Terrence William Boyle

In Foster v. Astrue, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability since October 2006 due to conditions including depression, anxiety, obesity, and related issues. The district court addressed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings after an ALJ had found the plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation process, determining she could perform other work despite her impairments. The court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings, holding that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate and assign appropriate weight to the opinion and testimony of the plaintiff's treating licensed clinical social worker, whose assessments were supported by treatment notes and conflicted with the greater weight given to non-examining state agency physicians without adequate explanation. The decision emphasized that such non-acceptable medical sources must still be considered under SSR 06-03p for their longitudinal insight into the claimant's functioning, and that an ALJ must articulate specific reasons when discounting treating source evidence in favor of other opinions.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involves a dispute between two religious ministries over the use of the 'Capitol Commission' service mark, where Capitol Commission sued Capitol Ministries for unfair competition and cybersquatting under federal trademark law after the latter allegedly began using the mark following the end of their prior association. Capitol Ministries moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(2). The court denied the motion, holding that specific personal jurisdiction exists in North Carolina because the claims arise from the parties' prior business relationship in the state, the alleged intentional infringement was directed at a North Carolina entity, and the long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a radio station account executive who suffered from worsening IBS, requested and received FMLA leave, and was terminated several months later. She sued her employer alleging FMLA retaliation, claiming her termination was motivated by her use of protected leave. The employer moved for summary judgment, asserting the termination resulted from declining sales, tardiness, and insubordination during a performance meeting. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court denied the motion because the plaintiff established a prima facie case and genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual.

labor & employment

In Bullock v. Astrue, the plaintiff challenged the Social Security Administration's denial of his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming the ALJ erred by giving limited weight to a medical source statement from his treating physician's assistant and by not classifying his depression as a severe impairment. The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision and granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendant. The court held that the ALJ's residual functional capacity finding was supported by substantial evidence from other medical opinions, the claimant's statements, and treatment notes, and that the ALJ properly applied the special technique for evaluating mental impairments, finding no severe mental impairment because the record showed only mild limitations and no extended episodes of decompensation.

federal powerhealthcare

This case involves RBC Bank suing closing attorneys Robert Hedesh and Robert Gwin, their law firms, and Chicago Title Insurance Company over alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and related claims arising from fifteen residential property loan transactions in South Carolina that were part of a mortgage fraud scheme. RBC alleged that the defendants failed to follow closing instructions by allowing third-party payments and inadequate supervision, leading to losses on defaulted loans. The court determined it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Hedesh and Gwin defendants, who had no continuous contacts with North Carolina and whose relevant conduct occurred in South Carolina. It therefore transferred the entire action, including claims against Chicago Title, to the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), finding that convenience and public interest factors strongly favored the transferee forum.

proceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case involved the re-sentencing of Michael Thompson for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) following a remand from the Fourth Circuit. The court determined that Thompson's prior North Carolina breaking and entering convictions did not qualify as predicate violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because, under the Fourth Circuit's en banc decision in United States v. Simmons, those convictions were not punishable by more than one year of imprisonment for this particular defendant. The court applied Simmons by analogy to convictions predating North Carolina's Structured Sentencing Act and rejected the government's arguments that suspended sentences or prior sentencing law should count differently. Accordingly, Thompson did not have three qualifying ACCA predicates and was sentenced to 92 months in prison.

criminal lawguns

This case involved a breach of contract claim by Sirsi Corporation against Craven-Pamlico-Carteret Regional Library System regarding a Master Software License and Services Agreement for library management software. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that no breach occurred because the implementation "Go Live Date" had not been reached and the contract was ambiguous or illusory. The court denied the motion, finding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim, including the defendant's failure to communicate and participate in pre-implementation steps, which it could not use to excuse performance, as well as possible repudiation by contracting with a competitor.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who participated in a truck driving orientation program with CRST but was not hired as an over-the-road driver, leading her to sue for sex discrimination under Title VII and negligent infliction of emotional distress under state law. The court granted summary judgment in part to the defendants, dismissing the Title VII claim because the plaintiff would have been classified as an independent contractor rather than an employee protected by the statute. The court reached this conclusion by applying traditional agency law factors, such as the method of payment, lack of benefits, and tax treatment, which indicated an independent contractor relationship. The state law claim was dismissed without prejudice as the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claim.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, Shearline Boatworks sued Peter Trost in North Carolina state court for breach of contract and to enforce a possessory lien after Trost terminated contracts for the construction of a custom vessel and moved it to another builder. Trost removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a counterclaim, after which Shearline moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration under identical clauses in the two contracts. The court granted the motion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applied and that Shearline had not defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The core reasoning was that Shearline sought arbitration only one month after filing suit, before any discovery occurred, and Trost had not shown sufficient prejudice from the limited litigation activity to overcome the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this long-running civil lawsuit between Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products and Von Drehle Corporation, the court considered Von Drehle's motion to reconsider a prior order denying leave to amend its answer to add issue and claim preclusion defenses based on an Arkansas district court ruling, as well as a motion by Myers Supply to intervene as a defendant asserting the same defenses. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, construing it as seeking relief from an interlocutory order and finding that Von Drehle had unduly delayed for sixteen months and that allowing the amendment after six years of litigation would prejudice the plaintiff. The court also denied the motion to intervene, holding that it was untimely since Myers had known of the action since at least 2008, and that Myers had not shown its interests were inadequately represented by Von Drehle, particularly given shared counsel and identical goals. The matter was set for trial.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Lanier Construction Company, an African-American owned firm, sued the City of Clinton after the city rejected its lowest bid for a downtown revitalization project and awarded it to a Caucasian-owned company, alleging racial discrimination and violations of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state law claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss the procedural due process claim under § 1983 and the state claims for defamation, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, and breach of contract. The court reasoned that Lanier lacked a protected property interest in the contract award for due process purposes, the city manager's statements were absolutely privileged in the defamation claim, the interference claim failed because the actions were within the scope of authority without showing lack of legal justification, and no valid contract existed from the bid invitation to support a breach claim.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved the federal government's attempt to civilly commit Gerald Wayne Timms under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 after he completed a prison sentence for a sex offense, with Timms challenging the constitutionality of his prolonged detention without a commitment hearing. The court granted Timms's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, holding that the Act as applied to him violated the Fifth Amendment's due process protections and dismissing the action. The court reasoned that the Act creates civil rather than criminal proceedings but found the multi-year delay between certification and any hearing unconstitutional as applied, particularly given the lack of prompt review or medical evaluation in the certification process. It distinguished prior Fourth Circuit rulings on burden of proof and noted that the statute's procedures allowed for extended unreviewed confinement by non-medical officials.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

This case concerns a federal prisoner's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed via the savings clause of § 2255 to challenge a money laundering conviction based on a post-conviction change in law from United States v. Santos as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit. The court had previously denied the government's motion to dismiss after finding that the petitioner satisfied the three-part test from In re Jones, applying Ninth Circuit precedent as the law of the circuit of conviction. The government moved for reconsideration, contending that Fourth Circuit law should control instead and that the Ninth Circuit's denial of a successive § 2255 motion barred relief. The court rejected these arguments, reaffirming that the law of the convicting circuit applies and that the unavailability of § 2255 relief due to its gatekeeping rules is what permits the § 2241 petition. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the request to transfer the case to Arizona.

criminal lawprocedure

The EEOC sued Thompson Contracting under Title VII, alleging it fired employee Banayah Yisrael, a dump truck driver, because his Hebrew Israelite faith prohibited Saturday work. After prior rulings narrowed the issues, the court considered cross-motions for summary judgment on whether Thompson had offered a reasonable accommodation. Thompson's operations required Saturday makeup work on rainy weekdays, and the company showed it had considered transferring Yisrael to a non-CDL role that avoided Saturdays but reasonably believed he would reject it due to lower pay and physical labor. The court granted Thompson's motion, holding that the employer had met its Title VII duty to accommodate the religious observance.

labor & employmentreligious libertycivil rights

The case involved the Wake County Board of Education suing Dow Roofing Systems for breach of contract, warranties, and related claims arising from defective roofing systems installed on school buildings. Dow Roofing moved to dismiss or stay the action, arguing that the claims were subject to arbitration under clauses in the limited warranty agreements. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding that the arbitration agreements were enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which preempts conflicting North Carolina law, and that all claims fell within the scope of the arbitration provisions requiring arbitration in Boston.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves current and former employees at a Mountaire Farms chicken processing plant who allege that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and North Carolina Wage and Hour Act by failing to pay for time spent donning, doffing, cleaning, and sanitizing required protective equipment, walking to and from workstations, and waiting for production lines to start, as well as by improperly deducting the cost of such equipment from wages. The plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of their FLSA claims as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and for certification of their state-law claims as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The court granted the motions in part, allowing conditional certification of an FLSA collective action (narrowed to exclude donning and doffing during unpaid meal breaks per Fourth Circuit precedent) and Rule 23 class certification for the state claims, while requiring clarification of the class period start date and directing notice procedures. Certification was based on findings that the proposed class members were similarly situated with respect to Mountaire's uniform compensation policies and that the plaintiffs satisfied the applicable legal standards for both types of actions.

labor & employment

This case involves Plaintiff Parker, who applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income after sustaining a traumatic brain injury in a 2006 moped accident that caused headaches, balance issues, memory problems, and other impairments. The ALJ denied the claims, finding that Parker was not disabled because his condition did not prevent all work, his subjective complaints were not fully credible due to inconsistencies with the record and non-compliance with treatment, and he retained the residual functional capacity for certain jobs. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the district court granted the Government's motion and upheld the ALJ's decision. The court reasoned that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of the medical records showing gradual improvement, the state agency opinions, and the vocational expert testimony based on a proper hypothetical. The court also found no error in the ALJ's credibility assessment or step-five analysis.

healthcare

This case involves civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (18 U.S.C. § 4248) for respondent Joseph Aaron Edwards, who was certified as sexually dangerous by the government shortly before his release from a prior prison sentence for a sex offense against a minor. The court addressed the government's obligations to disclose favorable expert evidence in these post-sentence detention cases, which lack initial judicial review or standard procedural safeguards. It ruled that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires application of the Brady Doctrine in § 4248 proceedings to ensure fairness given the significant liberty deprivations at stake. The court denied related motions for appointment of experts and withdrawal of those requests.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Ms. Charlene Sawyer's appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of supplemental security income benefits, based on her claimed inability to work since 1995 due to obesity, knee problems, arthritis, spinal deterioration, and residuals from uterine cancer. The district court reviewed the ALJ's application of the five-step sequential disability evaluation process and determined that the ALJ had erred at step five by relying solely on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines rather than obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. The court found that Sawyer's nonexertional limitations, including the need for a cane to ambulate and difficulties manipulating objects, significantly restricted the range of sedentary work she could perform, making use of the guidelines inappropriate. Accordingly, the court granted Sawyer's motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied the Commissioner's cross-motion, reversed the decision, and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with the opinion.

federal powerhealthcare

This case is a prisoner lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Michael Wayne Moore against North Carolina prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs related to Hepatitis C and a pancreatic condition, as well as retaliation for reporting a guard assault on another inmate. After prior appeals and procedural rulings that narrowed the claims, the district court addressed the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the remaining issues. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants and dismissed the case, finding insufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to Moore's medical conditions and that his transfer was motivated by legitimate security concerns over a potential hostage plot rather than retaliation for his letter-writing. The court also concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

civil rightscriminal law