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Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-06-26 · cited 26×
This case involved a summary process eviction action by Fairchild Heights, Inc., the owner of a mobile manufactured home park, against longtime residents Nancy Dickal and her family for repeatedly parking more than the two vehicles permitted under their lease agreement without paying required fees. The residents argued that the action was barred by General Statutes § 21-80a because they had engaged in protected conduct within the prior six months, including organizing a residents' association that sued the park over maintenance issues. The trial court entered judgment of possession for the park owner, which the Appellate Court affirmed. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that the statutory exception in § 21-80a(b)(1) permitted the eviction upon proof of a material lease violation, which the excess vehicle parking constituted, even though the residents had engaged in protected activities. The court therefore upheld the judgment allowing the park owner to regain possession.
propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory
State v. Thompson
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-06-19 · cited 12×
In State v. Thompson, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of murder and two counts of assault in the first degree arising from a shooting at a bar in Hartford, Connecticut. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's admission of a deceased eyewitness's statement and photographic array identifying him as the shooter, which were admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine based on a preponderance of the evidence standard and testimony from a jailhouse informant. He also contested the admission of evidence regarding the witness's death to show consciousness of guilt. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court applied the correct evidentiary standard, that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant caused the witness's unavailability, and that the evidence of the witness's death was properly admitted for the limited purpose of consciousness of guilt with appropriate jury instructions.
criminal lawprocedure
SAPKO v. State
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-06-12 · cited 25×
The case involved Christine Sapko's claim for workers' compensation survivor's benefits after her husband, a state correction officer, died from an accidental overdose involving excessive Oxycodone prescribed for compensable work-related back injuries and Seroquel prescribed for unrelated depression. The workers' compensation commissioner denied the claim, finding that the decedent's simultaneous ingestion of the drugs constituted a superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation between the work injuries and the death. The compensation review board upheld the denial, and the Appellate Court affirmed on alternative grounds. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the superseding cause doctrine applies in this workers' compensation context and that the commissioner's proximate cause determination was a proper application of the law to the facts, including that the claim did not satisfy the standard from Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp. for contribution from employment in more than a de minimis way.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
State v. Pascual
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-06-05 · cited 4×
The case involved the conviction of Francisco Pascual for multiple crimes, including attempted sexual assault in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, and unlawful restraint, arising from his actions toward a twelve-year-old girl he was transporting after her illegal entry into the United States. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding a threat conveyed to the victim days earlier and gave erroneous jury instructions on using that evidence to establish the victim's reasonable fear. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that even assuming the evidentiary admission and instructions were improper, any such errors were harmless and did not warrant a new trial.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Otto
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-06-05 · cited 58×
In State v. Otto, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murdering Shamaia Smith and tampering with evidence by attempting to conceal the crime. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove the specific intent required for murder and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly shifted the burden of proof to him by suggesting the jury should convict because he destroyed evidence of his intent. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury could reasonably infer the defendant's specific intent to kill from circumstantial evidence including his relationship with the victim, his actions around the time of her disappearance, and his subsequent conduct. The court further concluded that the prosecutor's statements, when viewed in context, did not improperly shift the burden of proof because they emphasized that the state had proven intent beyond a reasonable doubt based on the remaining evidence.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Jordan
Supreme Court of Connecticut · 2012-05-29 · cited 24×
The case concerned whether defendant Victor Jordan clearly and unequivocally invoked his constitutional right to self-representation during proceedings on reckless endangerment charges, thereby requiring the trial court to canvass him under Practice Book § 44-3. After the defendant filed pro se motions for a speedy trial and to dismiss counsel while stating he would handle the matter himself without an attorney, the trial court denied the requests and the Appellate Court affirmed the resulting conviction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's statements and motions were sufficiently clear to trigger the canvass requirement and that failure to do so violated his rights. The court focused on the specific language in the motions and hearing exchanges as evidence of an unequivocal assertion of the right.
criminal lawprocedure