In Foster v. Astrue, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability since October 2006 due to conditions including depression, anxiety, obesity, and related issues. The district court addressed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings after an ALJ had found the plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation process, determining she could perform other work despite her impairments. The court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, holding that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate and assign appropriate weight to the opinion and testimony of the plaintiff's treating licensed clinical social worker, whose assessments were supported by treatment notes and conflicted with the greater weight given to non-examining state agency physicians without adequate explanation. The decision emphasized that such non-acceptable medical sources must still be considered under SSR 06-03p for their longitudinal insight into the claimant's functioning, and that an ALJ must articulate specific reasons when discounting treating source evidence in favor of other opinions.
The case involves a dispute between two religious ministries over the use of the 'Capitol Commission' service mark, where Capitol Commission sued Capitol Ministries for unfair competition and cybersquatting under federal trademark law after the latter allegedly began using the mark following the end of their prior association. Capitol Ministries moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2). The court denied the motion, holding that specific personal jurisdiction exists in North Carolina because the claims arise from the parties' prior business relationship in the state, the alleged intentional infringement was directed at a North Carolina entity, and the long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process.
The case involved a radio station account executive who suffered from worsening IBS, requested and received FMLA leave, and was terminated several months later. She sued her employer alleging FMLA retaliation, claiming her termination was motivated by her use of protected leave. The employer moved for summary judgment, asserting the termination resulted from declining sales, tardiness, and insubordination during a performance meeting. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court denied the motion because the plaintiff established a prima facie case and genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual.
In Bullock v. Astrue, the plaintiff challenged the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming the ALJ erred by giving limited weight to a medical source statement from his treating physician's assistant and by not classifying his depression as a severe impairment. The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision and granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendant. The court held that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding was supported by substantial evidence from other medical opinions, the claimant's statements, and treatment notes, and that the ALJ properly applied the special technique for evaluating mental impairments, finding no severe mental impairment because the record showed only mild limitations and no extended episodes of decompensation.
This case involves RBC Bank suing closing attorneys Robert Hedesh and Robert Gwin, their law firms, and Chicago Title Insurance Company over alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and related claims arising from fifteen residential property loan transactions in South Carolina that were part of a mortgage fraud scheme. RBC alleged that the defendants failed to follow closing instructions by allowing third-party payments and inadequate supervision, leading to losses on defaulted loans. The court determined it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Hedesh and Gwin defendants, who had no continuous contacts with North Carolina and whose relevant conduct occurred in South Carolina. It therefore transferred the entire action, including claims against Chicago Title, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), finding that convenience and public interest factors strongly favored the transferee forum.
This case involved the re-sentencing of Michael Thompson for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) following a remand from the Fourth Circuit. The court determined that Thompson's prior North Carolina breaking and entering convictions did not qualify as predicate violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because, under the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in United States v. Simmons, those convictions were not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment for this particular defendant. The court applied Simmons by analogy to convictions predating North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act and rejected the government's arguments that suspended sentences or prior sentencing law should count differently. Accordingly, Thompson did not have three qualifying ACCA predicates and was sentenced to 92 months in prison.
