In Dunwoody v. Dunwoody, the parties' 2001 divorce judgment addressed life insurance policies by requiring a trust for the children's benefit but did not mention the cash surrender value of one policy, which the court later determined was omitted property. After Steven moved to clarify the judgment years later, the District Court issued orders establishing the trust, changing some terms, and directing that any remaining cash surrender value be split equally between the parties once the youngest child turned 23. Steven appealed, arguing the court had improperly handled the omitted property through a clarification motion rather than the required statutory process. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that under 19-A M.R.S. § 953(9) omitted marital property must be divided via a dedicated motion with proper evidentiary proceedings, not through clarification, and remanded for a hearing where both sides could present evidence. The court also noted procedural issues with an affidavit and lack of a conference of counsel but focused its ruling on the statutory requirement for handling omitted property.
In McIlroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard, plaintiff James McIlroy sued after being injured in a motorcycle accident at an intersection, claiming that a temporary sign placed by the defendant apple orchard obstructed a driver's view and caused her to maneuver her vehicle in a way that led him to lose control. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that any finding of proximate cause would require jury speculation. On appeal, the court vacated the judgment, holding that testimony regarding the sign's likely position and the driver's actions provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to determine that the sign was a substantial factor in the accident.
In Bojarski v. Bojarski, Robert Bojarski appealed a District Court divorce judgment that divided marital property and debts, allocated dependent tax exemptions for the couple's four children, valued his military retirement benefits, and set child support obligations without a downward deviation during summer custody periods. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court identified multiple errors, including the allocation of tax exemptions, the use of time in service rather than service points to determine the marital share of retirement benefits, an incorrect finding on the amount of credit card debt, and an improper division of marital debts. The court therefore vacated the property division portion of the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to correct these issues.
In Stanton v. Strong, the dispute centered on whether Michael Strong could place obstructions along a deeded easement providing access to Robert Stanton's property on Seven Tree Pond in Maine. Strong had placed boulders, crushed rock, and fence posts that blocked Stanton's access from the easement, leading Stanton to sue for trespass and seek injunctive relief. The Superior Court found Strong liable for trespass and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting him from obstructing Stanton's access, which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the easement deeds permitted full use of the granted area, that Strong as the servient landowner could not impair effective easement use, and that the facts supported the need for injunctive relief based on irreparable harm, balancing of interests, and public interest.
The case involved a dispute over whether J. Russell Tarason held an easement allowing access across property owned by Wesson Realty, LLC, based on language in a 1925 deed from Emma Wentworth to Leon Benoit. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Wesson Realty, ruling that the 1925 deed created an easement in gross that was personal to Leon Benoit and terminated upon his death, rather than an appurtenant easement that would run with the land to benefit Tarason's property. The court reasoned that the deed's language granted the underlying property to Benoit "his Heirs and Assigns forever" but omitted such words of inheritance from the easement grant itself, indicating an intent to create only a personal right. Additionally, the court determined that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to convert the easement into a fee simple interest because the deed clearly showed a different intention.
The case involved the City of Lewiston suing property owner Robert Gladu to collect unpaid stormwater assessments levied under a 2006 municipal ordinance that created a Stormwater Management Utility to address runoff pollution and infrastructure needs. Gladu argued the assessments were an unauthorized tax rather than a valid fee, while the City maintained they qualified as fees tied to property impact. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the assessments constituted fees because they were designed to regulate stormwater management, funded only stormwater-related expenses kept in a segregated account, were based on impervious surface area with available credits allowing property owners to reduce or avoid the charges, and bore a reasonable relationship to the costs and benefits of the utility services. The court also upheld awards of penalties, attorney fees, and costs to the City.