Donald G. Alexander

In Dunwoody v. Dunwoody, the parties' 2001 divorce judgment addressed life insurance policies by requiring a trust for the children's benefit but did not mention the cash surrender value of one policy, which the court later determined was omitted property. After Steven moved to clarify the judgment years later, the District Court issued orders establishing the trust, changing some terms, and directing that any remaining cash surrender value be split equally between the parties once the youngest child turned 23. Steven appealed, arguing the court had improperly handled the omitted property through a clarification motion rather than the required statutory process. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that under 19-A M.R.S. § 953(9) omitted marital property must be divided via a dedicated motion with proper evidentiary proceedings, not through clarification, and remanded for a hearing where both sides could present evidence. The court also noted procedural issues with an affidavit and lack of a conference of counsel but focused its ruling on the statutory requirement for handling omitted property.

family lawpropertyprocedure

In McIlroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard, plaintiff James McIlroy sued after being injured in a motorcycle accident at an intersection, claiming that a temporary sign placed by the defendant apple orchard obstructed a driver's view and caused her to maneuver her vehicle in a way that led him to lose control. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that any finding of proximate cause would require jury speculation. On appeal, the court vacated the judgment, holding that testimony regarding the sign's likely position and the driver's actions provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to determine that the sign was a substantial factor in the accident.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Bojarski v. Bojarski, Robert Bojarski appealed a District Court divorce judgment that divided marital property and debts, allocated dependent tax exemptions for the couple's four children, valued his military retirement benefits, and set child support obligations without a downward deviation during summer custody periods. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court identified multiple errors, including the allocation of tax exemptions, the use of time in service rather than service points to determine the marital share of retirement benefits, an incorrect finding on the amount of credit card debt, and an improper division of marital debts. The court therefore vacated the property division portion of the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to correct these issues.

family lawpropertytaxesprocedure

In Stanton v. Strong, the dispute centered on whether Michael Strong could place obstructions along a deeded easement providing access to Robert Stanton's property on Seven Tree Pond in Maine. Strong had placed boulders, crushed rock, and fence posts that blocked Stanton's access from the easement, leading Stanton to sue for trespass and seek injunctive relief. The Superior Court found Strong liable for trespass and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting him from obstructing Stanton's access, which the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the easement deeds permitted full use of the granted area, that Strong as the servient landowner could not impair effective easement use, and that the facts supported the need for injunctive relief based on irreparable harm, balancing of interests, and public interest.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether J. Russell Tarason held an easement allowing access across property owned by Wesson Realty, LLC, based on language in a 1925 deed from Emma Wentworth to Leon Benoit. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of Wesson Realty, ruling that the 1925 deed created an easement in gross that was personal to Leon Benoit and terminated upon his death, rather than an appurtenant easement that would run with the land to benefit Tarason's property. The court reasoned that the deed's language granted the underlying property to Benoit "his Heirs and Assigns forever" but omitted such words of inheritance from the easement grant itself, indicating an intent to create only a personal right. Additionally, the court determined that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act did not apply to convert the easement into a fee simple interest because the deed clearly showed a different intention.

property

The case involved the City of Lewiston suing property owner Robert Gladu to collect unpaid stormwater assessments levied under a 2006 municipal ordinance that created a Stormwater Management Utility to address runoff pollution and infrastructure needs. Gladu argued the assessments were an unauthorized tax rather than a valid fee, while the City maintained they qualified as fees tied to property impact. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the assessments constituted fees because they were designed to regulate stormwater management, funded only stormwater-related expenses kept in a segregated account, were based on impervious surface area with available credits allowing property owners to reduce or avoid the charges, and bore a reasonable relationship to the costs and benefits of the utility services. The court also upheld awards of penalties, attorney fees, and costs to the City.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryenvironmentproperty

The case involved Thayer Corporation seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Maine School Administrative District 61 for unpaid materials and labor on a biomass heating system installed at a school owned by the district under a contract with a third party. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to MSAD 61 on the lien claim, concluding the work was not lienable, and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. The court held that 10 M.R.S. § 3251 and prior precedent require materials or labor to be intended as a permanent part of the real estate to support a mechanic's lien. Because the agreement between MSAD 61 and the third party specified that the equipment remained the third party's property and would be removed upon termination, the system was not a fixture subject to the lien.

property

The case involved The Bank of Maine's foreclosure action against Lewis E. Hatch III and Kathleen Hatch after they defaulted on a 2005 mortgage secured by land in Newry, Maine. The Hatches appealed a Superior Court summary judgment for the Bank, arguing that an affidavit from a Bank employee failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting the Bank's mortgage records under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the affidavit satisfied the requirements of M.R. Evid. 803(6) and M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) because the employee demonstrated personal knowledge from custody of the records and direct dealings with the borrower, and established that the records were made in the ordinary course of business. The court distinguished the case from prior precedent where the affiant was not an employee of the lender itself. The notice of default also complied with the mortgage terms.

propertyprocedure

This case involves post-divorce disputes between Mark Skehan and Linda Lewin regarding obligations under their 2009 divorce judgment, specifically Skehan's responsibility for a second mortgage on the home awarded to Lewin and spousal support payments. After Lewin unilaterally refinanced the mortgages into a single loan in her name, Skehan stopped direct payments on the original second mortgage, leading Lewin to file motions to modify the judgment and for contempt. The District Court granted both motions, ordering continued payments to Lewin and holding Skehan in contempt. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the modification and contempt orders, holding that the refinancing required a recalculation of Skehan's remaining principal obligation with credits for the sale of personal property and application of the new interest rate, and that the contempt finding could not stand without proper basis in the original order. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these adjustments.

family lawprocedure

In Casale v. Casale, April Casale appealed an amended protection from abuse order issued by the District Court that modified a prior order by allowing her ex-husband Randall limited contact with her and their children, based on terms from a related divorce judgment. The court had issued the amendment without holding an evidentiary hearing after Randall moved to modify the order, despite April's opposition. The Law Court vacated the amended order, holding that the protection from abuse statute requires a hearing before modifying a final protection order, even when consolidated with divorce proceedings that address parental rights and contact. The core reasoning was that the statute mandates an opportunity for a hearing to determine whether modification is warranted, and the court could not rely solely on prior divorce hearing notes without affording the parties that process.

family lawprocedure

The case involved A.E. Robinson Oil Co. seeking payment for fuel products delivered over several years to an unregistered business operated by Galen Porter, who was the sole shareholder of County Forest Products, Inc. The District Court held both Porter and County Forest jointly and severally liable for the outstanding invoices plus financing charges and attorney fees. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the liability ruling, finding that Porter had acted as an agent for the undisclosed principal County Forest under principles of agency law, making both parties to the contracts. The court modified the judgment to eliminate the attorney fees award because the added contract term materially altered the original oral agreements without evidence of consistency with trade usage or the parties' course of performance, while upholding the financing charges based on the parties' conduct.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a property owner's application for a building permit to construct a single-family home on a lot abutting a public easement on York Road in Minot, which the town's code enforcement officer denied for lack of sufficient road frontage or a qualifying right-of-way under the Land Use Code. The town's Board of Appeals reversed the denial, concluding that a public easement qualified as a right-of-way under section 4-501.8, but the Town appealed that decision to the Superior Court under M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The Superior Court agreed with the Board's legal interpretation of the ordinance but remanded for further factual findings on other criteria in subsections (A)-(G); the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reached the merits in the interest of judicial economy, affirmed the conclusion that public easements are included within the term right-of-way, and vacated the remand because the Board's implicit findings were sufficient.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Dee, Michael J. Dee appealed a District Court judgment finding that he committed the civil violation of possessing a usable amount of marijuana under 22 M.R.S. § 2383(1)(A). Dee argued that Maine's marijuana prohibition unconstitutionally infringed on his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by violating his fundamental rights to liberty and property. The court determined that no fundamental right was implicated and applied rational basis review to the state's police power. It concluded that the prohibition was constitutional because the Legislature could rationally determine that marijuana poses a threat to health and social welfare, the means were appropriate to that end, and the civil fine of up to $1000 was not arbitrary or capricious. The Law Court affirmed the judgment.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a lawsuit by CACH, LLC, as the purported assignee of a Bank of America credit card account, seeking to recover an alleged unpaid balance of $6,042.80 from Nathaniel Kulas. The District Court granted CACH's motion for summary judgment after initially denying it on reconsideration, despite issues with Kulas's response filings. On appeal, the court vacated the judgment, holding that CACH failed to establish undisputed material facts regarding its ownership of the account through proper evidence of assignment and the exact balance due. The core reasoning centered on the requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 56, including the need for authenticated documents, affidavits based on personal knowledge, and strict adherence to statements of material facts, which were not met here due to destroyed contracts, unauthenticated reports, and insufficient support for the assignment.

procedure

The case involved the Town of Levant suing landowners Lawrence and Donald Taylor for violating the town's Land Use Ordinance after a third party parked a mobile home on the Taylors' lot without a permit. The District Court found a violation of the permit requirement in Article 1010, which applies to locating buildings or structures on a lot, and imposed civil penalties, costs, and attorney fees; the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed. The court reasoned that the ordinance's definitions made mobile homes structures and thus buildings requiring a CEO permit, and that the owners could be held liable for allowing the mobile home to remain on their property even after notice, despite the third party's actions. The majority rejected arguments that temporary parking did not trigger the permit rule and that owners bore no responsibility for third-party conduct.

property

In State v. Galarneau, the defendant appealed his conviction for operating after habitual offender revocation (Class C), arguing that a 2008 prior OUI conviction used to enhance the charge was unconstitutional because he lacked dedicated counsel and was not informed of his right to counsel at the time of that plea. The court held that the prior conviction was valid and could be used for enhancement, affirming the judgment. The core reasoning was that Galarneau was represented at his 2008 initial appearance and plea by the lawyer for the day, who confirmed to the court that she had advised him of his rights, satisfying constitutional requirements under the Maine and federal constitutions; because he had counsel, there was no need for the court to separately inquire about waiver of the right to counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between divorced parents over the guardianship of their adult son, who has a developmental disability, after years of contentious co-parenting litigation. The York County Probate Court appointed the mother and the father's wife as co-guardians, found the father in contempt for interfering with visitation, and ordered that a portion of the son's SSI benefits be deposited in a jointly controlled account. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the guardianship appointment and contempt finding, holding that the trial court's findings were sufficient and any evidentiary error was harmless. However, it vacated the SSI benefits order, concluding that it conflicted with federal law designating representative payees and was thus preempted. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

family lawprocedurefederal power

In Gillis v. Gillis, Robert Gillis appealed a District Court judgment that modified his post-divorce spousal support obligation to his former wife Judith, found him in contempt for failing to make required payments toward an arrearage, and awarded her attorney fees. The court affirmed the judgment in full. It held that federal law does not bar state courts from treating VA disability benefits as income when assessing a party's ability to pay spousal support, that the trial court's findings on Robert's income, expenses, and ability to pay $800 monthly were supported by competent evidence, and that the contempt finding and fee award rested on an adequate record.

family law

The case involves Robert Williams appealing his convictions for gross sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact after a jury trial, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements made to a state trooper on the grounds that he was in custody and should have received Miranda warnings. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction, determining that Williams was not in custody during the interrogation. The core reasoning applied ten factors in totality, noting the single officer present, the location in a cruiser parked in Williams's driveway, the explicit statement that he was not under arrest, lack of physical restraint, calm tone, and Williams's failure to indicate any desire to end the questioning or leave.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Teachout, the defendant was convicted of operating under the influence (OUI) as a Class C felony based on two prior convictions after the State dismissed an initial misdemeanor OUI charge and obtained an indictment charging the felony. Teachout appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, claiming violations of his speedy trial rights due to the delay after dismissal and improper judge-shopping by the prosecution. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the State had authority under 30-A M.R.S. § 284(2) and Unified Criminal Docket Rule 48(a) to dismiss the misdemeanor without prejudice and prosecute the felony. The court noted that the dispositional conference rules did not limit prosecutorial discretion and that Teachout had not shown any undue delay in the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure