This case involved a bankruptcy debtor's appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial of his motion for sanctions against a creditor and the creditor's attorney, as well as his request for a criminal referral to the U.S. Attorney. The debtor argued that the creditor's proof of claim for a prior judgment and subsequent pro se motion to vacate an order disallowing the claim were fraudulent or improper. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the filings were not frivolous or filed for an improper purpose under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and related statutes, and that the bankruptcy judge properly exercised discretion in declining to make a criminal referral under 18 U.S.C. § 3057 given the lack of reasonable grounds for believing a violation had occurred.
The SEC sued Joseph Apuzzo, former CFO of Terex Corporation, alleging he aided and abetted securities fraud committed by URI and its CFO through two equipment sale-leaseback transactions in 2000 and 2001 that involved hidden indemnification agreements and inflated invoices to mislead URI's auditor and overstate profits. Apuzzo moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the allegations showed only Apuzzo's awareness and participation in the underlying transactions on behalf of Terex, not that he substantially assisted the primary violation by URI. The court reasoned that Apuzzo had no duty to disclose the true structure to URI's auditor, did not authorize URI's conduct or enter arrangements on URI's behalf, and that mere approval of the scheme was insufficient to establish proximate causation under the aiding-and-abetting standard.
In this securities litigation, plaintiffs alleged that Xerox misrepresented the negative impacts of its 1998 worldwide restructuring and related Customer Business Organization reorganization, which allegedly inflated the company's stock price. The court addressed the lead plaintiffs' motion to exclude the expert report and testimony of Professor David Denis, who offered analysis of corporate restructurings, comparisons of Xerox's performance to peer companies, and critiques of another expert's methodology. The court denied the motion to exclude, concluding that the testimony met the reliability and relevance requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, as it addressed the materiality of the alleged misstatements and provided useful background on operational restructurings unfamiliar to jurors. The court further found that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any risk of prejudice, which could be addressed through a limiting instruction if needed.
This case involves a securities class action alleging that Xerox misrepresented the effects of its 1998 restructuring and Customer Business Organization reorganization, which plaintiffs claim artificially inflated the company's stock price. The court addressed a motion to exclude expert testimony from Anthony Saunders, Lee Buchwald, and Charles Drott under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards. The court granted the motion in part by excluding Buchwald's testimony entirely and barring Saunders and Drott from offering opinions on scienter or corporate state of mind, while denying the motion as to the remainder of Saunders's and Drott's proposed testimony. The core reasoning was that expert opinions must rest on reliable methods and facts, assist the trier of fact, and avoid direct conclusions about mental states that are reserved for the jury, with Buchwald's exclusion tied to disclosure or qualification issues.
The case involved McCrae Associates, LLC suing Universal Capital Management, Inc. and its officers and directors over the defendants' refusal to reissue stock certificates for 300,000 shares that had been issued to McCrae in 2004 in exchange for a nominal payment and alleged promises by McCrae's principal to provide services such as identifying acquisition targets and raising funds. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on claims including statutory theft, breach of fiduciary duty by officers and directors, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court granted the motion on all counts except the breach of fiduciary duty claims against defendant Queen, reasoning that there were no genuine issues of material fact supporting the theft, conspiracy, and CUTPA claims, that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred the conspiracy counts, and that disputed facts remained regarding whether Queen's actions in withholding the shares breached his fiduciary duties.
This case involved Scottsdale Insurance Company seeking a declaratory judgment against R.I. Pools, Inc. and related parties that it had no duty to defend or indemnify under commercial general liability policies for claims by swimming pool owners alleging cracking and deterioration due to defective concrete supplied by a subcontractor. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale. It reasoned that the underlying complaints alleged damages from faulty workmanship by R.I. Pools, which does not constitute an "occurrence" or "accident" under the policies, as faulty workmanship alone is not accidental, and any related damages from repairs or loss of use also do not qualify. The policies therefore provided no coverage for the claims or potential claims.