The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a Fayette Circuit Court order allowing death-row inmate Victor Taylor to litigate an intellectual-disability claim under CR 60.02. Taylor, convicted in 1986 of capital murder, kidnapping, sodomy, and robbery in the deaths of two high-school students, sought to vacate his death sentences on the ground that KRS 532.130-.140 and the Eighth Amendment bar execution of intellectually disabled persons. The Commonwealth argued the motion was successive and untimely because evidence of Taylor’s intellectual functioning had long been available and the claim could have been raised in earlier post-conviction proceedings. The Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the claim to proceed, reasoning that intellectual-disability challenges in capital cases present extraordinary constitutional questions that differ from ordinary collateral attacks, were not litigated in Taylor’s prior CR 60.02 motion, and must be assessed against the post-Atkins evolution of the law rather than strict timeliness rules applicable to other claims.
The case involved medical negligence claims by Deborah Lloyd against surgical assistant Sheila Slone and radiologists from Diagnostic X-Ray Physicians (Drs. Cain and Henley) after a suture needle dislodged and was left inside her knee during total knee replacement surgery at Norton Hospital; the needle was missed on post-operative x-rays, leading to infection, wound complications, and additional surgeries. The trial court granted summary judgment to Slone and the radiologists, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the summary judgments, holding that expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of care and any breach in medical negligence actions. Lloyd’s orthopedic expert was unqualified to opine on the radiologists’ standard of care, as he was not a radiologist and could not address what a reasonable radiologist would have done. Res ipsa loquitur did not eliminate the need for expert testimony against Slone, because evidence showed the needle could detach without negligence on her part and she lacked exclusive control over the subsequent search and removal decisions.
The case concerned consolidated challenges by Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear to two statutes, HB 518 (the Fair Board Act) and HB 334 (the EBEC Act), which redistributed appointment and removal authority over the Kentucky State Fair Board and the Executive Branch Ethics Commission from the Governor to other independently elected constitutional officers such as the Commissioner of Agriculture, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State. The Jefferson Circuit Court and Court of Appeals reached conflicting results on whether the laws violated the separation of powers. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that both statutes are unconstitutional to the extent they eliminate the Governor’s meaningful supervisory control. It reasoned that Sections 27, 28, 69, and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution vest supreme executive power in the Governor and require a chain of accountability for faithful execution of the laws; although Section 93 permits the General Assembly to prescribe the manner of appointing inferior officers, that authority cannot be exercised to fragment executive authority so thoroughly that the Governor lacks sufficient appointment or removal power to supervise the entities.
Kendra Russell filed a workers’ compensation claim against her former employer, International Automotive Components, alleging cumulative trauma injuries to multiple body parts from roughly twenty years of repetitive factory work that ended when the plant closed in 2021. An administrative law judge awarded her permanent partial disability benefits enhanced by the statutory three-multiplier after finding she lacked the physical capacity to return to her pre-injury job, relying primarily on one physician’s report; the Workers’ Compensation Board vacated that multiplier enhancement and remanded for further findings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ’s conclusion was clearly erroneous because the cited physician had actually stated Russell could continue performing her current clerical duties and had not addressed whether she could perform the specific tasks of her prior IAC position. The court explained that KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 requires a supported finding that the claimant is physically incapable of returning to the type of work performed at the time of injury, and the record lacked evidence justifying the multiplier.
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment in this negligence and products-liability action brought by the family of Vickie Williams, who allegedly developed asbestos-related illness from household exposure to fibers on her father’s work clothing. The claims alleged that Square D (now Schneider Electric) negligently failed to protect workers and their households from asbestos-containing molding compounds used at its Lexington plant, while Union Carbide negligently supplied and failed to warn about its asbestos-containing phenolic molding compounds. The circuit court had granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that no legal duty existed, but the Supreme Court held that foreseeability—and thus duty—could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment where material facts remained disputed and had to be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor. It further held that the trial court improperly limited an expert’s testimony without finding prejudice and that the workers’-compensation exclusivity provision did not bar the household-exposure claims. The decision returns the case for further proceedings without determining ultimate liability.
The case concerned the constitutionality of Kentucky House Bill 9, which authorized a system of statewide charter schools funded by state tax dollars but operating outside the existing system of common (public) schools. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the legislation violated the state constitution. The court reasoned that Sections 183, 184, and 186 of the Kentucky Constitution require public education funds to support only an efficient system of common schools, with any diversion of tax dollars to non-common schools needing prior voter approval via referendum; it further held that the General Assembly cannot delegate its ongoing duty to supervise such a system without retaining ultimate control, as established in prior precedent like Rose v. Council for Better Education. The court noted that voters had recently rejected a constitutional amendment that would have authorized such funding, reinforcing that legislative action alone was insufficient.