Ann Claire Williams

Fredrick Michael Baer was convicted in Indiana state court of murdering a woman and her four-year-old daughter, along with related robbery, theft, and attempted rape charges, and was sentenced to death after the jury rejected his guilty-but-mentally-ill defense. He sought federal habeas relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington by failing to object to misleading jury instructions on the GBMI standard and to repeated prosecutorial misstatements during voir dire and trial that confused legal standards, implied life without parole might not be permanent, and referenced victim preferences for a death sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Baer's convictions but reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief as to the penalty phase alone. It held that the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no deficient performance or prejudice, because counsel's failures allowed the cumulative effect of the improper statements and instructions to taint the jury's sentencing decision and undermine confidence in the death sentence. The court therefore ordered a new penalty-phase trial while leaving the underlying convictions intact.

criminal lawprocedure

ADM Alliance Nutrition sued SGA Pharm Lab and its president for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that SGA had overstated the potency of Chlortetracycline supplied under a 2013 Purchase and Development Agreement, causing ADM to overpay more than $1.1 million and later pay an unwarranted $750,000 under a 2014 Termination and Settlement Agreement. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Termination Agreement’s broad release clause expressly covered all claims, known or unknown, against SGA and its officers, and that the agreement’s integration clause stated no other representations had induced the parties to sign. Because the Purchase Agreement’s Certificate of Analysis obligations did not survive termination and no continuing warranties about potency existed, the release barred both the contract and fraud claims. The court also upheld the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendants under the Termination Agreement.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

Sophie Toulon purchased a long-term care insurance policy from Continental Casualty Company in 2002 that included a ten-year premium rate guarantee, after which Continental raised her premiums by 76.5% in 2013. She sued on behalf of herself and others, claiming the insurer had used misleading sales practices to attract elderly buyers with artificially low initial rates while concealing plans for later large increases, and asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Toulon had not identified any false statement by Continental or any duty to disclose further information, had not alleged a deceptive act, material omission, or unfair practice under the ICFA, and could not maintain an unjust enrichment claim because the fraud and statutory claims were insufficient and an express contract already governed the parties’ relationship.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In United States v. Johnson and Lang, the defendants were charged under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) after traveling from California to an Illinois mink farm, releasing about 2,000 minks from their cages, destroying breeding records and equipment, and causing $120,000–$200,000 in property damage before being arrested en route to a second farm. They moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that AETA is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes protected speech or expressive conduct that causes only economic losses such as lost profits or goodwill, is void for vagueness, and violates substantive due process by labeling them “terrorists” for non-violent property damage. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute requires damage to tangible real or personal property and does not reach lawful advocacy causing only economic harm, that its terms are sufficiently definite to avoid arbitrary enforcement, and that Congress had a rational basis for using “terrorism” in the non-codified title given the statute’s focus on violent acts such as arson and bombings.

criminal lawfree speechproperty

In United States v. Reginald Walton, the Indianapolis Land Bank manager and his associate David Johnson were convicted of honest services wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and (for Walton) bribery after they exploited a nonprofit loophole to buy city-owned properties at low fixed prices and resell them for personal profit, resulting in a $282,782 loss to the city. On appeal, the defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for their fraud and money-laundering convictions, the district court’s jury instructions on bribery and the lack of a good-faith instruction, and the application of sentencing enhancements for abusing a position of trust and targeting vulnerable victims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences, holding that substantial evidence—including kickbacks and false statements—proved the required specific intent, that the jury instructions correctly required proof of bribes rather than gratuities and that a good-faith instruction was unnecessary given the intent element, and that the enhancements were proper because Walton held decision-making authority over Land Bank sales and the purchasers were low-income Hispanic families with limited English proficiency who had previously been defrauded.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

In United States v. Ali Al-Awadi, the defendant was convicted of making and attempting to make child pornography after, while alone with napping children at a daycare, he pulled back a four-year-old girl's underwear and took multiple photos of her vagina, claiming he was checking for injury after she hurt herself on his lap. Al-Awadi appealed, contending that the jury received improper instructions on uncharged evidence of digital penetration, that too much molestation evidence was admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted for the purpose of producing visual depictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, ruling that the pattern jury instruction correctly guided the jury on other-acts evidence while requiring proof of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, that the molestation evidence was admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 414(a) as relevant to intent and not unduly repetitive, and that the record—including the photos' focus on the genital area, the defendant's prior interest in the child, and his history with child pornography—provided sufficient support for the jury's findings.

criminal lawprocedure

Michelle Frakes, a special education teacher, sued Peoria School District No. 150 after receiving an “unsatisfactory” performance rating that placed her on a reduction-in-force list and led to her honorable dismissal. She alleged that the rating interfered with her rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because her preferred classroom methods were better suited to students with behavioral and emotional disabilities. The district court granted summary judgment to the district, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Frakes had not engaged in any protected activity under Section 504, because she never complained about disability discrimination or asserted students’ legal rights; her disagreement concerned only teaching methods, which the statute does not protect. The appeals court also ruled that the district had waived its res judicata defense by waiting more than a year and a half to raise it.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

Eric Wagner was convicted after a jury trial of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity by exchanging hundreds of messages with an undercover federal agent posing as a 15-year-old girl, arranging a meeting, and bringing condoms and sheets to the rendezvous. At sentencing the district court included uncharged, similar conduct involving another undercover agent posing as a 14-year-old in the guidelines calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(d)(1) and imposed several special conditions of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit held that the uncharged conduct qualified as relevant conduct and therefore properly raised the guidelines range. It affirmed the computer-monitoring condition because the district court adequately justified it, but vacated the adult-pornography condition as an improper delegation of judicial authority to the treatment provider and vacated the internet-access restriction because its wording was unclear and could be misread to allow child pornography. The court also clarified that Wagner had not forfeited his right to file a future § 2255 motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the death of 20-year-old inmate Alexander Orlowski from a methadone overdose at the Milwaukee County House of Correction. Correctional officer Irby Alexander observed Orlowski’s abnormal breathing and unresponsiveness around 3:45 a.m., logged the issue, and consulted Sergeant Anthony Manns, but the officers decided not to seek medical attention; Orlowski was found dead about three hours later. His estate and father sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation through interference with the father-son relationship. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on the estate’s Eighth Amendment claim, finding a genuine factual dispute over whether the officers were deliberately indifferent that a jury must resolve, but affirmed dismissal of the father’s claim because circuit precedent requires evidence of intentional interference with the relationship with an adult child, which was absent.

civil rightshealthcarefamily lawcriminal law

Jeff Monroe, a longtime Indiana Department of Transportation employee diagnosed with PTSD, sued INDOT and its commissioner after he was fired in 2013, claiming his termination violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because it was based on his mental disability rather than the stated reason of creating a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Monroe provided no evidence that INDOT’s proffered reason was pretextual or that his disability motivated the firing. It also found that the non-disabled comparators Monroe identified were not similarly situated, either because their misconduct was less severe and less prolonged or because they were covered by different employment rules after a 2011 policy change. As a result, no genuine issue of material fact existed on pretext or disparate treatment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case arose after James Franklin Perry died on the floor of a Milwaukee County jail facility less than 24 hours after his arrest by City police, during which time he suffered a seizure, received hospital treatment, and then displayed clear signs of medical distress—including labored breathing and bleeding—that went unaddressed while he was shackled and wearing a spit mask. Perry’s estate and son sued individual officers and nurses under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, brought a Monell claim against the City for an alleged policy of ignoring detainee medical complaints and in-custody deaths, and asserted state-law negligence and wrongful-death claims; the district court granted summary judgment to all defendants and imposed sanctions on plaintiffs’ counsel. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that the record (including surveillance video) created triable issues on the § 1983 claims because a jury could find the defendants failed to provide objectively reasonable medical care, and that qualified immunity did not apply since the right was clearly established by 2010. The court affirmed summary judgment on the Monell claim for lack of supporting evidence, held that the nurses were not entitled to governmental immunity under Wisconsin’s medical-discretion exception while the officers were, and vacated the sanctions award as resting on an erroneous legal premise.

civil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure

Mark Schloesser applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, alleging disability from physical impairments including back and shoulder issues with an onset date before his September 30, 2011 date last insured. An ALJ initially found him disabled and awarded benefits, but the SSA Appeals Council reviewed the decision on its own motion, reversed it, and concluded he was not disabled, a ruling the district court affirmed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that SSR 83-20 did not apply because there was no determination of disability after the insured period, and that the Appeals Council’s conclusions—that certain claimed impairments were not severe and that Schloesser’s residual functional capacity did not require off-task time or unscheduled breaks—were supported by substantial evidence from medical records showing largely unremarkable findings, symptom improvement, and lack of pain medication use through 2011. The court noted that later 2013 medical opinions limiting work capacity explicitly did not apply retroactively to the relevant period.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

Douglas Hicks was convicted by a Wisconsin jury of sexually molesting his former step-son after a recorded phone call in which Hicks made incriminating statements while the victim threatened him. He sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress the recording and by not objecting to the prosecutor’s improper rebuttal argument referencing Hicks’s prior similar case and plea bargain. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. It held that, even assuming the state court unreasonably credited counsel’s testimony that Hicks had not felt threatened, Hicks suffered no prejudice from the tape’s admission because other evidence of guilt was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The court further held that the claim regarding the failure to object was procedurally defaulted because Hicks had not fairly presented it to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

Otis B. Grant, a tenured African American professor at Indiana University South Bend, was fired in 2011 for serious misconduct after the university found he had repeatedly misrepresented his academic credentials and employment history on his application materials and curriculum vitae. He sued the university, its trustees, and several officials, asserting twenty-six claims that included race discrimination, retaliation for prior complaints, denial of due process, defamation in a local newspaper, and breach of contract based on the faculty handbook. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings on some claims and summary judgment on the rest. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Grant had produced no admissible evidence creating a genuine factual dispute on any of the five claims pursued, that the pre-termination process satisfied due process, that the handbook expressly disclaimed contractual rights, and that the defamation claim lacked proof of falsity.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

Robert Stinson sued a Milwaukee police detective and two forensic odontologists after spending 23 years imprisoned for a murder he did not commit, alleging they violated his due-process rights by fabricating bite-mark expert opinions that linked his teeth to the victim and by concealing their agreement to do so. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on qualified-immunity and absolute-immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the qualified-immunity rulings because the appeals challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it, which is foreclosed by Johnson v. Jones. The court did have jurisdiction over the absolute-immunity claims and affirmed their denial, reasoning that the alleged misconduct occurred during the investigation rather than in the course of preparing or giving trial testimony.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Russell Prevatte was convicted in 1992 under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for detonating a pipe bomb that killed bystander Emily Antkowicz, and a judge later imposed an enhanced sentence of forty-four years after finding the bomb caused her death. Prevatte filed a § 2241 habeas petition claiming that Burrage v. United States required the jury—not the judge—to determine but-for causation for the sentence enhancement, rendering his punishment illegal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the petition, holding that Burrage addresses the substantive causation standard rather than who makes the finding, that Prevatte could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal, and that trial evidence undisputedly established the bomb as the but-for cause of death. The court therefore concluded there was no miscarriage of justice that would allow relief under § 2241 after an unsuccessful § 2255 motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Flaviano Victoria-Faustino, a Mexican national, could be placed in expedited removal proceedings based on his 2000 Illinois conviction for obstruction of justice (providing a false identity during a traffic stop), which the Department of Homeland Security classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Victoria-Faustino did not contest that classification in his response to the Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order, instead raising only a fear of persecution. The Seventh Circuit held that it retained jurisdiction to review whether the underlying conviction qualified as an aggravated felony, notwithstanding the general jurisdictional bar and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Illinois offense did not meet the INA definition because it lacked the required nexus to obstruction of justice proceedings, granted the petition for review, and remanded for further proceedings.

immigrationcriminal law

This case arose after a Chicago condominium building suffered water damage allegedly due to a painting subcontractor's failure to apply adequate waterproof sealant, prompting the condominium association to sue the general contractor, developer, and subcontractors in state court for resulting property damage. Westfield Insurance, the subcontractor's insurer, then filed this federal action seeking a declaration that its commercial general liability policy imposed no duty to defend the defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding a duty to defend, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeals court held that the association's allegations of negligent workmanship causing damage outside the subcontractor's specific scope of work constituted an "occurrence" under the policy—defined to include continuous or repeated exposure to harmful conditions—and thus triggered potential coverage for property damage under Illinois law.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved three Milwaukee police officers discharged for cause by Police Chief Edward Flynn, whose pay and benefits ended immediately; they appealed to the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which upheld the terminations after hearings, and then sued with their union alleging they retained a property interest in continued employment and pay until the appeals concluded, in violation of due process and Wisconsin wage laws. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the defendants. It held that Wis. Stat. § 62.50, as amended in 2008–2009, gives discharged officers no property interest in employment or wages during the appeal period (unlike suspended officers), that the officers received adequate process through the Board hearings, and that legislative history confirms the deliberate removal of any post-discharge pay entitlement for officers terminated for cause.

labor & employmentpropertyprocedure

Rafi Sayyed pleaded guilty to mail fraud for directing overpriced contracts in exchange for kickbacks while working at the American Hospital Association and was ordered to pay $940,000 in mandatory restitution, of which over $650,000 remained unpaid. The government sought turnover orders to collect roughly $327,000 from his retirement accounts at Vanguard and Aetna to satisfy part of the judgment under 18 U.S.C. § 3613. Sayyed argued that the funds qualified as “earnings” under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and were therefore subject only to its 25% garnishment cap. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the turnover orders, holding that the CCPA cap protects only periodic payments pursuant to a retirement plan and does not apply to lump-sum distributions, especially where the defendant had an unrestricted present right to withdraw the full balance. Because the government could step into Sayyed’s shoes and exercise that withdrawal right, the retirement accounts were reachable in full.

criminal lawprocedure