This case arose from a declaratory judgment action by Shannon Robinson and others against the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services challenging the validity of certain DHSS regulations (19 CSR 20-20.010 et seq.) that authorized local health officers to issue rules and orders with independent discretion, including closing businesses. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, invalidating the regulations and related local orders. After the attorney general declined to appeal on behalf of DHSS, St. Louis and Jackson counties along with several local health boards and administrators filed post-judgment motions to intervene as of right and permissively to pursue an appeal. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court correctly denied intervention to the Cooper and Livingston County entities because they failed to file the required pleading under Rule 52.12(c), but erred in denying the counties' timely motion, as they satisfied the criteria for intervention as of right to protect their regulatory authority; the judgment was vacated and the case remanded with instructions to allow the counties to intervene and amend the judgment.
Christina Forester sued Crystal May, a Missouri children's division caseworker, for the wrongful death of her granddaughter M.S., alleging that May failed to complete and submit a required SAFE-CARE Provider Evaluation Referral form within 72 hours during a child abuse investigation, which allowed the child to return to unsafe conditions where she died from a fentanyl overdose. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that May was entitled to official immunity. The court reasoned that the children's division manual granted May discretion to decide whether to complete the form, including exceptions if the child had already been seen by or would be referred to a SAFE-CARE provider, making the duty discretionary rather than ministerial. Because the petition's allegations established immunity as a matter of law, it failed to state a claim. The court did not reach the separate issue of whether causation was adequately pled.
Jenette Konopasek sued Douglas and Laura Konopasek seeking to avoid transfers Douglas made by depositing workers’ compensation and personal injury settlement proceeds into a bank account held with Laura as tenants by the entirety, alleging the transfers were made to hinder collection on her two prior judgments against Douglas. The Taney County circuit court dismissed the petition without prejudice. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, holding that Jenette adequately pleaded claims under sections 428.024.1(1) and 428.029.1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act by alleging she was a creditor, that Douglas transferred assets with actual intent to hinder or defraud her, and that he made at least one transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value while insolvent or becoming insolvent as a result. The Court reasoned that intent may be averred generally under Rule 55.15 and that the pleaded facts regarding the deposits satisfied the statutory elements for relief.
The case involved David Wilmoth's appeal of a circuit court judgment upholding the Director of Revenue's suspension of his driver's license under section 302.505, following his arrest for an alcohol-related traffic offense where he was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher. Wilmoth challenged the admission of testimony regarding the numerical result of a preliminary breath test administered before his arrest, arguing it violated section 577.021.3, and contended that the finding of probable cause lacked substantial evidence or was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the numerical result of a preliminary breath test is admissible as evidence of probable cause to arrest under section 577.021.3, as it reflects facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. The Court further determined that the circuit court's judgment was supported by substantial evidence, including the preliminary breath test result of 0.11 percent, the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and Wilmoth's admission of drinking, and was not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment sustaining the license suspension.
John Lisle sued Meyer Electric Co., Inc., claiming the company violated section 287.780 by refusing to rehire him in June 2019 in retaliation for his exercise of workers' compensation rights during prior employment with the company. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Meyer Electric. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that section 287.780 applies only to current employment relationships. The court reasoned that the statutory terms "employer" and "employee" must be strictly construed under section 287.800.1 to require a present employment relationship at the time of the alleged discrimination, which was absent here since Lisle was a former employee.
The case concerned whether Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC (CCE I) qualified for manufacturing sales and use tax exemptions under sections 144.030.2(4) and 144.054.2 for replacement equipment it purchased in 2011 and 2012 to operate its Missouri telecommunications network. The Director of Revenue denied refund claims totaling over $1.5 million, but the Administrative Hearing Commission ruled in CCE I's favor, finding that the company's provision of telecommunications services constituted manufacturing and that the equipment was used directly in that process. On review, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that transforming voice signals through the network infrastructure qualifies as manufacturing under the statutes and that CCE I satisfied the integrated plant doctrine without needing to prove substantial use. The Court rejected the Director's arguments that an additional substantial-use requirement applied beyond the integrated plant test.
This case involved a challenge to Missouri statutes sections 82.485 and 82.487, which created a parking commission for the City of St. Louis and assigned related powers and duties to municipal offices such as the comptroller, director of streets, and an alderman, on grounds that they violated article VI, section 22 of the Missouri Constitution by interfering with a charter city's governance of its own offices. The Supreme Court of Missouri first confirmed that city residents and an intervening alderman had standing to bring the claims. It then affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the statutory provisions establishing the commission and imposing duties on municipal officers were unconstitutional and void. The Court reversed the lower court's finding of non-severability, holding that the invalid language could be excised while leaving intact the remaining provisions that assigned powers to the city treasurer as supervisor of parking meters. Pursuant to its authority under Rule 84.14, the Court entered judgment striking only the unconstitutional portions.
This case involved a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Missouri's Attorney General against a St. Francois County circuit judge. The underlying dispute concerned a motion by the Washington County prosecuting attorney to vacate a second-degree murder conviction under section 547.031, which had been entered in St. Francois County after a change of venue from Washington County. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the statute authorizes such a postconviction motion only by a prosecuting or circuit attorney in the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. Because the Washington County prosecutor was not in the jurisdiction of conviction, the motion was unauthorized, and the circuit court lacked authority to consider it. The Court made the writ permanent, ordering dismissal of the motion.
The case involved the City of Harrisonville's claim that the Board of Trustees of the Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund committed fraud by failing to reimburse the city for costs of installing petroleum-resistant pipes to address soil contamination from a leaking underground storage tank at a gas station. After a jury awarded the city $8 million in punitive damages on the fraud claim, the circuit court entered judgment accordingly, but the board appealed on grounds including sovereign immunity. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the board is a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity from the tort claim, no statutory waiver or exception applied, and prior proceedings did not bar the immunity defense. The court reversed the judgment and entered judgment for the board under Rule 84.14.
The case involved Delores LaBlance, as personal representative of James Townsend's estate, challenging the Director of Revenue's authority to assess Green Duck Lounge, Inc.'s unpaid sales taxes against Townsend personally as a responsible party under section 144.157.3. The Administrative Hearing Commission denied the challenge, finding that a prior probate court judgment rejecting a claim against the estate was not res judicata and that the three-year notice requirement in section 144.220.3 for additional tax assessments did not apply to responsible-party assessments. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that the probate judgment addressed only the estate's liability without a prior personal assessment against Townsend and that the statutory language limiting notices of additional amounts proposed to be assessed does not cover notices of intent to assess responsible parties. The court applied the plain meaning of the statutes to conclude the assessment was timely and not barred.
The case concerned whether Beyond Housing, Inc. and Pagedale Town Center II, LLC qualified for sales and use tax exemptions under section 144.030.2(19) as charitable organizations for their development of Phase IV of the Pagedale Town Center project. The Director of Revenue appealed the Administrative Hearing Commission's ruling granting the exemptions, arguing that the organizations' prior civic exemptions made charitable status unavailable and that the project's benefits to the general community rather than solely low-income residents disqualified it. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the AHC decision, holding that the statutory definitions of charitable and civic organizations are not mutually exclusive and that the primary purpose of Phase IV was to provide targeted benefits to low-income residents in the 24:1 area through affordable housing and related services, which constitutes a charitable activity supported by substantial evidence.
This case involved The Central Trust Bank seeking a deficiency judgment against borrowers Barbara and Alexis Branch after repossessing and selling their vehicle following loan defaults under a security agreement. The circuit court denied the claim, ruling that the bank failed to provide reasonable notification of the sale and that its pre-sale notice improperly described the disposition as a private sale when the dealers-only auction was deemed a public sale. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the Branches received proper pre-sale notice under section 400.9-611, the post-sale deficiency explanation complied with sections 400.9-616(a)(1) and 400.9-616(c), and the auction was not a public sale because it was limited to licensed dealers with no meaningful opportunity for general public bidding. The court remanded the case after finding the circuit court misapplied the law on notification requirements and the classification of the sale.
The case involved a tenured teacher, Tammy Ferry, who transferred thousands of files from the Jefferson City Public School District's Google for Education account to her personal Google account, including confidential student information that she had not created or provided. The Board of Education terminated her contract after finding she violated board policies by disclosing the information without a legitimate educational interest and by failing to follow other administrative directives. The circuit court reversed the Board's decision, holding that Ferry had not made a "disclosure" under FERPA. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the Board's decision directly, found it supported by competent and substantial evidence, and held that the Teacher Tenure Act authorized the termination because Ferry willfully violated the policies. The Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and affirmed the Board's termination decision.
In this case, Ronald McLemore appealed the circuit court's denial of his Rule 29.15 postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to unadmitted statistics in closing argument, eliciting unfavorable testimony about a victim's reputation for truthfulness, and presenting a deficient opening statement and incoherent defense theory. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment, holding that McLemore failed to show the circuit court clearly erred because, although the record did not refute claims of deficient performance in some instances, those actions did not result in prejudice under the Strickland standard, and other claims were refuted by the record. The court emphasized that prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different outcome, which was not demonstrated here, as McLemore was acquitted on two of six felony sexual offense counts involving child victims.
In this criminal case, the State of Missouri appealed a circuit court order suppressing a cell phone and its data seized from James Bales during an investigation into child endangerment and abuse related to his son's head injury. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the suppression, holding that the search warrant was limited to a specific address and thus did not authorize seizure of the phone at the sheriff's office, rendering the search outside its scope. The court further ruled that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, as the executing officer knew the warrant's clear geographic restrictions and could not reasonably rely on it. The decision rested on the warrant's lack of particularity and the officer's awareness of its terms during execution.
The case involved Jeanne Olofson filing a Rule 74.06(b) motion to set aside the property division portion of her 2016 divorce judgment from Tom Olofson on grounds of alleged fraud concerning the valuation and strategic review of a major marital asset, Epiq Systems, Inc. After Tom Olofson's death, the personal representative of his estate moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the death abated the motion and that it was moot due to the subsequent sale of the property. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, ruling that abatement does not apply because the fraud claim concerns property division rather than a personal matter, and that the motion is not moot since the court can vacate only the property division while preserving the dissolution of marriage and then readjudicate the division under section 452.330.
Elad Gross sued Governor Michael Parson and the governor’s office custodian of records, alleging multiple violations of Missouri’s Sunshine Law in handling two public records requests related to potential campaign finance issues. The claims included improper inclusion of attorney review time in cost estimates, refusal to waive fees, inadequate explanations for delays, and improper redactions of records, some alleged to be knowing or purposeful. The circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings to the Governor’s Office, but the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and remanded the case. The court held that the pleadings sufficiently alleged violations of the Sunshine Law on their face, including issues with burden of proof on redactions, so the Governor’s Office was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The case concerned whether the Missouri State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF) was required to pay a $2.5 million judgment that Michael Holmes obtained against two former St. Louis police officers for fabricating evidence that led to his 2003 wrongful arrest and conviction. Holmes filed a federal civil rights suit in 2012, obtained the judgment in 2014, and then sought SLEF coverage; the state officials denied payment under a 2013 statutory amendment. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the right to SLEF payment arises only when a claim is made, so the 2013 version of section 105.726.3 applied and barred coverage for claims against the former officers. The Court therefore vacated the circuit court judgment that had favored Holmes and remanded the case.
The case involved a class of Missouri corrections officers and their association suing the Missouri Department of Corrections for breach of contract under labor agreements incorporating the FLSA, seeking pay for unpaid preshift and postshift activities like logging in, retrieving equipment, walking to posts, and supervising inmates. The circuit court awarded the class approximately $113 million after finding on summary judgment that all such activities were compensable principal activities. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the determination that retrieving keys and radios and monitoring inmates while not on post are integral and indispensable to the officers' work and thus compensable under the continuous workday rule, but held that the undisputed facts were insufficient to establish the chronological order of all activities or that the remaining preshift and postshift tasks qualified as principal activities. The court therefore vacated the award of damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and the remainder of the judgment, and remanded the case.
The case involved the City of Crestwood and two resident-taxpayers challenging Missouri statutes sections 72.418.2 and 321.322.3, which require an annexing city to pay a fire protection district for continued services in the annexed area without allowing the district to tax that area directly. The plaintiffs argued these provisions were unconstitutional special laws under article III, section 40, and that section 72.418.2 violated due process as well as tax limitations and unfunded mandate rules in article X of the Missouri Constitution. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the pleadings for the defendants, holding that the statutes' classification scheme was supported by a rational basis tied to county characteristics. The court further reasoned that the required payment was not a tax on residents, the arrangement did not impose an unfunded mandate because annexation was voluntary, and it involved only a local-to-local shift of responsibilities rather than state burden-shifting.
