This case concerns a law firm seeking to quash a subpoena issued by Bar Counsel to the firm's former general counsel for documents related to an internal investigation of a disbarred partner's misconduct and the firm's handling of it, which the firm asserted were shielded by attorney-client privilege. Bar Counsel argued that the crime-fraud exception under Maine Rule of Evidence 502(d)(1) eliminated any privilege because the documents might reveal criminal conduct. A single justice denied the motion to quash after in-camera review, concluding the exception applied to all documents. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine vacated the order and remanded, holding that it could not determine from the ruling whether the proper standard for the exception had been used, including the required prima facie showing of intent to use legal services to further crime or fraud.
This case involved a dispute between the City of Portland and the Portland Company over the city's condemnation of the company's non-fee track rights or easement on three waterfront parcels (A-1, A-2, and A-3) to facilitate development including parking garages and street extensions. The Superior Court had addressed claims of an unconstitutional taking, and on appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the Portland Company possessed a valid property interest, the takings were for a public use supported by exigent circumstances, the company had waived its coercion claim via stipulation, and it was not entitled to attorney fees or costs. The court vacated the judgment only as to parcel A-3 for entry of an order affirming the condemnation and otherwise affirmed the lower court's rulings. The core reasoning rested on prior judicial findings that the rights had not been abandoned, the development plans served public purposes like increased parking and commercial access, and procedural bars prevented additional relief.
The case involved a legal malpractice claim by Paul and Angeline Garland against attorney Peter Roy and his firm, arising from Roy's representation of the Garlands in a prior land boundary dispute with neighbor Robert Millot over a lakeside parcel and red camp that the Garlands claimed by purchase and the neighbor by adverse possession. After a jury found Roy negligent and awarded damages for the lost property value plus emotional distress to Paul, the trial court granted judgment as a matter of law setting aside the property damages. On appeal, the court held that sufficient evidence supported the malpractice finding, that the property value award was properly supported by testimony and should be reinstated for both Garlands, and that emotional distress damages must be vacated because they are unavailable in legal malpractice actions limited to economic loss absent egregious conduct.
In State v. Holland, the defendant was convicted of criminal mischief after cutting down trees on disputed property, resulting in damage to a neighbor's car. Holland appealed, arguing that the court erred by denying his challenge to the racial composition of the jury pool in Androscoggin County, by denying some of his challenges for cause to individual jurors during voir dire, and by refusing his requested jury instruction on the competing harms defense. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that statistical evidence failed to show a constitutionally significant underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury pool, that the trial court properly managed the for-cause challenges, and that there was no error in denying the requested instruction. The decision focused on Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirements, equal protection principles, and the application of Maine's jury selection statutes.
Fiber Materials, Inc. sued its former president Maurice Subilia and others, alleging fraud and that Subilia secretly competed with the company and deprived it of opportunities while still serving as president. Subilia appealed from the Business and Consumer Docket's denial of his motions to strike three paragraphs of the complaint and to disqualify FMI's attorneys, arguing that FMI improperly used a privileged Verrill Dana memorandum discovered on his company-issued laptop. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine dismissed the appeal, concluding that it was interlocutory and that no exception to the final judgment rule applied. The court noted FMI's handling of the memo but did not resolve the underlying privilege or disqualification issues.
The case involves David Catlett's appeal from a divorce judgment entered by the District Court in Presque Isle, Maine, regarding the division of marital property, including the Chapman Farm, findings on economic misconduct, spousal support, and the adoption of the proposed judgment. The court affirmed the divorce judgment, holding that the trial court's findings that the Chapman Farm was nonmarital property and that Carla did not engage in economic misconduct were not erroneous. The court also determined that the trial court properly applied the relevant statutes, 19-A M.R.S. § 953 for property division and 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A for spousal support, in reaching its decisions.