In United States v. Roger Pace, the defendant was charged with methamphetamine distribution after an officer discovered the drugs during a nighttime vehicle stop in a closed business parking lot; Pace moved to suppress the evidence and later sought sentencing relief under the statutory “safety valve” provision. The district court denied both requests, and Pace appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop based on the late hour, Pace’s connection to a known drug user, his nervous behavior, and his drug-related criminal history. It further held that Pace was ineligible for the safety valve because his criminal history points exceeded the statutory limit under the correct conjunctive reading of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). A dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the safety-valve eligibility criteria.

criminal lawprocedure

Gripum LLC, which makes flavored e-liquids for open-system e-cigarettes, petitioned for review after the FDA denied its premarket tobacco product application under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The FDA concluded that Gripum had not shown its products were “appropriate for the protection of public health,” because it failed to supply evidence that any benefits to existing adult smokers would outweigh the risks of youth initiation posed by flavored products. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, holding that the FDA’s comparative-risk analysis followed the statute’s requirements in 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c) and was not arbitrary. The court noted that Gripum’s application lacked product-specific data or bridging studies demonstrating a meaningful “switching” effect from combustible cigarettes, while the agency reasonably considered even limited youth uptake as a relevant harm.

business & regulatoryhealthcarefederal power

Jose Ageo Luna Vanegas, an H-2A visa worker hired by Signet Builders, sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime after regularly working more than 40 hours per week constructing livestock confinement buildings on farms in Wisconsin and Indiana. The district court granted Signet’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the work fell within the FLSA’s agricultural exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12). The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the exemption is an affirmative defense that must ordinarily be raised in an answer rather than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and that its application turns on fact-intensive factors not conclusively established by the complaint. The court noted that the complaint alleged purely construction duties with no contact to animals or farming operations, and that H-2A visa certification does not automatically satisfy the narrower FLSA agricultural exemption.

immigrationlabor & employmentprocedure

The case arose after Benita Levy missed a premium payment on her West Coast Life term policy and died five months later; the insurer treated the policy as forfeited and denied the death benefit to her sons, the named beneficiaries. The sons sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief, alleging that the insurer’s pre-lapse notice failed to satisfy the specific requirements of section 234(1) of the Illinois Insurance Code, which bars cancellation within six months of a missed payment unless the notice contains prescribed language. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the notice adequately tracked the statutory command by warning that nonpayment would render the policy “forfeited and void,” and that the phrase “the company or its agents” did not obligate the insurer to list multiple payees when the statute’s first sentence already permitted identification of a single recipient. Because the breach-of-contract claim failed as a matter of law, the duplicative declaratory-judgment claim was also properly dismissed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Martel Settles’s appeal of his 87-month prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After Settles pleaded guilty, the district court adopted the presentence report’s advisory guidelines range of 33–41 months but imposed a higher sentence, citing the offense’s seriousness—Settles’s armed arrival at his ex-girlfriend’s home in violation of a no-contact order while their child was present—and his extensive history of violence against romantic partners. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s unusual “mathematical” approach of adding equivalent offense levels to account for § 3553(a) factors was arbitrary and not recommended. Nevertheless, because the district court also provided a separate, traditional explanation of the sentence under § 3553(a) that independently supported the result, any procedural error was harmless, and the court affirmed the sentence.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

Daryl Holloway, exonerated by DNA after 24 years in prison for two 1992 sexual assaults in Milwaukee, sued the City and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that suggestive photo arrays and lineups, withheld exculpatory information, an arrest without probable cause, a conspiracy among officers, and the City’s lack of policies on notes, identifications, and DNA testing violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the identification procedures may have been impermissibly suggestive, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time; it found no Brady violation, probable cause supported the arrest, no evidence showed a conspiracy, and the City had no notice of a pattern or obvious risk that would support Monell liability.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Terrance Roberts was convicted in 2000 on Mann Act and money-laundering charges arising from his role in a prostitution operation, with the money-laundering counts based on a $2,000 wire transfer that the jury was instructed could involve either gross receipts or profits. Years after the Supreme Court’s fragmented decision in United States v. Santos (2008) interpreted “proceeds” under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 to mean profits in some contexts, Roberts filed a § 2241 habeas petition claiming his convictions were invalid under that definition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief, holding that Roberts failed to demonstrate the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” required for § 2241 review of a final conviction. The court reasoned that Santos did not clearly establish error in concealment-money-laundering cases, that any instructional mistake did not rise to plain error under circuit precedent, and that the inconclusive state of the law on gross versus net proceeds precluded collateral relief.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose after Shane Lyberger, his brother Andrew, and Robert Dailey followed a woman they believed was committing a traffic violation to her family’s home, confronted her on the driveway while recording, and refused repeated requests to leave the property. When police arrived in response to her 911 call, the men declined to provide identification or cooperate with the investigation, leading to their detention, arrest for disorderly conduct and obstruction, and a search of their car; criminal charges were later dropped. They sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the plaintiffs and probable cause to arrest them based on the reported trespass and refusal to leave, and that the First Amendment claim failed because the men were not engaged in protected speech and presented no evidence of selective enforcement under the Nieves standard.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rightsproperty

In this case, DHL employee Anthony Rankins sued Systems Solutions of Kentucky (SSK) and related parties for products-liability damages after he was injured by a winch system that SSK had designed and installed; DHL later lost key physical components of that system while in its possession. SSK responded by filing a third-party complaint against DHL asserting claims for contribution and negligent spoliation of evidence. After DHL settled directly with Rankins, the district court dismissed SSK’s third-party claims on the ground that the settlement discharged DHL’s liability and entered a partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to permit an immediate appeal. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the spoliation claim is factually and legally intertwined with the still-pending products-liability claims; resolution of those claims could alter or moot the spoliation issue, so the district court’s order was not a truly final judgment eligible for Rule 54(b) treatment. The court therefore vacated the partial judgment and dismissed the appeal, directing SSK to wait for a final judgment before seeking review.

proceduretorts & liability

Dr. Ricardo Vasquez, a vascular surgeon practicing independently in Bloomington, Indiana, sued Indiana University Health under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, alleging that IU Health’s acquisitions of Bloomington Hospital in 2010 and Premier Healthcare in 2017 created monopoly power in the local market for physician services and primary care, which IU Health then used to damage his reputation and revoke his hospital privileges in 2019. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Vasquez failed to allege a plausible geographic market and that the Clayton Act claims were untimely. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that Bloomington and its surrounding area constituted a plausible geographic market at the pleading stage because of the region’s relative isolation from larger cities and that the complaint did not conclusively establish untimeliness, as the discovery rule and multiple possible injury dates (including the 2019 privilege revocation) left open a timely filing. The court remanded for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by Protect Our Parks and individual plaintiffs to federal agency approvals for the Obama Presidential Center in Chicago’s Jackson Park, arguing that reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Department of Transportation Act, and related statutes were inadequate because the agencies failed to evaluate alternative sites. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the federal agencies had no involvement in or authority over the City of Chicago’s site selection and thus were not required to consider alternatives they neither caused nor could change. It reached the same conclusion on claims involving U.S. Army Corps of Engineers permits and anticipatory demolition under the NHPA, finding no evidence that the City acted to evade review requirements, and it rejected the request to supplement the administrative record.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

In 2007, an Illinois jury convicted Juan Reyes of murder, attempted murder, and home invasion stemming from a 2004 armed robbery in which William Thomas was killed and his associate Timothy Landon was shot. After exhausting state appeals, Reyes sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that Landon’s identification of him as a shooter—obtained after five police photo-array attempts—was the product of an impermissibly suggestive procedure and was too unreliable to support his convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition. It agreed that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive but held that Reyes failed to show the requisite prejudice for habeas relief, because the jury had heard substantial other evidence of his guilt and had been given a full opportunity to assess the identification’s weaknesses through cross-examination and defense arguments. The court further noted that any potential issues specific to the attempted-murder count had not been separately preserved.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this immigration case, Mathusala Menghistab, a lawful permanent resident from Ethiopia convicted of rape in Indiana in 2011, was found removable as an aggravated felon and denied deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture; after Ethiopia initially refused to accept him in 2013, he was released but detained again in 2020 when Ethiopia agreed to issue travel documents. Menghistab moved to reopen proceedings, arguing that the outbreak of the Tigray civil war created new risks of torture for ethnic Eritreans like him, but the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit granted his petition for review and remanded the case, holding that the Board abused its discretion by failing to address two material issues: whether the changed conditions in Ethiopia (and related cooperation with Eritrea) increased his risk of torture and whether Ethiopia would regard him as a citizen. The court reasoned that Menghistab had presented sufficient evidence of a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits to warrant a full hearing on citizenship and the war’s relevance to his claim.

immigrationcriminal law

Robert Haas was charged with eight counts of transmitting interstate threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for posts on VK.com vowing violence against Jews and officials protecting them, and five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) for direct threats against an FBI agent and others, after earlier threats against Nikki Haley drew official attention. A jury convicted him on all counts, and the district court imposed a 51-month sentence. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Haas’s preserved multiplicity challenge to three of the § 115 counts lacked merit and that his forfeited claims of insufficient evidence on the commerce element, constructive amendment of the indictment, and improper sentencing grouping under the Guidelines did not establish plain error. The court reasoned that the district judge had discretion to treat “federal employees” as a distinct victim category for grouping purposes rather than lumping all counts together as harms to society at large.

criminal lawprocedure

Marcos Santiago, convicted in 2005 of Hobbs Act robberies and related firearm offenses including felon-in-possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), sought to vacate his § 922(g) convictions in a § 2241 habeas petition. He argued that Rehaif v. United States (2019) required the government to prove he knew of his felon status, an element omitted from his trial, and that he could use the savings clause of § 2255(e) because successive § 2255 motions were unavailable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief, holding that Santiago failed to show actual innocence under the demanding standard that no reasonable juror could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt given his prior convictions and the evidence presented. The court emphasized the narrow procedural limits on post-conviction challenges for federal prisoners and the high substantive bar for invoking § 2241 to circumvent those restrictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Scott Carnell, the defendant appealed his federal sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine after an initial remand from a prior appeal in which the court had vacated the sentence due to insufficient proof of drug purity. On remand, the district court recalculated Carnell’s guidelines by raising his criminal-history category from III to V to reflect new state convictions obtained while the first appeal was pending, and it ordered the federal sentence to run consecutively to any sentences from pending state charges in St. Clair County. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court properly considered the new convictions because the remand was general rather than limited and therefore allowed issues arising after the first appeal. The court further held that the consecutive-sentencing issue was moot because the relevant state charges had been dismissed, leaving no pending matters to which the order could apply.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose after the Indiana Supreme Court ruled in Gunderson v. State that the state holds title to Lake Michigan’s shores up to the ordinary high-water mark, a decision that beachfront owners Randall Pavlock and others claimed took their property rights (which they asserted extended to the low-water mark) without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The owners sued Indiana’s governor and other executive officials in federal court, seeking to hold the state responsible under a “judicial takings” theory. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, modifying the dismissal to be without prejudice. The court held that the owners lacked Article III standing because none of the named officials caused the asserted injury—the state supreme court’s ruling did—or could provide redress for it. The panel did not reach the merits of the judicial-takings claim or related sovereign-immunity issues.

propertyprocedure

In Dawn Nowlin v. Jay Pritzker, individuals and Illinois businesses sued Governor J.B. Pritzker, challenging his early COVID-19 executive orders that imposed shelter-in-place requirements, temporary closures or reductions for non-essential businesses, and limits on gatherings of more than 10 (later 50) people. They alleged violations of the First Amendment’s free exercise, speech, and assembly clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses, and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, seeking damages, fees, and injunctive or declaratory relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), modifying the dismissal of the first five counts to without prejudice for lack of Article III standing while dismissing the Takings count with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiffs had not alleged concrete, particularized injuries for most claims, that free-exercise issues were moot after May 2020 exemptions, and that official-capacity damages claims were barred by sovereign immunity; it also found no abuse of discretion in denying leave for a second amended complaint.

business & regulatoryfree speechreligious libertyproperty

Jesus Arreola-Ochoa, who has lived in the United States without authorization since 1996, sought cancellation of removal based on the hardship his deportation would cause his U.S.-citizen family members, including his minor daughter Allison. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief, finding that the hardship did not meet the statutory standard of being exceptional and extremely unusual. Arreola also argued that his removal proceedings should be terminated because his initial Notice to Appear lacked a date and time, but the court held that any defect did not warrant relief because he received subsequent notices, appeared at hearings, and suffered no prejudice. On the hardship claim, the court concluded that the Board reasonably applied the law to the undisputed facts, which showed typical family impacts from removal rather than the required extraordinary hardship. The Seventh Circuit therefore denied the petition for review.

immigration

Craig Canter, an AT&T premises technician whose duties included climbing tall ladders and lifting heavy loads, sought short-term disability benefits under the company’s ERISA-governed plan after developing migraines, dizziness, and lightheadedness. The plan administrator initially approved benefits but later terminated them when an independent medical reviewer found all diagnostic tests normal and noted progressive improvement in Canter’s self-reported symptoms. After exhausting internal appeals, Canter sued the plan and AT&T; the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the denial was proper because the plan required objective medical evidence of a condition preventing job performance and none existed. The court also reversed a small award of pro hac vice admission fees as non-taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 while upholding deposition transcript costs.

labor & employmentprocedure