This case is an FTCA action by a minor NJROTC cadet and her parents seeking damages for injuries sustained when she fell from an obstacle course at Camp Lejeune in 2007. The government asserted affirmative defenses including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Feres doctrine and a liability waiver signed by the minor and her mother. On plaintiffs' Rule 12(f) motion to strike, the court struck the Feres defense because the plaintiff had never been a member of the armed forces. The court denied the motion as to the waiver defense after analyzing its enforceability under North Carolina law, finding the clause clear, the activity voluntary and non-commercial, and the bargaining positions not so unequal as to render it invalid, while also rejecting the parents' separate argument that the waiver did not bind them.
In United States v. Ezzat, a federal inmate charged with possessing prohibited objects (shanks) under 18 U.S.C. § 1791 moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that his prior nine-month placement in administrative detention constituted punishment for the same conduct. The magistrate judge, after an evidentiary hearing, found that the detention was administrative rather than disciplinary and recommended denial of the motion. The district court reviewed the recommendation for clear error, adopted it in full, and denied the motion. The court reasoned that Congress intended prison administrative proceedings to be civil in nature, and application of the Hudson and Kennedy factors confirmed that the detention was not so punitive as to qualify as criminal punishment triggering double jeopardy protections.
This case involves multiple defendants charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to commit violent acts abroad, firearms offenses, and false statements in naturalization applications. The defendants filed motions to suppress evidence derived from FISA-authorized electronic surveillance and physical searches, and to compel disclosure of the underlying FISA applications and orders. The court denied the motions in full. It reasoned that FISA provides a constitutional process for obtaining foreign intelligence information based on probable cause that targets are agents of a foreign power, that the applications in this case satisfied statutory requirements, and that neither suppression nor disclosure to the defense was warranted under the statute or Fourth Amendment precedent.
This case involves a federal prosecution under the Clean Water Act for alleged discharge of pollutants into Browder’s Branch, turning on whether that water body qualifies as a “water of the United States.” The government moved for reconsideration of the court’s preliminary jury instruction, arguing that both the plurality and concurring standards from Rapanos v. United States should be presented as alternative bases for jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, holding that it would instruct the jury solely under Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. The core reasoning was that, under Fourth Circuit precedent applying Marks v. United States, Kennedy’s concurring opinion supplies the narrower and therefore controlling ground for determining Clean Water Act jurisdiction over wetlands and related waters.
The case involved the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt an ongoing FTC administrative antitrust proceeding alleging that the Board improperly excluded non-dentists from offering teeth-whitening services. The district court granted the FTC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Board's collateral challenge to the administrative action was improper. The court reasoned that the FTC Act vests exclusive jurisdiction for such challenges in the courts of appeals after completion of the administrative process under 15 U.S.C. § 45, and that the Board could not bypass this framework by filing a separate federal lawsuit. The court also denied the State Boards' motion to file an amicus brief as unhelpful given the jurisdictional ruling.
This case involves a breach of contract and negligence lawsuit filed by Stonecrest Partners against Bank of Hampton Roads (as successor to Gateway Bank) over an alleged failure to honor a loan commitment, with the bank counterclaiming on a defaulted promissory note and related guarantees. After the Rule 16(b) scheduling order deadline for amending pleadings had passed, the plaintiff and third-party defendants sought leave to file an amended complaint adding claims such as fraud, unfair trade practices, and others, citing new evidence and the death of their lead counsel. The magistrate judge denied the motion, finding no good cause under Rule 16(b) because the supporting evidence could have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence, and the counsel's death occurred after the deadline. On appeal, the district court upheld the magistrate's order, confirming that the denial was a nondispositive matter within the magistrate's authority and that extensions of other deadlines did not establish law of the case for amending pleadings.