Chase T. Rogers

This case involved a summary process eviction action by Fairchild Heights, Inc., the owner of a mobile manufactured home park, against longtime residents Nancy Dickal and her family for repeatedly parking more than the two vehicles permitted under their lease agreement without paying required fees. The residents argued that the action was barred by General Statutes § 21-80a because they had engaged in protected conduct within the prior six months, including organizing a residents' association that sued the park over maintenance issues. The trial court entered judgment of possession for the park owner, which the Appellate Court affirmed. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that the statutory exception in § 21-80a(b)(1) permitted the eviction upon proof of a material lease violation, which the excess vehicle parking constituted, even though the residents had engaged in protected activities. The court therefore upheld the judgment allowing the park owner to regain possession.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Thompson, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of murder and two counts of assault in the first degree arising from a shooting at a bar in Hartford, Connecticut. On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's admission of a deceased eyewitness's statement and photographic array identifying him as the shooter, which were admitted under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine based on a preponderance of the evidence standard and testimony from a jailhouse informant. He also contested the admission of evidence regarding the witness's death to show consciousness of guilt. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court applied the correct evidentiary standard, that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the defendant caused the witness's unavailability, and that the evidence of the witness's death was properly admitted for the limited purpose of consciousness of guilt with appropriate jury instructions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christine Sapko's claim for workers' compensation survivor's benefits after her husband, a state correction officer, died from an accidental overdose involving excessive Oxycodone prescribed for compensable work-related back injuries and Seroquel prescribed for unrelated depression. The workers' compensation commissioner denied the claim, finding that the decedent's simultaneous ingestion of the drugs constituted a superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation between the work injuries and the death. The compensation review board upheld the denial, and the Appellate Court affirmed on alternative grounds. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the superseding cause doctrine applies in this workers' compensation context and that the commissioner's proximate cause determination was a proper application of the law to the facts, including that the claim did not satisfy the standard from Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp. for contribution from employment in more than a de minimis way.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved the conviction of Francisco Pascual for multiple crimes, including attempted sexual assault in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, risk of injury to a child, and unlawful restraint, arising from his actions toward a twelve-year-old girl he was transporting after her illegal entry into the United States. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence regarding a threat conveyed to the victim days earlier and gave erroneous jury instructions on using that evidence to establish the victim's reasonable fear. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding that even assuming the evidentiary admission and instructions were improper, any such errors were harmless and did not warrant a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Otto, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murdering Shamaia Smith and tampering with evidence by attempting to conceal the crime. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove the specific intent required for murder and that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly shifted the burden of proof to him by suggesting the jury should convict because he destroyed evidence of his intent. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the jury could reasonably infer the defendant's specific intent to kill from circumstantial evidence including his relationship with the victim, his actions around the time of her disappearance, and his subsequent conduct. The court further concluded that the prosecutor's statements, when viewed in context, did not improperly shift the burden of proof because they emphasized that the state had proven intent beyond a reasonable doubt based on the remaining evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether defendant Victor Jordan clearly and unequivocally invoked his constitutional right to self-representation during proceedings on reckless endangerment charges, thereby requiring the trial court to canvass him under Practice Book § 44-3. After the defendant filed pro se motions for a speedy trial and to dismiss counsel while stating he would handle the matter himself without an attorney, the trial court denied the requests and the Appellate Court affirmed the resulting conviction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's statements and motions were sufficiently clear to trigger the canvass requirement and that failure to do so violated his rights. The court focused on the specific language in the motions and hearing exchanges as evidence of an unequivocal assertion of the right.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Torrence Benton, who was convicted of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver after police recovered a handgun during a search incident to his arrest. Benton appealed, arguing that officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to seize him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Connecticut Constitution when they ordered him to stop while he was on a bicycle in a New Haven neighborhood. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the totality of circumstances—including the defendant's gang-related attire, presence in an area with recent gang-related shootings, a hand gesture suggesting a concealed weapon, and his flight upon seeing officers—provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop. The court concluded that the initial approach by officers did not constitute a seizure and that Benton's unprovoked flight contributed to the reasonable suspicion analysis.

criminal lawguns

This case involved a Connecticut limited liability company that owned a commercial building and sued its tenant, another LLC, over a lease dispute and unpaid rent. The trial court and Appellate Court had ruled that the plaintiff LLC lacked standing because one member with a 50% interest disapproved of the suit and her vote could not be excluded under General Statutes § 34-187(b), as her only connection to the defendant was through her husband's 20% ownership interest. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding that the term 'adverse' interest in the statute is not limited to a member's direct proprietary interest in the opposing party and that the member's vote could therefore be excluded due to her husband's stake in the defendant, allowing the remaining members' approval to authorize the action. The court also rejected the defendant's alternative argument that the company's operating agreement independently barred the suit without incorporating the statutory exclusion. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Luis Patino, a former machinist at Birken Manufacturing Company, who sued his employer under Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-81c(1) for permitting coworkers to subject him to repeated homophobic slurs and harassment over many years, creating a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation. Following a jury verdict in Patino's favor awarding damages, the defendant appealed, arguing that the statute does not authorize hostile work environment claims, that the evidence was insufficient, and that the damages were excessive. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the statute imposes liability on employers for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent such harassment, that the plaintiff's testimony and records provided sufficient evidence of pervasive conduct and inadequate employer response, and that the damages award was supported by the evidence of emotional distress. The court rejected the need for corroborating medical testimony and found the employer's remedial efforts, such as meetings and a seminar, ineffective in stopping the ongoing harassment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case concerned whether the City of Waterbury could offset the pension benefits of retired police officers and firefighters (and some survivors) with heart and hypertension benefits they also received under state law, despite provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. The plaintiffs sued the city and its retirement board for breach of contract and related claims after the city began applying offsets pursuant to its 1967 city charter. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the charter provision allowing offsets did not conflict with the relevant collective bargaining agreements (except possibly one aspect of plaintiff Russo's agreement), so the city was permitted to apply the offsets. The court reversed the trial court's judgment for the plaintiffs on most claims, entered judgment for the defendants on all but one claim, and remanded Russo's breach of contract claim for a new trial limited to whether his combined benefits exceeded a contractual cap. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' equitable estoppel arguments because they had not shown detrimental reliance on the city's prior non-enforcement of offsets.

labor & employment

This case involved a breach of commercial lease claim over responsibility for environmental conditions on property in Union, Connecticut. The lease included an anti-assignment clause requiring the landlord's prior written consent, which was not obtained when a majority interest in the tenant LLC was transferred. The trial court found no enforceable contract existed due to the invalid assignment and ruled for the defendants, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that an assignment in breach of such a clause is voidable rather than void, that the landlord had not properly elected to terminate the lease, and that a contract therefore existed between the parties.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned an advisory opinion by the State Ethics Commission's citizen's ethics advisory board concluding that workers' compensation hearing reporters could not prepare transcripts for private sale during their state working hours, as this would violate General Statutes § 1-84(c). The union representing the reporters appealed to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal after rejecting claims of unequal treatment compared to Superior Court reporters, conflicts with General Statutes § 51-63(e), and inconsistencies with a prior stipulated agreement. On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, adopting its memorandum of decision as the statement of facts and law.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the administratrix of a murder victim's estate seeking a prejudgment remedy against the wife of the convicted murderer, claiming that asset transfers during their divorce proceedings were fraudulent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to avoid paying a wrongful death judgment. The trial court granted the remedy, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the transfers, that the facts alleged supported a claim of actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor, and that the court had jurisdiction to grant relief without directly disturbing the dissolution decree. The court reasoned that marital asset distributions in dissolution can constitute transfers under the Act if made with fraudulent intent, as evidenced by the timing shortly after the investigation into the murder began.

family lawpropertytorts & liabilitycriminal law

The case concerned whether the City of New Britain had agreed to arbitrate a dispute with foremen employees over a violation of civil service pay rules that arose after negotiated wage upgrades for their subordinates. The city and union had a collective bargaining agreement allowing arbitration for unresolved upgrades, but a later memorandum of understanding barred arbitration for upgrades not resolved in negotiations; the parties then entered a settlement agreement allowing the union to file a grievance directly to arbitration while reserving the city's right to raise arbitrability as a defense. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the Appellate Court and held that the city had not agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The court reasoned that the memorandum of understanding expressly prohibited arbitration and that the settlement agreement did not override this prohibition or waive the city's preserved defense.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a pathologist employed by a private medical testing laboratory who was terminated after raising concerns about diagnostic testing procedures and reporting; he sued under Connecticut General Statutes § 31-51q, alleging that the termination retaliated against his exercise of First Amendment free speech rights. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff following a jury verdict awarding over $10 million. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rule from Garcetti v. Ceballos applies to private-employer actions under the statute, so speech made pursuant to an employee's official job duties receives no First Amendment protection. Because the plaintiff's statements occurred entirely in the course of performing his pathology duties, they were unprotected, and the court declined to reach an alternative state constitutional argument.

free speechlabor & employmentcivil rights

The plaintiff, a school principal, sued the city of Bridgeport, its board of education, and two school officials, claiming that she was disciplined in retaliation for reporting incidents of teacher abuse of students, in violation of free speech protections under the federal and state constitutions and related statutes, and that she suffered racial discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury found for the plaintiff on all claims and awarded over $2 million in damages, which the trial court reduced. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff's reports were made pursuant to her official duties and thus not protected speech under the First Amendment, the evidence was insufficient to support the racial discrimination and emotional distress claims, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over one statutory claim; the court also declined to consider an unpreserved alternative ground based on the state constitution.

labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights

John A. Carter, a former police officer for the Town of Clinton, sought heart and hypertension benefits under General Statutes § 7-433c after suffering a myocardial infarction in 2000, claiming it stemmed from a 1996 on-duty injury. He filed his notice of claim in 2001, more than one year after the incident, but argued that the medical care exception in § 31-294c tolled the statute of limitations due to alleged misdiagnosis of his symptoms. The workers' compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the notice untimely and no causal link established, a decision affirmed by the compensation review board. The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld this ruling, concluding that Carter had not shown the medical care exception applied to extend the filing deadline.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Judy Rettig, an animal control officer employed by a municipal district formed by the towns of Woodbridge, Bethany, Orange, and Prospect under General Statutes § 7-330, who sued the towns for damages after slipping and falling on the job. The trial court ruled in favor of the towns, and the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rettig's claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-284(a). The court reasoned that the district functioned as an agency or arm of the participating towns, which controlled its board, budget, and operations, appointed its staff, and bore its financial responsibilities, making the towns her employers for workers' compensation purposes. This conclusion aligned with prior precedent treating employees of regional school districts as municipal employees under the act. The decision turned on the statutory framework for intermunicipal districts and the absence of any independent legal existence for the district separate from the towns.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a property owner's appeal after the local planning and zoning commission denied his application to subdivide land, citing that a proposed dead-end street would combine with an adjacent loop road to exceed the 1200-foot maximum length under town regulations. The trial and appellate courts upheld the denial, interpreting the loop road as a dead-end street and requiring the lengths to be aggregated. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the loop road does not qualify as a dead-end street under the regulations' plain language, so the proposed street alone complies with the length limit, and the commission's denial was improper.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved the conviction of defendant John Jackson for the murder of Desti Parnell, the mother of his child, after evidence showed he was present during a violent argument at her apartment, his DNA was found at the scene, and he attempted suicide shortly after the crime. Jackson appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, claiming the trial court improperly denied his motions to suppress warrantless evidence and his statements to police, allowed untimely disclosed DNA evidence, and refused a requested jury instruction on third-party culpability. The court affirmed the conviction, concluding that the trial court had correctly ruled on the suppression motions, the disclosure issue, and the jury instruction request based on the evidence presented.

criminal lawprocedure