use. The Court rejected the Director's arguments that an additional substantial-use requirement applied beyond the integrated plant test.
