Michelle M. Keller

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a Fayette Circuit Court order allowing death-row inmate Victor Taylor to litigate an intellectual-disability claim under CR 60.02. Taylor, convicted in 1986 of capital murder, kidnapping, sodomy, and robbery in the deaths of two high-school students, sought to vacate his death sentences on the ground that KRS 532.130-.140 and the Eighth Amendment bar execution of intellectually disabled persons. The Commonwealth argued the motion was successive and untimely because evidence of Taylor’s intellectual functioning had long been available and the claim could have been raised in earlier post-conviction proceedings. The Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the claim to proceed, reasoning that intellectual-disability challenges in capital cases present extraordinary constitutional questions that differ from ordinary collateral attacks, were not litigated in Taylor’s prior CR 60.02 motion, and must be assessed against the post-Atkins evolution of the law rather than strict timeliness rules applicable to other claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved medical negligence claims by Deborah Lloyd against surgical assistant Sheila Slone and radiologists from Diagnostic X-Ray Physicians (Drs. Cain and Henley) after a suture needle dislodged and was left inside her knee during total knee replacement surgery at Norton Hospital; the needle was missed on post-operative x-rays, leading to infection, wound complications, and additional surgeries. The trial court granted summary judgment to Slone and the radiologists, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the summary judgments, holding that expert testimony is required to establish the applicable standard of care and any breach in medical negligence actions. Lloyd’s orthopedic expert was unqualified to opine on the radiologists’ standard of care, as he was not a radiologist and could not address what a reasonable radiologist would have done. Res ipsa loquitur did not eliminate the need for expert testimony against Slone, because evidence showed the needle could detach without negligence on her part and she lacked exclusive control over the subsequent search and removal decisions.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

The case concerned consolidated challenges by Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear to two statutes, HB 518 (the Fair Board Act) and HB 334 (the EBEC Act), which redistributed appointment and removal authority over the Kentucky State Fair Board and the Executive Branch Ethics Commission from the Governor to other independently elected constitutional officers such as the Commissioner of Agriculture, Attorney General, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State. The Jefferson Circuit Court and Court of Appeals reached conflicting results on whether the laws violated the separation of powers. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that both statutes are unconstitutional to the extent they eliminate the Governor’s meaningful supervisory control. It reasoned that Sections 27, 28, 69, and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution vest supreme executive power in the Governor and require a chain of accountability for faithful execution of the laws; although Section 93 permits the General Assembly to prescribe the manner of appointing inferior officers, that authority cannot be exercised to fragment executive authority so thoroughly that the Governor lacks sufficient appointment or removal power to supervise the entities.

federal power

Kendra Russell filed a workers’ compensation claim against her former employer, International Automotive Components, alleging cumulative trauma injuries to multiple body parts from roughly twenty years of repetitive factory work that ended when the plant closed in 2021. An administrative law judge awarded her permanent partial disability benefits enhanced by the statutory three-multiplier after finding she lacked the physical capacity to return to her pre-injury job, relying primarily on one physician’s report; the Workers’ Compensation Board vacated that multiplier enhancement and remanded for further findings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ’s conclusion was clearly erroneous because the cited physician had actually stated Russell could continue performing her current clerical duties and had not addressed whether she could perform the specific tasks of her prior IAC position. The court explained that KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 requires a supported finding that the claimant is physically incapable of returning to the type of work performed at the time of injury, and the record lacked evidence justifying the multiplier.

labor & employment

The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of summary judgment in this negligence and products-liability action brought by the family of Vickie Williams, who allegedly developed asbestos-related illness from household exposure to fibers on her father’s work clothing. The claims alleged that Square D (now Schneider Electric) negligently failed to protect workers and their households from asbestos-containing molding compounds used at its Lexington plant, while Union Carbide negligently supplied and failed to warn about its asbestos-containing phenolic molding compounds. The circuit court had granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that no legal duty existed, but the Supreme Court held that foreseeability—and thus duty—could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment where material facts remained disputed and had to be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor. It further held that the trial court improperly limited an expert’s testimony without finding prejudice and that the workers’-compensation exclusivity provision did not bar the household-exposure claims. The decision returns the case for further proceedings without determining ultimate liability.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned the constitutionality of Kentucky House Bill 9, which authorized a system of statewide charter schools funded by state tax dollars but operating outside the existing system of common (public) schools. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the legislation violated the state constitution. The court reasoned that Sections 183, 184, and 186 of the Kentucky Constitution require public education funds to support only an efficient system of common schools, with any diversion of tax dollars to non-common schools needing prior voter approval via referendum; it further held that the General Assembly cannot delegate its ongoing duty to supervise such a system without retaining ultimate control, as established in prior precedent like Rose v. Council for Better Education. The court noted that voters had recently rejected a constitutional amendment that would have authorized such funding, reinforcing that legislative action alone was insufficient.

taxeselections

The case concerned whether Kentucky had jurisdiction over a workers’ compensation claim for hearing loss filed by Troy Stidham against his employer, Clas Coal Co., and its insurer, Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI). Stidham worked for Clas Coal in a Kentucky coal mine for over sixteen years until the mine closed on January 1, 2020, then worked nine more months in Alabama before retiring; he was later diagnosed with noise-induced hearing loss. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decisions of the Administrative Law Judge, Workers’ Compensation Board, and Court of Appeals, holding that Kentucky had jurisdiction because Stidham’s injury occurred on January 1, 2020, while he was employed in Kentucky. The court relied on KRS 342.7305(4), which creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer providing the last injurious exposure to hazardous noise for at least one year is liable, and found that medical evidence showed the nine months of exposure in Alabama was too brief to overcome the presumption that the injury had already manifested from the longer Kentucky exposure. As a result, KEMI, the carrier on the policy in effect on the date of injury, remained liable.

labor & employment

Gary Sweet was convicted after a jury trial in Wayne Circuit Court of first-degree rape, Class B incest, and first-degree persistent felony offender status, based on evidence that he had sexual intercourse multiple times with his intellectually disabled stepdaughter, K.W., who functioned at the level of an eight-to-ten-year-old. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison, and Sweet appealed as a matter of right, challenging aspects of the proceedings including the jury instructions on the charges. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence in full. The majority held that any errors in the instructions did not rise to the level of palpable error warranting reversal after reviewing the full record, trial testimony from K.W., her mother, and others, and the applicable law, while concurring opinions noted that defense counsel’s submission of the flawed instructions constituted invited error or waiver.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the estate and family of Kyle Perkins, a mechanical maintenance worker at North American Stainless, who contracted COVID-19 in 2021, suffered complications requiring a double lung transplant, and died; they sought workers’ compensation death and survivor benefits, claiming the illness was work-related due to close contact with coworkers in a large plant. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the administrative law judge’s denial of the claim, as upheld by the Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals. The court held that the claimants failed to meet their burden under KRS 342.0011(1) of proving by a preponderance of evidence that Perkins’ exposure and contraction of the communicable disease arose out of or in the course of employment or involved an increased risk compared to the general public, as the ALJ’s factual findings on this threshold issue were supported by substantial evidence.

labor & employment

This case involved a wage and hour dispute in which former police officer Adam Wheeler sued the City of Pioneer Village for unpaid overtime compensation, vacation pay, sick leave wages, and related claims under Kentucky statutes (primarily KRS 337.285 and 337.385), stemming from the city’s 36/44-hour work schedule for officers that did not pay overtime for hours over 40 per week. After a bench trial, the circuit court awarded Wheeler some overtime and vacation pay but denied liquidated damages and sick leave claims, and it reduced requested attorney’s fees from over $91,000 to $2,500; the Court of Appeals affirmed most rulings but remanded for reconsideration of interest and fees. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in full, holding that the city failed to meet the statutory requirements for an overtime exception under KRS 337.285(13) due to the lack of a qualifying collective bargaining agreement, that the trial court properly denied liquidated damages and certain wage categories based on the evidence and ordinances, and that attorney’s fees must be assessed under the lodestar method with a reasonable relation to the documented work performed rather than arbitrarily capped.

labor & employment

The case involved Landon Stinson’s appeal from his Trigg Circuit Court convictions on two counts of murder, for which a jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole after finding he fatally shot his cousin Matthew Blakely and aunt Sue Farris in 2021. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or denying a new trial based on alleged disruptive conduct by a testifying detective, as any questioned actions caused no demonstrated prejudice to the jury. The court further ruled that the cumulative-error doctrine did not apply because no individual errors occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Raiantez Shackles, who was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of two counts of first-degree assault, six counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and first-degree persistent felony offender status, arising from a January 2021 shooting outside an apartment that wounded Marvin and Cassandra Yarbrough. The jury recommended a 60-year sentence, which the trial court reduced to 45 years under KRS 532.070(1). Shackles appealed as of right, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a self-defense instruction. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding after review of the record, arguments, and applicable law that the trial court committed no reversible error.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

Isaiah Brown was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of murder and first-degree robbery, both as an accomplice, for his role in a January 2019 robbery scheme in which Rayshawn Tucker and Brown shot and killed DaMani Dulaney after Fatima Alabusalim lured him to a park. The jury recommended concurrent sentences of twenty-two years for the murder and ten years for the robbery, which the circuit court imposed. On direct appeal, Brown challenged the admission of certain cell-phone records, expert testimony attributing phone numbers, and statements about witness credibility. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that any evidentiary errors were harmless or did not rise to palpable error because the remaining evidence—including text messages, cell-site location data, and other testimony—sufficiently tied Brown to the offenses and ensured a fundamentally fair trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Glenn A. Peeler, Jr. petitioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus after the Court of Appeals denied relief, seeking an order directing the Hardin Circuit Court to retroactively dismiss his 2013 pro se RCr 11.42 motion—which lacked the required verification under RCr 11.42(2)—notify him of the deficiency, allow correction, and appoint counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. It held that Peeler had waived any jurisdictional challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the merits by waiting years to object and by later filing a verified successive motion, and that he had an adequate remedy by appeal, which he failed to pursue in a timely manner.

criminal lawprocedure

Elvis Wynn was convicted by a Knox County jury of first-degree bail jumping and first-degree persistent felony offender after failing to appear for an October 2022 sentencing hearing in a prior felony case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Wynn argued that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce video evidence identifying the specific underlying felony charge rather than accepting his proposed stipulation, and that his sentence should have been capped at thirteen years under KRS 532.110(1)(c) to account for his prior seven-year sentence. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. It held that the Commonwealth was not required to accept a stipulation and could prove the felony-charge element of bail jumping with its chosen evidence. It further held that the sentencing cap in KRS 532.110(1)(c) does not apply to sentences arising from separate indictments and trials, and that KRS 533.060(3) required the new sentence to run consecutively to the prior one.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a neglect petition filed by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services against Father K.O. after a school resource officer reported smelling marijuana in Father’s car during child drop-off, Child tested positive for THC exposure, and Father tested positive for THC, methamphetamine, and oxycodone. The Calloway Circuit Court (family division) adjudicated Child neglected under KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2) for creating a risk of physical injury; the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the family court’s orders, holding that the findings were supported by substantial evidence—including the positive drug tests, repeated observations of marijuana odor by school and Cabinet personnel, and Father’s initial non-denial—and that the risk of harm was more than theoretical. The Court emphasized that family courts need not wait for actual injury before acting and that appellate deference is owed to the trial court’s factual determinations when supported by the record.

family law

The case involved Terry Hall’s workers’ compensation claim against BPM Lumber, in which he alleged permanent total disability from occupational diseases—including neurological issues, skin conditions, and lung impairment—caused by long-term workplace exposure to a hydraulic fluid and diesel fuel mixture while operating a slab saw. The ALJ dismissed the claim after finding the medical evidence failed to establish work-related causation. The Workers’ Compensation Board issued an initial order affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding on certain issues; Hall did not appeal that order. After the ALJ issued a new decision on remand and the Board affirmed it, Hall sought review of all issues in the Court of Appeals, which held the Board’s first order was final and appealable. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, concluding that Hall’s failure to timely appeal the initial Board order barred later review of the issues it resolved under principles of finality in administrative proceedings.

labor & employmentprocedure

Jaime Morales, a Scott County Sheriff’s deputy, was shot and paralyzed in September 2018 during a joint law-enforcement operation with the Georgetown Police Department to apprehend a suspected bank robber at an interstate rest area. He sued the City of Georgetown, the Georgetown Police Department, Lt. James Wagoner, and Officer Joseph Enricco, alleging negligence in the operation’s planning, training, and execution. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case, holding that some defendants were entitled to immunity because their actions involved discretionary functions, while other claims could proceed because they involved ministerial duties—such as adherence to specific training-attendance policies—whose breach could be evaluated without second-guessing tactical judgment. The Court distinguished between the broad discretion officers exercise in formulating a response plan and the concrete, non-discretionary obligations imposed by written policies, directing the trial court to apply that distinction on remand.

criminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

Jaime Morales, a Scott County Sheriff’s deputy, was shot and paralyzed in September 2018 during a joint operation with Georgetown police to apprehend a suspected bank robber at an interstate rest area. He sued the City of Georgetown, the Georgetown Police Department, Lt. James Wagoner, and Officer Joseph Enricco, alleging negligence in the operation’s planning and in SRT training and attendance policies. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower courts’ rulings on governmental immunity, remanding the case to Scott Circuit Court. It held that certain duties, such as formulating a tactical plan before the call-out, were ministerial and thus not shielded by immunity, allowing those claims to proceed, while other aspects of the case remained protected.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case arose after the Shively Police Department categorically denied the Courier Journal’s Open Records Act requests for CAD reports, 911 calls, radio communications, bodycam and dashcam footage, and incident reports tied to a July 2020 police pursuit that ended in a fatal crash, citing only the “law enforcement exemption” in KRS 61.878(1)(h) because an active criminal case existed. The Courier Journal sued, and after lower courts ruled against SPD, the Kentucky Supreme Court granted review. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that SPD failed to comply with the Act because the exemption may be invoked only when the agency articulates a specific, concrete risk of harm from disclosure rather than relying on a blanket assertion tied to an ongoing prosecution. It further clarified that KRS 17.150(2) does not independently authorize withholding the requested records before prosecution concludes. The case was remanded to Jefferson Circuit Court.

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